April 7, 2010
Crossing the Mountains
Comment by Sergey MarkedonovSpecial to Russia Profile
Georgia’s Wish to Challenge Russia in the North Caucasus Is Tempered
by a Sober Understanding of the Diplomatic and Political Implications
The Georgian Parliament has received a petition asking its
deputies to pass a legal and political judgment on the events of the
1860s and 1870s in the Northern Caucasus and to acknowledge the
"genocide” of the Circassian people during this era. The initiative
came from the participants in the aptly titled forum "Suppressed
nations, ongoing crimes: the Circassians and the peoples of the North
Caucasus between the past and the future,” an event that could have got
lost in the myriad of seminars and round tables that take place in the
Georgian capital were it not for its unusually influential organizers
- the Jamestown Foundation, an American think tank, and Mikheil
Saakashvili’s personal education project, the Ilya Chavchavadze
University.
But it’s not just the prominence of the forum’s organizers that makes
the issue relevant. Firstly, following the "five-day war” of August
2008, Georgia suffered its most sensitive national trauma since the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. In 1992 to 1993, when the
"rebellious republics” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia de facto seceded
from Georgia, they did not receive international recognition. But in
2008 the two former Georgian autonomies were not only recognized by
Russia, they also received a territorial increment in the shape of the
Khodori Gorge, the Akhalgorsky District and the Liahvsky Corrdior.
Georgia, for its part, took in dozens of new refugees and suffered a
blow to its hopes of quick north-Atlantic integration and of any kind
of support on behalf of the United States and the EU. In these
circumstances, the country is looking for ways to use its relatively
few resources to influence Russia.
This task is made easier by the fact that a number of similar
"problematic knots” also exist on the other side of the Caucasian
mountain range, where Russia is battling against Islamic radicalism and
ethnic nationalism that, although suppressed, has not been fully
eradicated. Hence Georgia’s attempt to open a north-Caucasian vector in
its foreign policy. Its national Parliament already has an
interfactional contact group on the North Caucasus, and it is this
group that is the main lobbyist for legally recognizing the Circassian
"genocide.” Georgian Parliamentary Deputy Gii Tortladze believes that
"the demand of the Circassian people is rather legitimate.”
Secondly, Tbilisi has made no secret of its wish to prevent the Winter
Olympics from taking place in Sochi in 2014. From the point of view of
many of Georgia’s politicians and experts, both opposition and
pro-government, holding the games at the famous Russian resort will
make Abkhazia’s secession irreversible. Meanwhile, Sochi is not only
the capital of the future Olympics and a favored vacation destination
for many, but it is also an important place in the history of the
Greater Caucasus. It was here on May 21, 1864, in the Kbaade commons
(now called Krasnaya Polyana and the site of the Russian president’s
summer residence), that the victory over the Adyg (i.e. Circassian)
militia was celebrated – the Russian Empire’s last victory in a
Caucasian War that lasted for nearly half a century.
For many Caucasian peoples, and primarily for the Circassians, the
success of the Russians in the 1860s marked the beginning of forced
immigration. The Circassians’ departure from their historic birthplace
was not always connected to Russian coercion, since these decisions
were often made under pressure from Ottoman diplomats and spies. But as
a result, tens of thousands of Circassians ended up beyond the borders
of the Caucasus. Today there are an estimated 2.5 million of them in
Turkey, Syria and Jordan. At present it is impossible to figure out the
actual number of Adyg diasporas in these states, because their census
data was gathered either according to religion (and not ethnicity), or
to the native language (after nearly 150 years, most descendants of the
Adyg immigrants speak Turkish and Arabic).
However, some (although not all) nationalist Adyg organizations view
these events as "genocide.” This approach has supporters both inside
Russia and outside it, in the Circassian disaporas in Europe, the
United States and the Middle East. In the present-day political
environment, the Georgian authorities are interested in using this
factor to rock the "Sochi boat” – especially since the Olympic Charter
explicitly forbids competitions from being held in places of massive
ethnic cleansing.
However, what are the chances that the Georgian lawmakers will want to
take the next step toward aggravating the relationship with Russia? On
the one hand, by playing this combination Tbilisi will create a schism
in the alliance of the Abkhaz and Adyg nationalist movements. The
recently established Georgian-Adyg friendship has no solid tradition.
At the beginning of the 1990s, members of various Circassian national
movements often showed solidarity with separatist Abkhazia, even
against Moscow’s will. Acknowledgement of the Circassian "genocide”
will also become an additional international means of putting pressure
on Russia (the way the Armenian genocide is being used to put pressure
on Turkey).
But on the other hand, escalating tensions will create new problems for
Tbilisi. This step will put Georgia at cross purposes with Armenia
(Yerevan has called on Tbilisi more than once to acknowledge the events
of 1915 as genocide). And having on its territory the problematic
Armenian populated Dzhavakheti region, Georgia is not likely to want to
ruin its relationship with its neighbor. The fact that the Adyg
organizations’ call for the recognition of "genocide” did not receive
any substantial international support, although appeals have been made
to the UN, the U.S. Congress, and the European Council, also speaks
against Georgia. Inside Russia, the Adyg have three republics where
they are considered as the "titular” ethnic group (the Republic of
Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia), and their
representatives are part of the government and business elites.
Today, any actions taken in Tbilisi and Moscow are extremely painful.
In an interview with Kommersant on March 31, Secretary of Russia’s
Security Council Nikolai Patrushev noted a possible "Georgian trace” in
the recent bombings on the Moscow metro. Meanwhile, it is important to
understand that the Georgian authorities, who want a strategic
partnership with the United States, are very fearful of radical
Islamist activity in the North Caucasus, especially since Doku Umarov
names not just Russia, but also the United States and Europe as his
enemies. Tbilisi is willing to support ethnic nationalists (Circassian,
Ingush, Chechen), but it is openly afraid of "Islamic internationalism”
because of its own vulnerability in the regions of Pankisi and Kvemo
Kartli. All this forces the Georgian authorities to moderate displays
of their negative feelings toward their northern neighbor. Even Mikheil
Saakashvili’s team does not want to be left to deal with the "Caucasian
Emirate” alone. Such considerations are likely to have a restraining
influence on those enthusiastic for recognizing the Circassian genocide
and destabilizing the situation in the North Caucasus.