PRAGUE, 24 February, Caucasus Times – By Sergei Markedonov, director of the Department of International Relations Issues at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, exclusively for Caucasus Times.

The last day of January 2009, after a nearly eight-year hiatus, a national convention took place in Ingushetia. The common practice of bringing together the republican government and representatives of the people was discontinued during the presidency of Murat Ziazikov (2002-2008). In some ways, the event generated public uplift.

Many former opposition members supported the initiative and expressed readiness to engage in a constructive partnership with the government. Magomed Multsogov, who leads the human rights group «МАШР» (“MAShR”) and was a fierce critic of the previous administration, had this to say: “The most important thing about the convention is that it took place. In six or seven years, this is the first such social and political event in the Republic, bringing together not only officials, but also representatives from NGOs. Plus, ordinary people – delegates chosen by municipalities – also had a chance to voice their opinion. People of different persuasions discussed important issues concerning the country’s social structure. This was the first opportunity they have had to do so. Before, there was no such forum.”
Unlike previous conventions, the current forum was approved by the federal government (in the past, such events had caused visible irritation). The Russian President sent his regards to participants, stating that “The convention will help build social consensus in the Republic, and solidify the unity of peoples in the North Caucasus and across all of Russia.”
It would be difficult not to notice that the forum not only charted the path for cooperation between the government and the people; it also put forth a number of challenging objectives, whose achievement could significantly reduce the level of enthusiasm currently circulating within Ingush society. Foremost among these issues is the territorial dispute between Ingushetia and North Ossetia over Prigorodnyi District.

It should be noted that the 1992 conflict between the two republics was the first ethnic clash on Russian territory. The specific problem concerning Prigorodnyi District comes as a result of various administrative and territorial shifts enacted by the Russian Empire, and to a greater degree, the Soviet Union. Ossetians claim historical rights to the region based on the fact that until the XIV century it was inhabited by the Alans, who are regarded as the ancestors of modern Ossetians. Yet a number of municipalities in the District are also claimed by the Ingush as the “cradle” of their people. One such example is the village of Tarskoe, previously named Angusht, from where the Russians derive the term “Ingush,” used for the ethnos that self-identifies as “Gaglai.” It should also be noted that the current president of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Evkurov, is a native of this village.

According to the All-Union census of 1939, the population of Prigorodnyi District was 33.8 thousand, of which 28.1 thousand were Ingush, 3.5 thousand were Russian, and 0.4 thousand were Chechen. The surface area of the district comprised 34% of the total surface area of Checheno-Ingushetia. After the Ingush deportation of 1944, the land was transferred to the North Ossetian ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). After the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was reinstated, Prigorodnyi District remained as part of North Ossetia. From 1944 to 1957 it was settled by Ossetians. In 1956 the Council of Ministers of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR issued a decree that forbade real estate sale and rent to former Ingush deportees. It should be noted that the deportation process did not only affect the Ingush. The resettlement of the Ossetians into former Ingush lands was also done in a coercive manner. During the 1960s, the demographics of Prigorodnyi District had changed significantly. Many Ossetians had been born and raised there, and knew no homeland other than the District. Regardless, even during the Soviet period the issue became public, specifically during Ingush demonstrations in January 1973, and North Ossetian demonstrations in October 1981.

During perestroika the problem surfaced once again. The further radicalization of the crisis surrounding Prigorodnyi District unfolded after the Law “On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples” was passed on 26 April 1991. This legal document codified norms for the territorial rehabilitation of repressed peoples (articles 3, 6 and 7); however, it offered no concrete legal mechanisms for the implementation of such norms. It gave the Ingush side unrealistically high expectations for the quick resolution of the conflict at the same time that it instilled fear in the Osseitans for the fair division of the land they were on. Both sides began to form defensive brigades. The newly forming Russian government chose to distance itself from the conflict. Over the course of 1992, ideologies of “restoring historical justice” at any cost and “defending territorial integrity” would form in the neighboring republics.

