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Anatoly Chubais on Putin, Khodorkovsky, SPS
17.06.05 Friday
By Yevgeny Kiselev, Moskovskie Novosti editor-in-chief
While Anatoly Chubais sees all the flaws and shortfalls of Russia's ruling establishment, he does not refuse to cooperate with it - at least with the part thereof that is ideologically close to the Union of Right Forces (SPS)
Anatoly Chubais was interviewed by Yevgeny Kiselev, Moskovskie Novosti editor-in-chief, the day the sentence was delivered for Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev.
What do you think about this harsh sentence?
I find it gruesome. I don't understand what objective it is supposed to achieve. I don't understand the necessity, the expediency - strategic or tactical - of such a stiff penalty. Frankly speaking, I don't even want to delve into the charges, collate them with the articles of the Criminal Code. My basic position has not changed: From the very outset I have been categorically opposed to Khodorkovsky's arrest, and saying it loud and clear. I have always thought that this whole story from beginning to end - if this is the end - has done both the ruling authorities and the country as a whole far more harm than good.
Specifically what harm?
It is obvious. Two months ago I was travelling abroad in London and the United States, meeting with about 70 investors, waxing enthusiastically about reform of the energy sector and the future energy market in Russia. The first question that my interlocutors invariably asked was about Yukos and Khodorkovsky. It has caused colossal damage to Russia's image - above all, to its investment image.
This is a typical case of selective application of laws since 90 percent of the charges brought against Khodorkovsky could be easily brought against 90 percent of Russian businessmen.
But it was you who wrote the laws that brought about Khodorkovsky and other businessmen.
That's right.
I remember very well the first time I interviewed you: December 1992, the launch of the privatization program. At that time you made what I believe is a key comment, to the effect that high-paced privatization pursued a political objective - namely, to create, within the shortest possible time span, a class of property owners that the ruling establishment could rely on. Do you feel a measure of guilt for the hasty, haphazard manner in which privatization laws and regulations were made and for the way they have backfired now?
Was there a possibility of making these laws from concrete?
So you think that everything was done just right?
I believe that we made thousands of mistakes and I am ready to enumerate and spell out many of them. But there is one criterion that outweighs everything else. You have quoted me accurately enough: Indeed, that was how everything was being done then. Now ask yourself this question: Did private property appear in Russia? Did the capitalist class appear in Russia?
They most certainly did.
Full stop. That's the end of the debate. We did what we were supposed to do.
Are you not afraid that we are now on the verge of seeing this class of property owners becoming dispossessed?
As long as private ownership exists - and I believe that it will exist in Russia for thousands of years to come - there will be this wish to destroy it.
To divvy it up, share it out, appropriate it.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether I am afraid of it or not. What is relevant is how I assess the risks.
So how do you assess the risks?
The Khodorkovsky case has increased the risks drastically. This is why I was so opposed to it in the first place. Let us forget for a minute about those who organized the Khodorkovsky case. Let us take the country as a whole. How does it relate to privatization? Negatively. This is in May 2005! This, I believe, is a deplorable fact. It is a wound that can only be healed by time. It must not be reopened, as is being done by Zyuganov and Rogozin. Property is that foundation on which the entire economy rests. This is not a matter of figures - it's about values and mentality. Property is not a deed issued by the State Property Management Committee. It is an association that is evoked in the minds of 140 million citizens when they hear the word "property": whether or not it can be taken away - lawfully or unlawfully, rightly or wrongly. As long as the negative attitude remains, the ruling authorities, if they are concerned about the country's future, must do everything to minimize rather than maximize the risk, which, regrettably, was exactly what the Khodorkovsky case actually did.
The sentence has now been delivered: nine years for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev each. Are we going to see more such cases?
Are you asking whether I am going to be next?
Yes, among other things.
