From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng (Original Message) Sent: 2/9/2008 5:49 AM
© RIA Novosti
Military Spending Gets Second Look
17/01/2008
MOSCOW - The Russian defense industry, like any modern institution, plans ahead. Thus Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the General Staff of Russia's armed forces, told a Federation Council meeting in mid-November 2007 that "we have already started creating a new program to last until 2020."
As a result, this year promises a lot in armaments, both strategic and conventional. At the end of December, General Nikolai Makarov, chief of armaments and deputy minister of defense, said that the first nuclear submarine armed with the Bulava missile would join the navy this year. He also revealed that an entirely new tank would start entering service in 2009, following its tests this year.
That is all fine if Russia is really going to play a key role in global affairs. But there is another question concerning the new armory: Why exactly do we need a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, in addition to a new tank? Although to question the defense ministry may seem unpatriotic, let us pause and think.
The Bulava missile (named RSM-56 in international treaties, and SS-NX-30 as NATO's codename) is Russia's latest solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is a product of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering, which is also credited with designing the Topol-M ground-based missile.
The theory is that the new missile, when installed on the new Project 995 Borei-class missile submarines, and used in refitting one of the Project 941 Akula boats, will add a new punch to the Russian navy's strike power. This is doubtful.
To begin with, the Bulava is a half-baked product. It was first tested in December 2003 and has since had only six firings, four of which failed. During one reportedly successful launch, not all of the warheads behaved as predicted. Thus, to include such a weapon in the regular inventory in 2008, even if there are two further successful launches, would seem to be a stretch of faith.
In comparison, the American Trident-1 missile had 25 flight tests before it entered service; only three were aborted. Nor does the Bulava's record match the standards of previous Russian missile tests. For example, the RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) medium-range missile endured 21 launches - all of them successful. Moreover, no complaint were made when the missile was later used by the troops. The RS-12M Topol (SS-25) and the RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27) each had only one abortive launch out of 13.
But, most importantly, the Russian navy already has a fine liquid-fuel SLBM, or the RSM-54, and its latest version Sineva R-29RMU (Skiff SSN-23), once more successfully tested in December. The RSM-54 and the Sineva, which has a service life of several decades, have four and ten, respectively, individually targetable reentry vehicles. Each has a yield of 100Kt.
The RSM-54 can also be mounted with a HEF warhead of about two tons of conventional explosives for use in a non-nuclear conflict, or with a low-yield nuclear warhead (equivalent to up to 50 tons of TNT) for pinpoint strikes.
Given this successful history, it remains mystery as to why the navy needs an unproven, under-tested missile.
Sea-based solid-fuel missiles are not Russia's strong point. True, Akula-type submarines were once armed with solid-fuel RSM-52s. However, their Bark modernization program was discontinued following several abortive launches. If the thinking behind the new sea missile is confused, the motives for developing yet another combat tank are equally murky, and require no small amount of research to understand.
For the record, Russia has five combat tanks in service: the T-62 and the T-64, which are no longer produced; the T-72, which has spawned further versions, such as the modified T-80 and T-90, which have the status of new tanks.
Only a handful of battalions in Russia are equipped with tanks of the last type, and both the T-80 and the T-90 have much room for improvement - especially in their propulsion machinery, the weakest point of Russian tanks.
So, even without a new tank project, arms companies such as Uralvagonzavod should have their hands full, primarily in the field of research into turbo-diesels, which showed such fine performance in the mid-1980s. These machines successfully replaced the fuel-guzzling and notoriously fickle gas turbine engines on the T-80s.
Incidentally, the T-90'S robust diesel engine has won it enviable fame on the export market, yet the tank has a small presence in the Russian armed forces themselves! How do we account for such a contradiction? In 2001, India signed a contract with Russia for the delivery of 310 T-90 tanks; in early December, India was reported to have ordered another 347 machines.
Of course, the technological process cannot be stopped, but the designer's ideas that stem from a pool of technological data are one thing, while accepting nostalgic reports of weapon success are quite another.
By Andrei Kislyakov, RIA Novosti political commentator
http://www.mnweekly.ru/comment/20080117/55303742.html
