From: MSN Nicknamelove_caucasus (Original Message) Sent: 6/21/2007 9:47 PM
THE CHECHEN KALEIDOSCOPE OF COUSINS
THE CHECHEN KALEIDOSCOPE OF COUSINSCHECHYA, 17 April, Caucasus Times – Moscow has started a risky experiment in Chechnya: the leading figures in the Republic’s executive branch are almost all close relatives of President Ramzan Kadyrov. Instead of a hierarchy of power, there is now a hierarchy of cousins of a magnitude that puts Yeltsin’s one-time “family” to shame.
Until now, there had not been a case on the federal subject level where a president’s cousins occupied the posts of both Prime Minister and Vice-Premier. For example, the former head of Dagestan’s state council, Magomedali Magomedov, built and fortified his clan for many years, but as an experienced Soviet executive, he was careful to stay within “sensible” limits and mind the federal center. Moscow has traditionally declared its objection to a clan-based organization of power. In conducting his cadre policy, the deceased president of Kabardino-Balkaria and a political long-liver, Valerii Kokov, also had to keep this factor in mind.
It would seem that events of the past two years in these two republics should have alarmed the Kremlin, especially given that the appearance of rebel groups in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkarii was caused largely by their mafia-like power-structure, which made fighting them with any means other than military impossible. A less distinct, but generally similar system has formed in Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Ingushetia.
The new national elites, failing to find common ground with the established family clans, seek ways of achieving their political goals by means that are far from political. In Dagestan, this materializes in repeated terrorist attacks; in Ingushetia, several of President Murat Ziazikov’s close relatives have been kidnapped. First was the latter’s father-in-law, and now his uncle. According to many reports, the kidnappers’ main goal was not so much the ransom money, but rather a message to the regional leader that it is time he made changes to his policies, including cadre policy.
According to some, the security forces’ successful destruction of Shamil Basaev last year only became possible after former FSB general Murat Ziazikov took measures in response to his father-in-law’s kidnapping. In Ingushetia, they say that one of the conditions for the old man’s release was the removal of his son-in-law from the presidency. Ziazikov supposedly accepted the conditions and then proceeded to eliminate those to whom the promise was given.
The story of the execution of seven people – business competitors of the President’s father-in-law – shows that in order to maintain and secure their power the current political elites in the Northern Caucasus act much like criminal gangs – through simple physical elimination of their opponents.
The Russian president’s plenipotentiary in the Southern Federal District, Dmitry Kozak, emphasized on several occasions that the key problem facing the southern federal subjects is the clan-based nature of power. The old national elites don’t share with the new, and the conflicts intensify. In the end, tensions break out into armed fighting. This is exactly what happened in Kabardino-Balkaria, except the organizers of the Nalchik attack, which was essentially armed revolt, used religious slogans to mobilize support. In the present context, it should be noted that in their struggle for a place under the sun the interests of “new non-Russians” in the Northern Caucasus often coincide with the aims of extremist groups, including religious extremists. The key aim is the overthrow of present regimes, which cut off the air supply for the entire population, and the restructuring of power and property ownership.
Another peculiarity of the events unfolding in the Northern Caucasus is that by supporting the clans that have been in power for many years, and by doing nothing to stop the development of new ones, like it is happening in Chechnya, the Kremlin is essentially making the Russian state another player in the region’s clan wars. This circumstance causes distrust towards the federal center’s regional policy, because the local population has begun to regard Moscow as a “cover” for local mafia clans’ struggle for power. The worst part is that Russia is being equated with the local Mafiosi.
A year ago, Alu Alkhanov, who was at that point the Chechen president, devoted almost the entirety of his annual address to the Chechen people to discussing the dangers of the clan-based organization of power in the region. Not long before his dismissal, Alkhanov returned to this theme, but concentrated only on one aspect of the problem: the consequences of the cult of personality being formed in the Republic. Why these warnings went unheeded, and why the Kremlin allowed Ramzan Kadyrov to install his relatives in all modestly important positions in the Republic, is no longer important. It is now impossible to avert the crisis that will result from the current balance of power in Chechnya. The notion that Ramzan Kadyrov has complete control of everything in the Republic and that he will not let go of the reins is nothing but an illusion.
No one would be likely to enter a debate over the differences between, say, pictures of the earth taken from a plane versus a satellite. In each of the Northern Caucasian republics there are “topographical” details that are impossible to see from the Kremlin’s altitude. The distinctive feature of Chechnya’s political topography is the vacuum that has, in recent years, been forming around the elected or appointed leaders of the Republic. A rarified space, which only the select could enter, existed around party secretary Dokka Zavgaiev, presidents Dudaev and Maskhadov. The same crystal sphere was beginning to form around Akhmat-Hadzhi Kadyrov. After his tragic death, this principle was adopted entirely by his heir and taken on frighteningly hypertrophied forms over the last two years.
The fact that the political elite now regards the clan as a Moscow-approved, if not Moscow-developed, model of government has, first of all, led Ramzan Kadyrov to see no one but his cousins as suitable candidates for Premier and Vice-Premier.
Second of all, it is now fairly clear that Ramzan Kadyrov’s substitute bench is more than short and is limited, again, to his own kin. Where, for example, does a non-poor non-peasant go? To the opposition? But in a clan-based dictatorship political opposition is, by definition, non-existent, and even a threat to one’s life, given the present conditions in Chechnya. Therefore, the only way is a time gap, in which a viable opponent to the current regime could emerge – an opponent who, like Ramzan, would not hesitate to spill blood. This was the exact kind of figure that Dzhokhar Dudaev became in the early 90’s. This was the exact kind of leader that Shamil Basaev was in the scheme that operated under Aslan Maskhadov.
Third, unlike, say, Dokka Zavgaiev, Ramzan Kadyrov has very hazy notions of the mechanisms involved in developing an economy or a social structure. It is impossible to compensate for incompetence. Neither the head of the Chechen state, nor his entourage, it seems, suspect that the reserve of violent means using which they establish order, is not only finite, but works as a kind of boomerang, coming back to take a toll on whoever launched it. The scandalous ignorance of the government is already being exploited: it thoughtlessly signs documents that essentially postulate socialist agricultural methods. Without the slightest doubt, Ramzan Kadyrov listens to reports on successful plant-sowing in the wintertime. The only ones who don’t feel guilt and shame are the leaders themselves, and the ministers who lie to them.
And finally, the Northern Caucasus in general, and Chechnya in particular, is a territory where many forces are in motion. Political clichés don’t work here for decades. Ramzan Kadyrov is the biggest cliché of a military-political leader, who, the Kremlin thinks, will sort out everything in the region. To have faith in the boundless power of Ramzan’s political hierarchy is no sin. The mistake is not thinking of the consequences that the existence of such a hierarchy could bring about – as well as the consequences of its failure.
Adam Sadaev, Grozny, Caucasus Times
http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=12425
