Moscow sees Chechnya’s Kadyrov as a Silver Bullet for the North Caucasus
Publication: North Caucasus Weekly
May 22, 2009 01:49 PM
Category: North Caucasus Weekly, The Caucasus, North Caucasus

“We
have agreed, that we will fight against the militants together,
regardless of which territory they are in,” Chechen President Ramzan
Kadyrov stated on May 17 during a joint press-conference with Ingush
President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. “I have waited long for this day”
(Interfax, May 17). Kadyrov was visiting Ingushetia for the first time
since Yevkurov replaced his predecessor, Murat Zyazikov, in October
2008.
On May 16, the Chechen, Ingush and federal forces
launched joint operation in the border area between Ingushetia and
Chechnya—an operation that is ongoing. According to Kadyrov, the leader
of the Islamic separatists of the North Caucasus, Dokka Umarov, is
among the group of approximately 25 fighters that were trying to escape
encirclement by government forces (RIA Novosti, May 17). The
insurgents’ primary online resource, Kavkaz-Center, reported heavy
fighting in both the Chechen and Ingush mountains, but did not specify
the exact origins of the fighters. According to the website, government
forces used heavy mortars and helicopters and both sides suffered
several casualties (Kavkaz-Center, May 20).
During his meeting
with Yevkurov, Kadyrov proclaimed that Chechnya, Ingushetia and
Dagestan should join their efforts to quell the resistance put up by
Islamic insurgents in their respective regions. Kadyrov’s previous
attempts to infringe on Ingush territory in order to carry out attacks
evoked increased resistance from both the republican government and the
Ingush public. Numerous clashes have been reported between the Ingush
and Chechen police forces in the past, but now Yevkurov may well be
under pressure from Moscow to accept Kadyrov’s assistance in
suppressing the insurgency in Ingushetia. The substantial involvement
of Chechen military detachments in the operation in Ingushetia
highlights the higher level of Kadyrov’s involvement in the neighboring
republic.
Little progress has been made in bringing down
violence levels in Ingushetia since Zyazikov's dismissal last autumn.
Violent attacks by insurgents and heavy-handed punitive actions by the
government forces have become a daily routine in Ingushetia during the
past several years.
Exasperation over the actions of both sides
in the conflict—the government forces and the insurgents—has been
growing in Ingushetia steadily. On May 9, the parents of an alleged
insurgent gang member were killed in the settlement of
Ordzhonikidzevskya in Ingushetia. This was the first event of this type
in Ingushetia, and it strikingly resembles the tactics of threats and
killings of alleged insurgents’ relatives espoused by federal forces
and Kadyrov in Chechnya.
While offering his services in
Ingushetia, Kadyrov has been facing an increased level of attacks in
his own domain, Chechnya, and even in its capital, Grozny. On May 15,
two alleged suicide bombers killed four policemen in the vicinity of
the Chechen Interior Ministry building in the Chechen capital (North
Caucasus Weekly, May 15). Following the attack, Kadyrov’s forces killed
four suspected collaborators in the attack on the spot. Kadyrov’s
quick-tempered solutions to the problem of insurgency in Chechnya have
been criticized by human rights activists as illegal and essentially
leading to further radicalization of portions of the population.
According
to Kadyrov, no more than 50-70 insurgents remain at large (RIA Novosti,
May 16). Yet, the intelligence given by Kadyrov on the remaining number
of fighters have been notoriously unreliable, and were habitually
downplayed by Moscow and its representatives in Chechnya.
The
increased activity of the insurgency in Chechnya comes as an
embarrassment to Kadyrov, given that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
solemnly abolished the counter-insurgency operation regime in the
republic on April 16. The Memorial human rights group has reported that
following the official ending of the counter-insurgency operation
regime in Chechnya, young people have been increasingly pressured by
Kadyrov’s forces (Kavkazky Uzel, May 20).
In the meantime
Yevkurov has imposed peculiar night guard duties on civilian government
employees, in what seems to be a naïve attempt to widen the social
support base for his policies. The employees have to maintain vigilance
alongside with the police, but without arms and corresponding training,
essentially becoming human shields for the police forces (Prague
Watchdog, May 16). Unarmed civilians observing civil order were fairly
common across the country during the Soviet period, but at that time,
no clandestine forces outside the government were armed with grenade
launchers and other weaponry routinely used by the insurgents in the
North Caucasus.
Both trends—the application of harsh,
semi-legal tactics to quell the insurgency in Ingushetia and elsewhere
in the North Caucasus, and recalling ghosts from the Soviet past, like
civilian vigilance patrols—indicate a certain crisis in the thinking of
the federal and local governments.
Having virtually eliminated
representative democracy on the federal level, Moscow does not accept
the fact that this cannot be done so easily also on a local level. As
the former president of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev has repeatedly pointed
out, the long term solution for stability in the North Caucasus is
restoring popular elections for regional governors. Moscow is still
grappling to understand why what works in Moscow and elsewhere in
Russia backfires in Ingushetia and other republics of the region. Of
course, in the current political environment it is hard to imagine that
Moscow will start democratizing the North Caucasus in order to avoid a
further escalation of violence.
At stake here is not only the
fate of the North Caucasus region, but the future of Russia as a whole.
If Moscow opts for a return to elections in Ingushetia, it will be
harder for it to ignore calls for the liberalization of Russian
political space elsewhere. That will essentially mean putting an end to
Putin’s power vertical—an outcome hardly acceptable to the current
Russian leadership.
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