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Photo from www.smi-nn.ru
Russia Has No Real Enemies — Defense Minister

Created: 15.06.2005 18:27 MSK (GMT +3), Updated: 18:32 MSK > document.write(get_ago(1118845947)); </SCRIPT>

Svetlana Babayeva

Profil

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, in an interview given to the Profil magazine, talks candidly on what Russia’s military influence in the post-Soviet bloc, the <NOBR>CIS</NOBR>, really means, and whether the preemptive strikes his doctrine stipulates could have been used to quell the revolutions that have mushroomed in Russia’s backyard. But just who are this nuclear power’s real enemies?

A year and a half ago, in a document titled the “Ivanov doctrine”, Russia proclaimed the right to preemptive strikes against CIS countries. In light of the events in the last months in the former Soviet states, why didn’t you strike?

I want to remind you that preemptive strikes do not mean military action or attacks on this or that country, in our understanding. We identified right away what we meant: a preemptive strike is possible when it averts a terrorist threat to Russia. And only when we are 100 percent certain of where and when the threat is coming from. We have proclaimed that right, and we will stick to it. If it comes down to that, we will make a strike.

So during the latest events, in particular in Uzbekistan, Russia did not find enough basis for a terrorist threat?

No direct threat, no. A threat of serious destabilization in the Ferghana Valley region, shared by three countries, was developing. It was connected not only with fundamentalist values brought into the region; there was the factor of a weak socio-political setting that also played a negative role, and only helped the extremists act in such a way that led to such severe outcomes. Such a series of events had been predicted, but Uzbekistan is a sovereign state that is not part of any military-political bloc. And the question of intervention or of sending Russian troops to help President Islam Karimov was not a priori considered.

Unlike Kyrgyzstan. During the uprisings, the question was considered, but in a different dimension: if the looting, killings and robberies did not stop in one night, we were prepared to send military transport planes to evacuate Russian citizens whose lives were in danger.

The approaches demonstrated by Russia in relation to Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan testified that Moscow was determined to employ its entire foreign policy arsenal. This was underlined by your statements that in certain cases Russia could “correct its military planning principles.” There was a perceived readiness to transfer personnel and equipment to places where Russia does not yet have a presence. But in reality it turned out that Russia is accepting everything that is being done on its borders by the citizens of those countries or third states. And this led to questions about what Russia wants as opposed to what it can do.

We never considered sending troops into any CIS country without an official request from that country’s leadership. Also, in the document that you cited, it clearly says: the uncertainty factors are increasing. The main issue is in operatively reacting to a situation. We clearly proclaim: today we do not see any military enemies in the classic sense of the word as it was understood, say, 50 years ago. There are no direct military threats to Russia issuing from CIS territories. Other threats – demographics, migration, drugs, terrorism – yes. But not in the classical military sense. Is any CIS country prepared to attack us?

They are all sovereign states. Trying to stop history... is counterproductive by definition. Another case is that we must – and here I agree with you – clearly formulate what are the possible consequences – economic, visa, policy, etc. — if this or that CIS state starts changing its policy towards Russia. I believe that often we don’t articulate clearly enough our policy regarding other CIS states, and act too timidly in regards to economic influences on the relations these countries have to Russia.

How will relations between Russia and China develop in the next few decades? This includes the European Union possibly lifting the weapons embargo?

Although the embargo question does not concern us, I believe that it will not be lifted in the near future, and this will be quite painful for China. But if it is lifted, nothing would change considerably. First of all, the European Union introduced strict limitations on any military production shipped to China. Secondly, I dare say that of all other countries, Russia is the most familiar with the needs and and the future modernization of the Chinese army. We have deep, long-term military-technological cooperation. The Europeans cannot ship the technology that China needs. Yes, they can ship certain radio equipment, reconnaissance equipment, and we are not afraid of that. But in the near future, we will remain China’s main shipper of arms and certain military technology.

Can China present a threat to Russia in the near future?

I don’t think so. First of all, we are already members of a regional organization — the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation. Recently, we removed one of the last splinters in our relations – territorial demarcation – as unfortunate as that was for many other states. Our trade volume and the areas of cooperation are widening. Where the military aspect is concerned, there is an agreement that lifts tensions along the entire Russia-Chinese border – there are no deployed units on either side. And the last thing, I noticed a strong interest in joint military training between Russia and China – the first in history – planned for this August. The People’s Republic of China has never before conducted joint military training with a foreign state.

What is your opinion regarding the prospects of cooperation with India? The Russian military cannot ignore the fact that the United Sates has changed its relations with India. The United States is already taking part in arms tenders. Moreover, we must look at Russia’s involvement in the context of its political cooperation with some other countries. In particular, there is a dilemma: cooperation between Russia and Israel on the Indian market and Russia’s simultaneous shipments to Syria.

Here national interests come forward, in particular commercial ones. It would not be right if we get upset every time our traditional partner includes other countries in its tender. On the contrary, we must be prepared to be competitive on any market. As regards cooperation, today there are no governments in the world that produce the entire range of military equipment, and that is not necessary. Even the United States buys some of its weapons from abroad. And we have reached that point as well.

Does Russia still intend to continue shipments to Syria?

We look at the balance of forces in the entire region and we are not interested in an escalation of tensions. We never intended to ship the Iskander missile complex to the Middle East. Where the Strelets is concerned, I am grateful to Israel for the fact that the whole world now knows what a Strelets is, and that it is not a transmittable zenith rocket complex. The shipments will continue, they do not destabilize the situation in the region.

Don’t you think that maintaining our traditional markets is justified from the economic standpoint, but not the political? Perhaps more cooperation with Israel would give a major technological boost to Russia itself? Maybe we should strive for other, more advanced markets through cooperation with other countries?

It is naive to reason this way. We will not reject the Middle East. We have one criteria – whether the weapon is permitted for export. By your logic, selling so much as a bullet to Syria would provoke an outcry. Moreover, we ship weapons to the Arab states to a considerably lesser degree than the United States. And sometimes our rivals ship some things... Who, for example, sent Iran a centrifuge for enriching uranium?

Is it possible that an agreement on mutual nuclear inspections will be signed, as the United States is insisting?

It cannot. Moreover, the question was never raised. There is a shift in understanding. Starting in 1993, there was the Nanna-Lugara program, which stipulated technical aid for Russia in physically guarding a number of objects where usable nuclear materials are stored. But the program never dictated visits to the objects. Each of the sides invites the other for a visit to the so-called outer perimeter. Where the latest talks are concerned, the reason for them is the mythology that nothing in our country is guarded, that you can easily steal a nuclear bomb, etc. We accept aid, but it does not go towards physically guarding the objects but towards utilizing nuclear carriers that are no longer in use, such as submarines, lowering the risk not so much of leaking nuclear materials, but the environmental risk.

http://www.mosnews.com/interview/2005/06/15/ivanov.shtml