Three Years After Nalchik, North Caucasus Resistance Remains Potent, Deadly Force

But other political and economic factors may also be in play across the region, including the conscious rejection of a corrupt political system and the lack of employment opportunities. In a prescient analysis, presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak warned then-Russian President Vladimir Putin in the early summer of 2005 that high-level corruption, clan ties, cronyism, incompetence, economic stagnation, unemployment, and poverty in the North Caucasus could lead to a sharp rise in radicalism and extremism across the entire North Caucasus and parts of Stavropol Krai.

Some of the young Ingush who participated in the June 2004 attacks said at the time that they joined the resistance after their male relatives disappeared without a trace after being arbitrarily detained by local security services. In Chechnya, dozens if not hundreds of men, and some women, still join the resistance forces every year. Threats by Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov to hold responsible the parents of young men who do so have failed to stem the outflow. "The New York Times" reported on September 29 that the Chechen authorities have launched savage reprisals, such as torching the homes of fighters' families. The paper also quoted Grozny Mayor Muslim Khuchiyev, a close associate of Kadyrov, as warning that the authorities will not permit families to bury slain insurgents.

The abortive Nalchik attacks nonetheless marked a turning point in terms of military strategy. Since then, the resistance has eschewed spectacular large-scale operations in favor of a lower-level war of attrition targeting primarily local police and security personnel, but also increasingly local government officials and representatives of the pro-establishment clergy.

There are several possible explanations for that decision. The first is that the heavy casualties suffered by the Nalchik attackers, and the large number (more than 100) of innocent civilians injured in the crossfire highlighted the risks of launching such attacks by largely untrained fighters in an urban environment.

The second is the generational change within the upper echelons of the resistance command following the deaths of Maskhadov, in March 2005; of his successor, Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev, in June 2006; and of Basayev, in July 2006.

Attacks On A Grand Scale

Maskhadov had repeatedly impressed on his men the need to abide by the Geneva Conventions and to avoid civilian casualties. Basayev was the last senior field commander with tactical experience in planning and implementing attacks on a grand scale. It was Basayev who masterminded the Budyonnovsk hostage taking in June 1995; multiple attacks in June 2004 on police and security facilities across Ingushetia; and the Beslan school hostage taking in September 2004. He also claimed responsibility for the October 2002 hostage taking at a theater in Moscow.

True, Umarov, now aged 44, who succeeded Sadullayev as Chechen president and resistance commander in June 2006, is a veteran of the 1994-96 war, during which he fought under, and presumably learned much from, Basayev. But the remaining commanders of the various fronts and sectors are men in their 20s and early 30s. With the exception of the Ingush Amir Magas (Akhmed Yevloyev), who took part together with Basayev in the attacks in Ingushetia four years ago, their combat experience is limited to small-scale ambushes and hit-and-run operations. Only in Chechnya does the resistance still periodically mobilize up to several hundred fighters to take on local armed units loyal to Kadyrov.

Finally, the resistance has demonstrated it is capable of inflicting comparable casualties at far less risk to its own men by systematically targeting either police patrols or small groups of police or Russian troops. The death toll among police, Russian Interior Ministry forces and other security personnel in Ingushetia since January this year has already exceeded 50.