Hotmail  |  Gmail  |  Yahoo  |  Justice Mail
powered by Google
WWW http://www.JusticeForNorthCaucasus.com

Add JFNC Google Bar Button to your Browser Google Bar Group  
 
 
Welcome To Justice For North Caucasus Group

Log in to your account at Justice For North Caucasus eMail system.

Request your eMail address

eMaill a Friend About This Site.

Google Translation

 

 

Window On Eurasia: Russians View Spy Scandals As Proof Their Country Is Still A Superpower, Soldatov Says

posted by eagle on November, 2010 as Imperialism


WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2010

Window on Eurasia: Russians View Spy Scandals as Proof Their Country is Still a Superpower, Soldatov Says

Paul Goble

Vienna, November 17 – Because Moscow has in the best traditions of Soviet times played up the notion that all recent failures in Russia’s espionage activities are the result of traitors, the powers that be have reinforced the notion among most Russians that their country is still a superpower which can compete as equals with the United States, Soldatov Says.
Andrey Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru and one of Moscow’s leading independent specialists on intelligence operations suggests that the case of the two intelligence officers, Shcherbakov and Poteyev, that has attracted so much attention provides a key insight into how Russians view espionage and how Moscow plays on that view.
In an article in today’s "Yezhednevny zhurnal” entitled "Heroes and Traitors for Internal Use,” Soldatov argues that the recent story has "from the very beginning been constructured according to the laws of the Soviet spy mythology” in which the hero spy is confronted by the traitor and then is defeated by yet a third (ej.ru/?a=note&id=10560).
As Soldatov points out, "in the mythology of Soviet intelligence, treason always occupied a particular place.” Traitors were responsible for all failures, and consequently one had no reason to look for "shortcomings in the world of the special services themselves,” a view that former SVR spokesman Yury Kobaladze expressed last weekend on Moscow television.
As the case of the scandal about the Russian illegals in the United States showed, Soldatov argues, Russian society was split into "two unequal parts,” a small group of liberals who viewed this as a reflection of "the degradation of the intelligence service,” and "the enormous majority who viewed this story” very differently.
For the latter, the spy scandal was "testimony that Russia is still a super power which can on an equal basis compete with the special services of the United States,” an idea that is identical to the one that Soviet officials liked to promote during the Cold War. President Dmitry Medvedev "perfectly well” understands this and hence his playing up of these spies.
It is worth noting, Soldatov continues, that "the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is the only special service of Russia which was never reformed. In the early 1990s, the First Chief Directorate of the USSR KGB was simply separated from the KGB, and with that, the reform of this structure concluded.”
As a result, the Agentura.ru editor says, "the traditions of Soviet intelligence were not critically reviewed” and "the methods inherited by the Russian intelligence serve were those which had been developed in the first half of the 20th century,” traditions which continued by "inertia” even as they gradually decayed over the last 40 years of Soviet power.
The period of "the very greatest successes of Soviet intelligence” was the 1930s and 1940s, Soldatov writes, but "these successes were the result not of Soviet intelligence but of the Communist International” which linked together "convinced fanatics of the communist idea throughout the entire world.”
After Stalin disbanded the Comintern, "everything that happened with Soviet intelligence was an attempt to repeat its success.” And the way the Soviet intelligence service sought to do that was to "train its own citizens to pose as residents of the West,” the kind of illegals who were just exposed in the United States.
That led to the formation of two intelligence schools, one by the GRU and a second by the SVR to train such people often for years while the training course of intelligence officers in the US and Great Britain typically lasted only "several months” because they were not going to be used in the same way.
As was the case with many other Soviet institutions, corruption and nepotism contributed to the degradation of Soviet espionage operations abroad because "children of highly placed party leaders used the agent networks in the US and Western Europe as a great place to begin a career and a comfortable place to live.”
Recruitment of people like Hansen and Ames, Soldatov says, was "more the exception than the rule” and by the early 1990s, Soviet intelligence was "in such a deep crisis that party functionaries from the KGB fled to the West carrying with them lists of all the members of the party organization of the students at the [Soviet] intelligence academy.”
Over the last 20 years, Soldatov suggests, drawing on the testimony of a defector, the SVR has not changed from its focus on active measures such as disinformation and the dispatch of illegals as a substitute for the ideological loyalists it has not been able to count on since the end of the Comintern.
Moreover, he continues, "the declarations that traitors were responsible for the failure of the illegals reflect the traditional approach of the Russian special services, for whom the special services can only be guilty of an insufficiency of vigilance” against enemies internal and external.
As a result of this and the internal use of this case for the Russian leadership, the Kremlin not only did not raise the question as to whether illegals are a useful tool at the present but did not take advantage of this opportunity to "reform the SVR.” But another result of this case may matter even more: the FSB has gained the chance to expand its control over the SVR.

comments (0)


1 - 1 of 1

Post comment

Your name*

Email address*

Comments*

Verification code*







 RSS FEED


New Posts



Search Imperialism



Imperialism



Archive


 january 2015

 march 2014

 november 2013

 september 2013

 july 2013

 march 2013

 february 2013

 january 2013

 december 2012

 november 2012

 september 2012

 july 2012

 april 2012

 february 2012

 july 2011

 june 2011

 april 2011

 march 2011

 february 2011

 january 2011

 december 2010

 november 2010

 october 2010

 september 2010

 august 2010

 july 2010

 june 2010

 may 2010

 april 2010

 march 2010

 february 2010

 january 2010

 december 2009

 november 2009

 october 2009

 september 2009

 august 2009

 july 2009

 june 2009

 may 2009

 april 2009

 march 2009

 february 2009

 december 2008

 november 2008

 october 2008

 september 2008

 august 2008

 july 2008

 june 2008

 may 2008

 april 2008

 march 2008

 february 2008

 january 2008

 december 2007

 november 2007

 october 2007

 september 2007

 august 2007

 july 2007

 june 2007

 may 2007

 april 2007

 march 2007

 february 2007

 january 2007

 december 2006

 november 2006

 october 2006

 september 2006

 august 2006

 july 2006

 june 2006

 may 2006

 april 2006

 march 2006

 february 2006

 january 2006

 december 2005

 november 2005

 october 2005

 september 2005

 august 2005

 july 2005

 june 2005

 may 2005

 april 2005

 january 2005

 july 2000





Acknowledgement: All available information and documents in "Justice For North Caucasus Group" is provided for the "fair use". There should be no intention for ill-usage of any sort of any published item for commercial purposes and in any way or form. JFNC is a nonprofit group and has no intentions for the distribution of information for commercial or advantageous gain. At the same time consideration is ascertained that all different visions, beliefs, presentations and opinions will be presented to visitors and readers of all message boards of this site. Providing, furnishing, posting and publishing the information of all sources is considered a right to freedom of opinion, speech, expression, and information while at the same time does not necessarily reflect, represent, constitute, or comprise the stand or the opinion of this group. If you have any concerns contact us directly at: eagle@JusticeForNorthCaucasus.com


Page Last Updated: {Site best Viewed in MS-IE 1024x768 or Greater}Copyright © 2005-2009 by Justice For North Caucasus ®