Between 31 October and 4 November 1992, Prigorodnyi District and Vladikavkaz became sites of armed conflict between the Ossetians and the Ingush. Each side has its own interpretation of the events. According to official data, the conflict resulted in 478 dead, 840 wounded, and over 200 missing persons. Over 40,000 were forced to migrate. The Ingush claim the number is as high as 70,000 or even 100,000 (the latter estimate is clearly exaggerated). The total damage was assessed to be 12 billion rubles (1992 valuation). The Ossetian-Ingush conflict is also linked to the Ossetian-Georgian conflict. Prigorodnyi District has a population of about 7,500 refugees from the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region and parts of Georgia. Some of them have settled in homes formerly belonging to Ingushetians. To a significant extent, refugees from South Ossetia have become the base of the ethno-national movement in North Ossetia. It is therefore unsurprising that during the “Five-Day War” of 2008 (South Ossetia) Ingushetia did not accept any South Ossetian refugees. This is how the issue was described by Ingushetians in an interview with Kavkazskii Uzel: “Russia now feels sorry for South Ossetia, but the Ingush still remember everything well.” 19-year-old Inessa from Nazran talks about the Ingushetians who fell victim in Prigorodnyi District, pointing out that “No one showed them pity during that conflict; no one stuck up for them.”
Thus, the Ossetian-Ingush conflict continues to influence the situation in both North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Today, the problem is once again relevant because of a new law regarding local self-government. At the end of November 2008, Dmitry Medvedev passed a federal law “On Measures of Organization of Local Self-Government in the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic.” The law had been passed by the State Duma a month earlier and received approval from the Federal Assembly. The law provides for constitutional guarantees to local self-government after a transitional period lasting until 1 January 2010. During this time, organs of local self-government must be fully formed. But how is this process to be completed if the Republic has unresolved territorial disputes with its neighbors?

This is why, during the National Congress held on 31 January 2009, the issue became one of the key topics of discussion. Forum participants were read a resolution passed on 15 January 2009 at a conference of Ingush NGOs. The basic pathos of the document leaves little doubt as to its position. Ingush intellectuals and activists are uncompromising on the question of territorial changes (in other words, the return of Prigorodnyi district to the Republic). According Bembulat Bogatyrev, a former deputy of the Russian Supreme Soviet and a present-day activist in the Ingush national movement, the law on local self-government cannot be passed “before the Prigorodnyi District problem is resolved” (by “resolved” he means “incorporated into Ingushetia”). President Yevkurov is much more cautious in this regard. At the convention on 21 January, he even accused Issu Kostoev, a member of the Federal Assembly, of populism: “As a federal politician, you know well that regional governments have no right to determine borders between federal subjects. You are just saying [that Prigorodnyi District should be incorporated] to look like you’re sharing the plight of the people! If you’re on the same team as the president, you have to align with my position.”

Unfortunately, we have to point out that the problem of Ossetino-Ingush relations has not attracted the due attention of the federal center. Moscow prefers these problems to be discussed in Vladikavkaz and Magas. Yet it is evident that the problem will not go away on its own. Without the necessary (and active) involvement of the Kremlin as judge, the problem will continue to be interpreted in the radical-nationalist light by both sides. Alas, today the Kremlin is the only political force that hasn’t taken an official position on the events of autumn 1992, hasn’t determined the causes of the conflict, and hasn’t indicated a way out of the crisis. The federal government has avoided making a public judgment call, choosing instead to channel things through the bureaucracy.

Yet, in the past few years some progress has taken place in Ossetino-Ingush relations. Starting in the early 2000s, one could see cars in Vladikavkaz with Ingush license plates; North Ossetia, which has a more advanced healthcare system than Ingushetia, has seen a rise in Ingush patients in its hospitals. Even the Beslan tragedy, which involved Ingush terrorists, did not render the situation back to its 1992 state. At the same time, as far as the general populations are concerned, there isn’t much trust between the two peoples – and the federal government must work, first and foremost, on building trust. If we are to discuss the repatriation of refugees, it is difficult to do when there are deadlines involved: it’s not a production plan! The new post-conflict Kremlin elite remain unprepared. There are no new leaders willing to make compromises, or willing to put loyalty to the Russian state above ethnic considerations. To this day, the agenda is set by those who have come to prominence by exploiting the interethnic conflict. Against this backdrop, Yevkurov’s presence alone is insufficient to making a difference.

Of course, it would be easier for the federal government to pick one of the sides, one of the “truths.” Indeed, this is the governing paradigm Moscow has become used to operating under. However, in the case Ossetino-Ingush conflict, “simple” paradigms don’t work, since both the Ossetians and the Ingush are Russian citizens, and it is in the state’s interests to uphold the rights and liberties of both. To this end, Moscow could outline two clear points in its policy: first, to acknowledge that administrative and territorial changes in the Caucasus (and in the country, in general) can lead to nothing but conflict. The first victims of the “Prigorodnyi precedent” could become the Ingush themselves. If they get their way in the Prigorodnyi District dispute, they could face similar claims from Chechnya regarding Sunzhenskii and Malgobekskii districts (this has been voiced by both separatist and pro-Russian Chechen leaders). Thus, the acquisition of Prigorodnyi District would not bring long-awaited happiness to Ingushetia. Furthermore, the use of this “precedent” in Dagestan would set off a separate cluster of problems. Second, the federal government has to guarantee – more realistically than with a deadline – the rights of the Ingush in North Ossetia. The Ingush population of that republic should not experience any discrimination. Citizens of the Russian Federation cannot be regarded as second-class outside Moscow. Only by feeling like full citizens of Russia will the Ingush be inclined to relinquish claims to Prigorodnyi District, since its administrative designation would no longer be relevant.