From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 4/14/2005 4:00 AM
April, 14, 2005

Is “velvet revolution” possible in Russia ?

Some analysts and experts interpret the process of regrouping of forces in the CIS as something responding to the reality of our time and fitting with the natural logic of the civilized development that should not be resisted, or, in other words, it would be out of place to resist it.

Others evaluate the processes taking place today as the result of the collisions of global geopolitical interests in the Eurasian territory, first of all, that of the USA that is often in variance with the interests of Russia .

And in both cases it is clear that Russia loses its influence in the post-soviet space.

Meantime, despite the alarming symptoms, Putin persistently declares that relations of Russia with the countries of CIS are a priority of the Russian foreign policy. However, according to the majority of experts, Russia failed to provide a basis for realization of the given priority of Russian Foreign Ministry.

First, the events in Georgia, and then, in full measure, in the Ukraine, have showed that in each of these countries Russia, guided by its own interests (however, it is difficult to say with certainty, whose interests were in reality), tried to realize its course, though, it should be admitted that very unsuccessfully, and it has brought to coolness of Russia's relations with these countries, as well as with Europe and the USA. But in Kirghizia , at first sight, all happened not very painfully for Russia .

Ukraine and Georgia , in contrast to Kirghizia , are trying to pursue their independent from Russia policy. Georgia is more confrontational that is demonstrated by the guess-work about “Russian trace” in the recent death of Premier Minster Z. Zhavania, as well as the discord with regard to settlement of conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to say nothing of the friction concerning the Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.

Ukraine is trying to cut its own window through Europe and at the same time, to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia . Presenting new chief of the Internal Ministry of Ukraine on 8 February, Victor Yushenko said: “I set him the first task – that is the development of policy concerning Russia … This is necessary for integration of Ukraine in the EU. It is impossible to go to Europe with three-four suitcases of problems with Russia ”.

According to Yushenko, “the development of relations with Russia and integration in the EU do not contradict one another. These are two harmonized directions. Integration in the EU is a strategic objective of Ukraine ”.

And, in the end, foreign police of Ukraine should be understandable, successive and public” in order to make it possible for “ Ukraine to be held in respect both in Moscow and in Brussels ”.

How are these statements taken by Russia ? What ' s its priority in foreign policy now ? If it is as before the development of relations with the countries of CIS, what can be done with the new priorities of these countries?

Did Russia draw any lessons from the events in Georgia and Ukraine ? I would not like to mention Kirghizia in this context, as it produces an impression that a dirty show was staged there by Russia .

The fact of the matter is to know what Russia is for the Near East . Is it an attractive ally for the countries of the Middle East, a partner and a guiding line, or it is a structure that puts obstacles I the way of their advancement in the direction of the West, Europe, etc.

I would not adhere to any of the above-mentioned viewpoints, if the problem concerns all the countries as a whole. Today CIS is a very contradictory and to some extent amorphous structure. The same contradictory and diverse was the Soviet Union .

There are countries in CIS, where most progressive groups of the population – various strata of society, significant part of the youth, significant part of the elite look toward the West, and not simply look toward the West because of ideological identity, but also want to follow the route that has been passed by the Baltic countries, for example, which, on the one hand, form part of the post-soviet space, and on the other hand, have become the members of united Europe, joined the North Atlantic bloc and European Union.

I doubt it is worth the reader's attention whether these plans are well-grounded or not, for example, for Ukraine , Georgia , Moldova and Byelorussia . The fact is that in these countries, which have a chance to unite with the West, Europe , significant part of the establishment will make this process more active.

Perhaps this is less urgent for Byelorussia today, however, the opposition there has stirred the masses to greater activity, and the process, to all appearances, will be continued.

Therefore, Russia is a hampering factor to Georgia , Byelorussia and Moldova – for significant part of their establishment, for various strata of society, for the ambitious, educated and advanced part of the population, who provided support to the “orange revolution” in Ukraine – to all this strata Russia hampers the realization of their intentions, their plans.

At the same time, judging by the situation in Central Asia , it should be noted that there is no perspective of Euroepan integration because they are too far from Europe , This refers to Kirghizia , where, at first sight, nothing has changed thanks to the “revolution”: Akaev was replaced by Baikov, who is much more oriented on Russia than his predecessor.

An absolute majority of the elite in Kirghizia is concerned with the peaceful development of events, with various versions of succession of “bey-khan type” authority. For lack of the pluralistic traditions there, wide sections of the population are mostly oriented on the clannish authority than, for example, in Georgia or Ukraine , as they see no Western-European perspectives for their country.

