THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSO-ABKHAZ-GEORGIAN TENSIONS: TURMOIL IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

In light of USSR’s disintegration in 1992, a power vacuum was created in Georgia and the rest of the Caucasus fostering a bloody uprising in the Abkhazia region. Since then, most of Abkhazia has been autonomous from Georgia’s central government. Tbilisi has conducted occasional attempts to reclaim the region; only to be thwarted by Russia. Moscow after all, wholly supports the Abkhaz separatists and other secessionist movements throughout the country, including South Ossetia’s. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was the epitaph of that.  Tbilisi’s dream of regaining complete control of the whole region is unlikely in the near future. But there is another dimension that influences this. It is the centuries-long feud between the Georgians and Abkhaz; and Russia’s manipulation of tensions as a means of retaining geopolitical influence in the Caucasus. The following is a succinct analysis on why it is so.

Both the Abkhaz and Georgians are descendants of ethnically related Caucasian tribes that have been quarrelling with each other for centuries. Abkhazia has been sporadically occupied by the more dominant Georgia since the 10th century; when it was taken over by the Georgian Bagratid Dynasty. The Bagratids were eventually ousted by the Ottomans, who made Abkhazia a vassal state and kept tensions between both groups at bay. However, the Russian Empire’s annexation of both Abkhazia and Georgia in the early 19th century prompted greater tensions between them. One of the earliest forms of this was St Petersburg’s instigating land redistribution and taxation aimed at marginalizing the Abkhaz. The Akbhaz retaliated by rebelling against the Russian imperialists in 1867. Around 200 000 people or half of the Abkhaz population were expelled from their homeland throughout the 1870s. This led to Czarist-encouraged immigration of foreigners, primarily Russians and Georgians. Abkhaz systematically became a minority in its own country and was integrated with Georgia.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR granted Abkhazia its own autonomous republic. Yet privilege was revoked by the ethnic Georgian Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1931 when he reintegrated it with Georgia in order to strengthen the status of his ancestral country. Stalin afterwards further endorsed ethnic cleansing of Abkhaz by promulgating Georgian assimilation policies which included banning the Abkhaz language, closing down their schools and purging prominent Abkhaz. It is true to note that with the Stalin époque long gone by the 1970s, an Abkhaz national movement succeeded in petitioning for establishing an Abkhaz University in the  capital, Sukhumi. Regardless, the Abkhaz identity was still a shadow of its former presence in the USSR’s declining years. In fact by 1989, Abkhaz only constituted 17% of Abkhazia’s 525 061 inhabitants while the dominant Georgians constituted 44%.

Not content with years of ethno-cultural and political suppression by Georgia, Abkhaz nationalists took advantage of USSR’s fragmentation by rebelling. This was instigated on 9 April 1989, known as "The Bloody Sunday” when there were armed clashes between Georgians and Abkhaz. By August 1990, Abkhazia declared separation; ensuing civil war. Eventually, Georgia became independent when USSR was dismembered in 1992, yet Abkhazia’s sovereignty was not recognized. Although Abkhaz leaders were in negotiation with the Gamaskhudia government for a peaceful settlement, Eduard Shevardnadze carried out an illegal coup and became Georgia’s president. He cut off discussions with Abkhaz leaders and reinstated the 1921 Constitution.  This did not permit an Abkhaz Republic to have an equal federative relationship with Georgia. Abkhaz nationalists were against it as it made Abkhazia totally subjugated to Georgia. So they decided to implement the 1925 Constitution guaranteeing equal status for Abkhazia and declared independence from Georgia in 1992.

Still wanting to retain Georgia’s possession on as much land as possible, Shevardnadze and the Georgian military retaliated to Abkhazia’s secession by conducting an extensive armed crackdown against its nationalists and militias. Abkhazian separatists were able to repel successfully the assault from Georgian forces thanks to the thousands of volunteers from the North Caucasus (particularly Chechens) and local Russians and Armenians. The guerrillas received financial assistance from the Abkhaz Diaspora. Unfortunately during the infighting which peaked in 1993, there were many atrocities committed by soldiers on both sides against civilians. The famous one was the 27 September Sukhumi Massacre when Abkhaz militias tortured and murdered thousands of Georgian civilians. As a result of the violence, nearly all Georgians fled Abkhazia. The war ended when an UN-sanctioned ceasefire was implemented under Russian guidance in December 1993. Abkhazia has since then been autonomous from Georgia.

However, Russia continually comes into the picture of the tumultuous Abkhaz and Georgian relationship. Russia has been manipulating both peoples since Colonial and Soviet times (previously discussed) in order to geopolitically control their regions. Despite losing Abkhazia, Georgia and huge swaths of Eastern Europe and Central Asia when USSR collapsed, Russia was determined to have as much political, economic and military influence on former Soviet Republics in these regions; now known as the Near Abroad Policy. Its involvement in Abkhazia is a prime example. After all, it is believed that Russia was the one that sent the North Caucasian militias to combat with Abkhaz during the war. It is also confirmed that Russian forces fought alongside them against Georgia. Today, Moscow still provides Sukhumi economic and military assistance; thus preventing Tbilisi from ever regaining Abkhazia. Even though current Georgian President Mikheil Shakashvili tried to achieve that militarily in 2008, Russia responded with a full-invasion of Georgia; with its soldiers within sights of Tbilisi.

This has ensured Abkhazia’s freedom from Georgia for many years to come. Aside from its Near Abroad Policy objectives, Moscow wants to use Abkhazia as an excuse to counterbalance Shakashvili’s pro-Western stance in international affaires. But even if Georgia was Russia-aligned, Abkhaz are generally happy with being separate from Georgia, despite the lack of international recognition of their republic. They faced decades of ethno-cultural and political marginalization when integrated with Georgia. With this history, they are content with the current status quo. It therefore does not seem an end is within sight of the quarrel between Georgia and Abkhazia. This is certain to remain as long as Russia persistently instigates conflict between them in its favor.