A Crack in the Caucasus Wall

An infuriated Moscow condemned as "propagandist” and "provocative” the Georgian government’s move last month to ease entry restrictions for Russian citizens from seven North Caucasian republics bordering or near Georgia.

"The aim is to simplify contacts between the bandit underground in the North Caucasus with the Georgian bandit underground and Georgian official policy,” Alexander Torshin, deputy head of Russia’s upper house of parliament, told the Interfax news agency on 13 October, the day the new rules came into force.

Georgian authorities cited mostly humanitarian and commercial reasons for the snap decision to allow most Russian citizens living near the border to enter Georgia for up to 90 days without a visa. The relaxed regime has not been extended to residents of the Krasnodar region, which borders the breakaway Abkhazia territory. Only Vano Merabishvili, the outspoken minister of the interior, said bluntly that the move would provide North Caucasians with an opportunity to come into contact with the West via Georgia. The move would help integration between Georgia and this region suffering under the "terror” imposed by Russian federal forces, Merabishvili said in an interview with Rustavi 2 television on 16 October.

The Kazbegi crossing on the Georgia-Russia border seen in 2009 after completion of modernization work by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. USACE photo by Carol Davis.

Georgian journalist Georgy Zedgenidze in an article on the Slon.ru website proffered one of the more convincing explanations for Georgia’s decision. "The true motive for the opening of the border lies in the Georgian leader’s attempt to create a more attractive image of Georgia among the nationalist, but secular and peaceful elites, as well as ordinary peaceful residents of the North Caucasus.”

Tens of thousands of ethnic Georgians as well as Ossetians with strong connections to Georgia live in the North Caucasian republics, most of them in North Ossetia. There is also a sizeable Chechen diaspora in Georgia that formed following the two Russian-Chechen wars and whose members fear returning to Russia but would be happy to see their relatives. For the first 10 days of the visa-free regime, an estimated 70 people from the North Caucasus crossed into Georgia at the single open crossing point. Some, however, reportedly were turned back by Georgian border guards.

The most eloquent sign of North Caucasian governments’ approval of the Georgian gesture was their almost total absence of reaction, given the extremely strained relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. Initially, only the president of Karachay-Cherkessia made some critical remarks. Authorities in the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia also refrained from criticism of Tbilisi.

Even the authoritarian ruler of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who regularly makes statements on Russia’s foreign policy, remained silent until a few days ago, when he reacted to the reported sighting of a Georgian-born gunman in Chechnya by denouncing the Georgian decision, saying, "The first thing Tbilisi probably hoped to achieve was to drive in this manner [easing travel restrictions] a wedge between Russian citizens residing in the south of this country and other regions.”

Reactions in Georgia itself, however, embraced a number of critical voices.

"Does it follow that we will feel better protected now that any person can freely cross into Georgia from this extremely unstable and crime-stricken region where people are armed to the teeth?” wondered journalist Margarita Akhvlediani in the Georgian magazine Liberali. "The attempt to improve relations with our neighbors is unrealistic, even if we deceive ourselves to imagine, for example, that they are simply North Caucasians and not Russian citizens,” Akhvlediani wrote.

The first deputy of the Georgian Foreign Ministry, Giga Bokeria, defended the government’s approach: "Unlike the Russian government, we are guided by opposite aims regarding its citizens. We want them [the North Caucasians] to have the opportunity to travel to Georgia easily, study at our universities, and undergo medical treatment at Georgian facilities. We want them to form an appropriate opinion of Georgia and see that it is a country where there are lots of opportunities; that it is not a hostile country.”

The situation in the North Caucasus has been very unstable for years. This year the number of attacks increased more than fourfold in comparison to 2009, according to a statement by Russian Deputy Prosecutor-General Ivan Sydoruk on 25 October. Violence by suspected militants also worryingly sprang up this year in the Kabardino-Balkaria republic, which had been largely free of large scale violence. A website that focuses on reporting from the region, Caucasian Knot, counted 25 deaths among police, officials, and their relatives, as well as 44 deaths among the suspected militants in the easternmost North Caucasian republic of Dagestan alone in the period from 1 September to 10 October.

Since the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and subsequent recognition of its breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two countries have had no diplomatic relations, opting for Swiss representation in their respective countries. Georgia’s nearest neighbors to the north had been practically deprived of the opportunity to travel to Georgia because of visa restrictions. The only border checkpoint recognized by both sides, at Upper Lars/Kazbegi in North Ossetia, was closed by the Russian side in 2006 following the arrests of several alleged Russian spies in Georgia. It reopened in March, but at Russia’s request Georgian border guards have not issued entry visas. With the new rules, the Georgians have not formally broken, rather bypassed, the agreement with Russia.

A source in Chechnya said people in the republic in general perceived the Georgian government’s move to remove additional hurdles for the North Caucasians as a conciliatory gesture to improve relations with Chechnya, despite the fact that Chechens fought against Georgians in the August 2008 war in South Ossetia.

"Opening the Georgian borders to the North Caucasus may have a significant impact on democratization of the region as the locals will have more opportunities to study in Western-type educational facilities in Georgia and also to become more independent economically,” the North Ossetian political analyst Vissarion Aseev said. According to Aseev, Moscow reacted so nervously because it feared losing control over the North Caucasus but felt politically constrained not to counter a Georgian policy of open borders.

BORDER WAR BY OTHER MEANS

Knowingly or not, Georgia’s decision mirrored a move by Russia in 2000, when Moscow imposed a visa regime for citizens of Georgia proper while unilaterally allowing those from the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to travel to Russia without a visa, despite protests from Tbilisi. In a reaction to Georgia’s easing of travel restrictions, on 14 October the Russian Foreign Ministry denied that it had any problems with the Georgian people. "We have problems only with [President] Saakashvili’s regime, which will not keep quiet,” the statement said. However, the history of Moscow’s more than a decade of support for the breakaway regions underlines that the Russian leadership’s dislike for Georgia’s flamboyant president does not explain the full scope of Russian-Georgian tensions, as Saakashvili came to power only in 2003.

Russia has applied visa diplomacy in other regions as well. In 2008 President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree allowing the Russian-speaking stateless residents of Latvia and Estonia to visit Russia without obtaining visas. As was reported by the Russian government official paper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the Latvian and Estonian foreign ministers only learned of the decree from the media.

Visa manipulations now appear to have backfired on the Russian government in the area where it feels the least comfortable – the North Caucasus, with its volatile situation, separatist aspirations, and insulation from the outside world. Violence in the region has been on the rise since the August 2008 war. While Georgia seems to be the weaker side in the duel with Russia, paradoxically, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has made it a more cohesive state. Even though the Georgian government is adamant about its wish to regain control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that prospect seems so distant that it is bound to have progressively less impact on Georgian politics. There is more consistency emerging in the Georgian approach to the wider Caucasus region. On 25 October Georgian Reintegration Minister Temuri Yakobashvili announced new, simplified rules for civil society organizations wishing to work in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 3 November Georgia and Iran signed an agreement allowing visa-free travel for both countries’ citizens.

Georgia appears to be taking seriously the policy of open borders in the region. Russia on the contrary is yet to find a lasting and acceptable solution to the increasing instability in the North Caucasus.