This can be said with regard to the all post-Soviet countries of Central Asia . The “Westerner” opposition in these countries is minority, and rather opportunistic one, which tries to use some symbols of the “velvet” revolution, such as, for example, yellow in Kirghizia.

As a matter of fact, there was no revolution in Kirghizia – the Kirghiz opposition failed to carry out a real revolution because there was no ground for revolution there. In Kirghizia it was only an imitation of revolution, a mechanic imitation.

Russia plays quite another role for the central Asian countries, than for Ukraine and Georgia . In central Asia Russia plays the role of a partner, “big brother”, who actively but not very busily interferes in the home affairs of his “younger brother”, being well aware of the fact that there is no need to be too much obstinate in this region, as these countries are very loyal and servile to the Russian invaders. That's why Putin was so indifferent to the events in Kirghizia – all roles had been distributed, all lines had been redacted.

In this connection, I would like to remind you of Askar Akaev's flattering aphorism: “If Russia had levied war on us, we would have surrendered at once!”.

That's why Russia, like USSR, does not send investigating groups of Gldyan and Ivanov to these republics, Russia does not even try o impose its style on the elite of these countries, and allows them to live as they wish, for there is no other way but Russia for them – like sheep, they are getting into the yoke themselves.

Moreover, the leaders of the Central Asian countries ask Russia to keep their military bases in their territories to defend the Kirghiz , Turkmen, Kazakh and others from the “real danger” coming, in their opinion, from “radical Islamists”.

To all appearances, the problem of CIS should be considered in this context. Russia , most likely, will continue to stake on the development of the structures already existing inside CIS, such as the Collective Security Treaty, EvrAzElectric Power Station, etc.

I would like to touch upon the question of “velvet” revolutions. Today the scenarios of its realization in the post-soviet countries are the subject of wide speculation in world media.

Yet it should be noted that the factor of these revolutions is real only there where the middle section of the establishment believes or has some grounds to believe that they will become part of united Europe, and in 10, 15 or 20 years they will pass the way tracked by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and central European countries. That is quite possible there.

In Armenia , for example, all is much more difficult, as there is a prevailing orientation on Russia there. But one should not exclude that this wave can touch Armenia as well. The same scenario cannot be excluded with respect to Byelorussia either.

Genuine “orange revolutions” can really take part in these countries, or some other colors can be used. Because they can at least hope, reckon on this kind of (well-grounded or not) integration.

As to the countries of Central Asia, there, most likely, only imitation of revolutions, like that of Kirghizia, can be carried out, when some elite groups, or the groups having aspirations for power but say for a minority, will only use the symbol of revolution to come to power.

As a matter of fact, the activists of “velvet” revolutions are not simply the multitude – they know what they want, they are many and they want the European version of development.

In Central Asia we can speak about not numerous activists wishing to come to power, and about using the symbol, about using masses. But I cannot see any good reason for real (and nor forged!) “ orange revolutions ”.

As to the events in Kirghizia , in my opinion, it was a special operation of the FSB of Russia.

But Putin is wrong to think that if he manipulates the “velvet” revolutions in Central Asia , he can make his people resist the temptation of repeating the success of the Georgian and Ukrainian oppositionists!

Of course, one cannot exclude anything in historical outlook. But I can see no signs of revolutionary situation in Russia , because those protesting groups of disabled people, pensioners and veterans who, as a rule, come out against anything in Russia , are not oriented on Europe and modernization. Quite o the contrary, they go through the anti-modernization, anti-European and anti-American orientation.

The quintessence of their revolutionary enthusiasm and passion is based on purely worldly basis: rise in wages, return of privileges, provision of pensions, free medicines, free tickets, etc.

Putin is not afraid of these protests, as, if worst comes to worst, he can retreat, having fulfilled their requirements, and then give a command to do away with the most loud “protestants”.

In other words, all these menacing (by sight) manifestations, pickets, marches do not create any ticklish situation to the regime of Putin, leaving much ground for cabals.

Taking into consideration all that has been said above, the “revolutionary scenario” is impossible in Russia in the nearest future. But there is possibility that a real Russian version of “color” revolution can break out there - accompanied with revolt, blood and civil war.

Vladimir Tishenko, DAYMOHK, April 7, 2005

14.04.05
http://chechenpress.co.uk/english/news/2005/04/14/05.shtml