I would not like to speak about myself, even though I am ready to comment on this. But my feeling is that the excessive severity of the punishment is an indication that the ruling establishment cannot afford a repetition. Any new attempt on such a scale within the next two or three years will irreparably destroy (which has not happened yet) the possibility of any consolidation of the political elite in 2008. This is a key to preserving the continuity of power, which I consider to be a very important objective.
What do you mean by the continuity of power? That new ruling authorities will roll out a new case with a clear-cut political subtext, continue the crackdown on the mass media, and use the judiciary as a bludgeon or a lock-pick, depending on the task at hand - to punish an opponent or to divvy up property?
You have just enumerated some negative characteristics of the current political process. We could mention more or we could look on the positive side of the situation. I have a very simple criterion for continuity - specifically, the attitude of new rulers to previous rulers.
Do you mean that those who will come to power after 2008 must not reverse the positive processes that were started by their predecessors?
I can put it more bluntly: If new rulers come to power under the slogan "Put the Putin Gang on Trial!" this would be a catastrophe for Russia.
I believe that the permissible gap, the margin of difference between the future and previous ruling authorities, is still very narrow - due to the extreme institutional weakness of the establishment as a whole. Consider the public attitude to the Russian government, the State Duma, the Federation Council and the courts. The attitude to the political parties, the business community, the mass media and the leading state and public institutions is on the whole skeptical, contemptuous, and cynical - even downright antagonistic. This is why the country cannot afford a radical change of power since the consequences may prove disastrous.
Do the incumbent ruling authorities preserve continuity with regard to their predecessors?
Absolutely. Yes, their policy is to a very large extent different from that of their predecessors. Please note that I am not passing any judgment, saying that this is bad and that is good. Although I categorically reject certain things, right now I am trying to evaluate the changes, the reform process on a different level of understanding. So I believe that Russia's present ruling authorities have not overstepped the limits set by Russian history. They make a number of steps that put the situation on the brink of disaster, but it is not over the edge yet - at least that's the way I see it. If in the three following years the government stays the course (it is necessary, above all, to maintain the macroeconomic course) but implements no serious reforms in other spheres (which is in fact the most likely scenario), the aggregate impact on the economy will be positive because the foundations are in place that, without external intervention, are conducive to development. It is extremely difficult to reverse the recuperative growth of GDP - it is moving under its own steam.
You spoke about the weakness of political parties, but we can see the party-building process being cynically manipulated; you spoke about the weakness of the parliament, but it is also being turned into an institution that is obedient to the executive branch of government. The ruling establishment is using these institutions for transient, time-serving political objectives, thus weakening them.
Undeniably, many charges could be brought against the ruling establishment on the parliamentary process, political parties, and the mass media. Yet it would be absolutely wrong to expect that the problems will be resolved once it has mended its ways. Unfortunately, the Russian people's attitude to parliament in recent years, during Putin's presidency, has not changed in any visible way. Be it 1995 or 2005, the people absolutely do not perceive it as an embedded institution of state power in the country. The federal parliament, the regional parliaments, or the municipal legislative assemblies do not mean a thing to the people.
Now the political parties. We can make 150 charges on this score.
So what? What do political parties mean to the people today? Look at the ratings: There are some evaluations there - "positive/negative," "trust/do not trust," etc. - but there is simply nothing behind them.
And this also holds true for the SPS?
Absolutely. Mind you, I am not talking in terms of "pro-Putin/pro-democrat," but trying to take it to a higher level of analysis. Consider this: A tent has been put up on the asphalt, its pegs are not secured, and this is where we live. There is a sudden gust of wind and it is gone. Nobody has put down roots. Supposing as of 9.00 a.m. next Monday the ruling authorities stop using the courts. What will be happening there?
Clearly, the people will have no respect for the judiciary until they have seen that the courts can really mete out justice.
That's one way of looking at it.
What does it take to do this?
