The choice is not yet made

In his article The choice of unfreedom, Sergei Gligashvili puts his finger very neatly on the point of contact between the jihadism of Dokka Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate quasi-state and the version of post-Ichkerian Chechnya headed by Ramzan Kadyrov. The dilemma for Chechens who have not yet made up their minds is indeed not an enviable one.

Like Mr. Gligashvili, I believe that were Russia to leave the North Caucasus today, this would not automatically lead to the establishment of a just and free political system in the region. Moreover, it is quite possible that of the two evils – Kadyrov and Umarov – the people of Chechnya would choose Kadyrov, as Islamist theocracy, at least in its Umarov form, is incompatible with any freedoms, public or private. On the other hand, Kadyrov’s dictatorship may evolve into a more flexible political system through unification with Russia as a whole.
 
Closely examined, the difference is not very great. Kadyrov also imposes strict state control on morality, justifying it either by Chechen tradition or Sharia law. But compared to Kadyrov, Umarov looks a pale and faceless figure who has opted for a program that will require an unprecedented scale of violence, as it will meet with strong opposition not only from the Moscow-backed authorities but also from most of the region's population.

The ideological gap between the supporters of the Caucasus Emirate and the official government is certainly greater in the other North Caucasus republics than it is in Chechnya. This is on the one hand because Kadyrov and Umarov are competing for the title of true Muslim ruler and interpreter of Sharia, and on the other because in the other republics the people are less religious and are therefore less inclined to support the jihadist movement. Thus, if the Caucasus Emirate’s chances of victory in Chechnya are small, in the other parts of the Caucasus they are even smaller.

This would be good news, were it not for two circumstances. First, the cause of the Caucasus Emirate attracts young men and is provoking a civil war in the North Caucasus (let us call things by their proper names), while in no way contributing to the development of civil society, to the expansion of civil liberties or to progress in general. Second, the alternative to the Caucasus Emirate – pro-Moscow loyalism – cannot be seen as a way out. Loyalism is the other side of the same coin, for although it is a more flexible version of unfreedom than jihadism, its rejection of democracy is just as aggressive. And there are also more fundamental problems.

According to the Russian sociologist Dmitry Furman, the democratization of a continental empire like the Russian one cannot but have an effect on its colonial margins. As a result of the democratization which took place in the 1980s and 1990s, Russia first lost its constituent republics and then its ethnic provinces. Of the latter, Chechnya is the most glaring example. Russia’s reply to this process was to roll back democratic reforms in order to avoid the state’s collapse. The rollback took place not only in the North Caucasus, but also in Russia itself.

This argument leads to at least one optimistic conclusion: not only does the democratization of the North Caucasus depend on Russia’s democratization, but also vice versa. Either the North Caucasus will become independent, or Russia will subject it completely to its will.

But what would a “third way” – an alternative to loyalism and jihadism – look like in practice? I believe there are many options. Let us suppose that today the ideas of separatism – under the flag of nationalism or Islamism – not only continue to have relevance, but actually draw more supporters. In that case it should be possible to have a free debate about the peoples’ right to self-determination. When it becomes acceptable freely to express the view that the region’s republics have the right to secede from the Russian Federation, the opponents of separation from Russia will inevitably appear. The participation of supporters of democratic reform will widen the scope of the public debate that is presently dominated by loyalists and jihadists. This is bound to lead to a reduction in the level of violence. The outcome of such a discussion might be a shift in the paradigm of North Caucasus development – from civil war to a respectful dialogue between the citizens and the state.
 

Photo: InfoZoom.ru.

(Translation by DM)

http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000024-000005-000007〈=1