From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng (Original Message) Sent: 4/18/2005 4:01 AM
Monday, April 18, 2005.
Sidelining the Opposition
By Nikolai Petrov
In the world of Russian soccer, coaches and the president of the national governing body have been fired in the quest for success; you can't get rid of the opponents, after all. In Russian politics, on the other hand, the rules are changed so that the president and lower-tier officials can sideline their opponents and hold onto their jobs.
A slate of amendments to election laws submitted to the State Duma by President Vladimir Putin, along with the bill on Duma elections passed in a second reading last week, is the latest step in a sweeping transformation of the entire electoral system. This is Putin's second crack at election reform, and it may prove more radical than the first, especially when you figure in the recently implemented system of appointing governors and the shift away from direct mayoral elections that is part of the ongoing reform of municipal government.
At first glance, Putin's proposed amendments to a score of federal laws appear less alarming than previous reform measures, which dismantled major components of the electoral system. Holding all elections nationwide during two set periods in the spring and fall doesn't seem like such a bad thing. But early spring, when presidential elections will now be held, has always been considered a tough time to hold elections. Voters are far more content and positively inclined toward the political leadership in the fall.
The new, stricter procedures for the the registration of candidates are more worrisome. The rules on the submission of signatures have been used in the past to reject candidates who didn't fit into the regime's plans. Putin's amendments make this even easier. At present, a candidate can register either by submitting signatures or by paying a deposit. Many candidates do both to cover their bases. Under the new procedures, they will have to choose one or the other.
The new ban on deputies switching factions once they're in the Duma follows logically from the proposed elimination of single-mandate seats in the lower house. But it also serves to strengthen command and control within factions and to discourage independent thinking. The 10 percent increase in the funding political parties get from the federal budget makes sense in the context of the transition to elections based entirely on party lists, as does compensating parties for the loss of sponsors -- apart from the Kremlin, of course. This also seems only fair: The Kremlin should pay to play just like anyone else. The new, higher ceiling on campaign spending makes sense given the improving financial health of the major political parties.
Finally, the new legislation would eliminate electoral blocs at all levels, a blow primarily to the opposition in regional elections.
Considered on their own, these latest changes to Russia's election laws do not seem so bad. Sure, the pro-Kremlin majority in the Duma wants to secure its position. And United Russia, which has under-performed in regional parliamentary elections, wants to get rid of powerful rivals. Holding all elections during two set periods may help to increase voter turnout. But in fact, the Kremlin is simply putting the finishing strokes on reforms that bode ill for democracy and free elections.
The first thing you notice about the Kremlin's latest initiatives is their total inadequacy. Three or four months ago, the Kremlin was confident that appointing governors would allow it to take control of regional politics without getting directly involved in the process and exposing itself to humiliating defeats. And it might have been right -- if not for developments in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and widespread protests here at home over the government's poorly thought-out policy of replacing welfare and other benefits with cash payments.
It's now clear that the Kremlin's awkward attempt to streamline the process sparked a response by several regions that aimed at convincing the Kremlin that the current governor was not up to the task and ought to be replaced before his term was up. This sort of self-inflicted political damage will only increase now that the Kremlin is appointing the governors.
Putin's approval rating is steadily declining. It would seem time for the Kremlin to open up legislatures at all levels to the political opposition in order to divert the force of social protest away from the executive branch, and to bolster the democratic institutions, including elections and the legislative branch, that have been weakened during Putin's five years in office. The risk of inaction is nothing short of the collapse of the entire political system.
Nikolai Petrov is scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2005/04/18/008.html