You want me to be frank? I don't know. It is not like building a house - it's rather like growing a tree. It is a process with different time parameters. You do not get particularly involved in the process; you come back in half a year and see that it keeps growing and strengthening. The wind or hurricane may have broken some of its branches (i.e., due to ill-treatment by the establishment), but it survived, while what was rotten just fell to the ground. It is a process on an entirely different level, a different time scale. I have no simple answers here.
What is to be done for the people to start respecting political parties? Putin has to start respecting them first? Oh, come on.
Still, what is to be done with the SPS? What should it be like? Should it be a party that will fit into the party system devised by the Kremlin? A party that will serve as an umbrella for pro-Putin liberals? Or an avowedly opposition party that will serve as a lightning rod for the liberal protest mood?
First of all, for all the criticism of the ruling establishment, Putin's steps in amending the electoral law are in fact aimed at strengthening the parties as a political institution. I for one do not agree with the idea of appointing rather than electing the governors, but if this idea is viewed calmly and objectively, in context with the ongoing moves to create federal parties and introduce party lists for State Duma elections...
Including the raising of the election bar?
That's right. This may be bad for the SPS, but I am now talking not about the SPS but parties as a political institution. Party lists on the regional level are far more important than raising the bar. Surely you will agree that there is clear logic here: When you have federal parties in a regional parliament, these parties elect their deputies to legislative assemblies, while these deputies elect governors. For all the superficiality and apparent rubberstamp nature of this process, the establishment is obviously interested to see political parties as something more meaningful. Here I wholeheartedly support Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
The second part of the question is how the SPS casts itself with regard to its position toward the establishment as a whole and Putin in particular. There is no consensus on this within the SPS.
Which position do you tend to favor?
As is known, the electorate, especially during election campaigning, understands such slogans as "Down with so and so" and "Hurray!" much better than such turns of phrase as "on the one hand, this is so, but on the other..." These risks are obvious to us, especially considering that we saw them in two nationwide election campaigns - one being a resounding victory for us and the other a crushing defeat. Nonetheless, the SPS electorate includes a considerable proportion of accomplished people who are part of the political establishment and - both in the narrow and broad sense of the word - part of the elite. Incidentally, I find the regional elite far more important than the federal one. Journalists, state and government officials, businessmen, and politicians are accomplished people who are put off by the slogan "Down with Putin's Fascist Regime!" And it would be wrong to lose them. On the other hand, there are people who are far more negative toward Putin, and they are also part of our electorate. The task of our party, as well as of any other party, is to reach out to its electorate to the maximum degree possible. This is why I favor both trends. Although being as I am "Putin's notorious stooge," I advocate somewhat more loyal positions than some SPS members.
In other words, supposing you receive a cynical offer from Vladislav Surkov (Putin's deputy chief of staff) that the SPS take part in some party building project - for example, there has been much talk that the right, liberal wing may be cut from United Russia and incorporated into the SPS - will it be an offer that cannot be refused? Otherwise you will not be able to clear the 7-percent hurdle, even if you come to terms with Yabloko and other parties. But then you could get 10 or 15 or even 20 percent.
I believe that if the party is ready to reform itself, if it has increased its membership (to 50,000 as of January 1), it should interact with different forces on a broad scale. The position advocated by forces acting under the slogan "Down with Putin's Political Regime" is preposterous. Especially given that these forces are increasingly siding with the Communists, which is absolutely unacceptable to me. So I consider cooperation with the ruling establishment, at least with the part thereof that is ideologically close, a viable proposition.
Does the election of Nikita Belykh as the SPS' new leader mean that Chubais' line is prevailing?
In answer to your question I will once again cite the Khodorkovsky case. When the sentence was delivered, I wondered whether I should call Nikita Belykh and ask him to say something on the issue.
Aha, there you are: Chubais is still calling the shots: He phones Nikita Belykh and dictates the text of a statement to him.
Please note: I said I wondered whether Nikita should be given a call and asked to make a statement. But then I clicked on the Interfax site and saw that his statement was already there. I am ready to subscribe to every word he said.
Well, your tried and trusted man, Leonid Gozman, is by his side, and he must have proposed the correct decision to him.
I don't think so. Nikita is in Perm, while Gozman is in Moscow. Read Nikita's statement - an extremely harsh judgment on what has happened.
It is an open secret that you [RAO UES Unified Energy Systems] hold a large stake in REN-TV; there are persistent rumors that you are going to sell it or that you have already sold it with much speculation around the name of the buyer. Could you clarify the situation?
Certainly. The formal side of the matter is simple. Some time in the spring of 2003 we received the decision by the board of directors about the expediency of selling off this non-core asset. We have since been considering various sell-off options. The substantive side is even simpler. As a result of the ongoing reform, RAO UES is to disappear with the assets being divvied up proportionately between its shareholders. The state owns a 52-percent stake in our shareholding structure. This means that 52 percent of our assets go to the state. I consider it wrong if, as a result of this, REN-TV becomes state-controlled, even if by 52 percent. I believe it would be more appropriate to sell it to a private investor. Yet because the deal has not been finalized yet, I am not prepared to disclose the details.
When is it going to be finalized?
It should have been finalized a long time ago, but this has not happened yet.
There has been persistent talk on the market that the buyer was chosen for you by the Kremlin.
I am aware of this talk, but will only be in a position to confirm or deny it only when there is a buyer. Thus far there is none.
Will you try to do something to ensure the continuity of editorial policy?
We certainly will. It should only be understood that the owner is the sole guarantor of continuity.
Now one final point. Your personal fate. Could it be decided at the upcoming annual UES shareholders meeting?
No. This does not fall within its purview. A shareholders meeting is a strictly regimented process whose agenda was approved a month ago by the board of directors and may not be reviewed. But there are two aspects here - formal and substantive. I have always said that if the owner tells me that I as a manager do not suit him for some reason, I will quit immediately.
Is it enough for the president to request your resignation?
That's right.
You have not been asked to resign yet?
No.
Could you be asked?
This is quite possible.
What would you do then?
I will resign.
And then?
I don't know.
You have never thought about this?
Frankly speaking, I am not given to navel-gazing hypochondria. Right now I am only concerned with restoring the normal operation of the power grid after the accident.
MN File
FACT BOX
Anatoly Chubais
Born June 16, 1955 in Belorussia, into the family of a military serviceman.
Education: the Leningrad Palmiro Togliatti Institute of Economics and Engineering (LIEI, 1977); Cand.Sc. (Econ.) (1983).
1977 through 1990, LIEI junior lecturer, assistant professor.
1984-1987, leader of an informal circle of "young economists," formed by a group of alumni of the city's economics institutes. In 1987, was closely involved in founding the Perestroika Club in Leningrad, designed to advance liberal ideas among intellectuals.
In 1990, deputy, first deputy chairman of the Leningrad City Council, chief economic adviser to Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak.
From Nov. 1991, chairman of the RF State Property Committee (GKI).
June 1, 1992, appointed first deputy chairman of the RF government in charge of economic and financial policy.
July 1996, appointed RF presidential chief of staff.
March 1997 through March 1998, first deputy prime minister and finance minister of Russia.
May 1997 through May 1998, a member of the RF Security Council.
April 1998, elected chairman of the RAO UES Board.
May 2000, elected co-chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Right Forces (SPS), a Russia-wide political organization.
January 2004, resigned as SPS co-chairman; elected to the party's Federal Political Council.
Anatoly Chubais is married with a son and daughter.
***
On May 25, 2005 power went out in large parts of Moscow and surrounding regions for several hours, and President Vladimir Putin blamed UES chief Anatoly Chubais for the outage. Chubais was quick to assume personal responsibility and apologized for the inconvenience. "UES and its chairman are responsible for energy supply," Chubais said. "I don't take responsibility off myself." However, addressing a session of the RF Security Council on the 25 May power outage, President Putin lashed out at UES management, but stopped short of blaming Chubais personally.
http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2005-22-19
