Introduction
February 20, 2011 marked the one year anniversary of Magomedsalam Magomedov's tenure as the President of the Republic of Dagestan. In 2010, Dagestan became the most violence-ridden place in the North Caucasus, overtaking Chechnya and Ingushetia. Magomedov inherited a deeply divided republic, plagued by routine insurgent attacks, skirmishes and acute economic underdevelopment. Faced with the challenges of revitalizing the sluggish economy, curbing daily violence and restoring people's trust in the authorities, Magomedov made some laudable attempts at reconciliation and consolidation of the society. However, the sheer number of casualties, lackluster economic indicators and the deteriorating morale of the civilian population attest to Magomedov's inability to tackle the core problems that plunged Dagestan in a virtual state of civil war.
The situation in Dagestan began to spin out of control several years before Magomedov's appointment. Critics describe his predecessor, Mukhu Aliyev, 70, as a feeble personality, unable to address the long-simmering discontent in the republic, clan-based policies and stem the escalation of violence. Aliyev's fragility was rooted in his background as a person outside the republic's deep-seated clan system whose capacities were severely curtailed by influential ethnic clan groups unwilling to cede control over the republic.
According to local rights group Memorial, the situation in Dagestan under the former leader was marked by a steep drop in the quality of education, uncontrollable corruption, social vulnerability of citizens, economic underdevelopment, malfunctioning political institutions and, most significantly, the unchecked and lawless conduct of siloviki. Arguably, for the Russian
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American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus would like to thank Ilyana Ovshieva for providing valuable input and contributing to this analysis.
government, Aliyev's biggest shortcoming was his glaring failure to contain violence and
political instability, epitomized in the frenzy of the October 2009 elections in Derbent.
The vote, which pitted then-mayor Felix Kaziahmedov against former prosecutor general Imam Yaraliyev, was seen as utterly rigged. In what some described as a major blow to Aliyev's authority, the Dagestan's municipal court overturned the results of the controversial vote, and fresh elections were scheduled for October 2010. Another bone of contention was Aliyev's defiance in appointing an ethnic Russian as the republic's chief tax inspector, which may have incensed the central government, willing to look for another, more docile appointee and return to relying on ethnic and clan elites.
The Kremlin found this figure in the son of Dagestan's strongman, Magomedali Magomedov, who during his 18-year-long tenure left an indelible imprint on the structure of local political system. The uncertainty surrounding the nomination, which took place twenty days after the scheduled deadline of January 20th, was clear testament to the significance and agony of the decision. With the end of Aliyev's tenure drawing near, the Kremlin kept resounding silence as to who would lead the most populous and ethnically diverse republic, sending waves of anxiety across the republic.
Madomedsalam Magomedov was seen by many as a compromise figure. His selection almost coincided in time with the appointment of Aleksandr Khloponin as President Dmitry Medvedev's Special Representative to the North Caucasus Federal District. Medvedev heralded, at least, in rhetoric the beginning of a development-oriented policy, aimed at luring major investors and spearheading ambitious development projects. Magomedov's educational background in economics, young age and abundance of family connections were arguably the main assets the Kremlin sought to capitalize on to pacify the restive republic.
Accomplishments
Amid a growing perception that Dagestan was approaching a state of civil war, Magomedov vowed an overhaul of regional policies, acknowledging that the mounting challenges required a qualitatively different approach, based on dialogue and reconciliation. He accrued some political accomplishments by espousing a brand new discourse that instilled cautious optimism in both ordinary citizens and human rights activists.
Magomedov's salutary recognition that the problem of extremism cannot be solved with reliance on brute force solely inspired hope that the incoming president would break away with the heavy-handed tactics of combating insurgency. In his inauguration remarks, Magomedov pledged to launch an inter-Dagestan dialogue, involving the full spectrum of political, economic and other forces. He promised to consolidate the Dagestani society and rectify the former ideological failures that contributed to steering more youths into "the forest".
To that end, Magomedov initiated a flamboyant all-Dagestan Congress. The republic held similar events twice in its history, in 1920 and 1992, both at critical junctures. The second congress reaffirmed Dagestan's willingness to remain part of Russia in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Magomedov's decision to convene the third congress in 2010 signaled his acknowledgement that Dagestan was at a tipping point.
In his 40-minute address, Magomedov lambasted the former leadership for countering violence with violence, all the while maintaining that fighting radicalization would top his agenda. He admitted that "at some point, neither the government nor civil institutions were able to fully realize the danger of these negative trends and find effective means of countering them", betting primarily on "forceful measures and siloviki".
The need for a multi-layered, comprehensive approach to combating extremism was a leitmotif of Magomedov's platform. He called for "a broad, honest and direct social dialogue", employing an array of political, legal and socio-economic instruments. He promised to weed out corruption, pledging a thorough probe into extortions of public funds and threatening "loud criminal cases" and even "imprisonments". Magomedov vowed to bridge the growing divide between people and the government by filling the "ideological vacuum" that plagues Dagestani youth. Indeed, the conspicuous discourse shift that occurred in the first year of Magomedov's tenure was a positive move. His seeming eagerness to pay heed to the demands of the disenfranchised youth inspired hope and optimism, and the cognizance of the complexity of the problems facing Dagestan was a marked difference from the previous authorities' detachment from the realities of the republic.
In another praiseworthy gesture, Magomedov attempted to launch a dialogue with representatives of Salafi communities and signed a decree creating a special commission aimed at helping reintegrate repentant militants into society. Reaching out to Salafis was one of the key promises of the new president. "We are open to dialogue with those who want to return to normal human life, to peaceful life. We hope for support of religious leaders and representatives of various confessions who traditionally play the main role in the life of Dagestan's society," Magomedov assured in his inauguration speech. The head of the republic said that he would personally guarantee "humane treatment" and "respect for the constitutional rights" of those who agreed to lay down arms. Magomedov also called for the Russian President to pass a general amnesty law for ex-militants, akin to the measures taken in Chechnya, where former insurgents were pardoned and co-opted into local security services.
In his interview with Kommersant, Magomedov spoke of the local government efforts to hold a meeting with "unofficial leaders of the Salafi current", but the attempts proved abortive as representatives of non-traditional Islam were reluctant to "jeopardize their lives". Such failures eveal the corrosive distrust between citizens and authorities as well as the pervasive climate of fear. Lack of credibility and public support for the government remains one of the paramount challenges facing Magomedov. In this light, the success of Magomedov's policies will hinge on his capacity to win genuine legitimacy, all the while maintaining the Kremlin loyalty.
Some critics, meanwhile, note that Magomedov's interest in launching the dialogue began to wane by the end of his first year. The idea of a round-table with Salafi representatives, slated for the end of January, got abandoned over time. One might suggest that Magomedov's flaggingenthusiasm could be prompted by the Kremlin, which adheres to the policy of force in dealing with the region and assertively backs Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov as a putative example of stability and success to be emulated by other regional leaders.
Skeptics were also unconvinced that the commission, albeit a commendable move, would yield any tangible results. They mainly referred to lack of solid legal guarantees and judicial vacuum. The make-up of the newly formed body, consisting mainly of members of security services and the interior ministry, also raised doubts. The commission is headed by Dagestani Deputy Prime Minister Rizvan Kurbanov, with 13 out of 14 members being part of the incumbent government. The only member unaffiliated with the authorities is head of a Salafi organization Abbas Kebedov, who served a prison term under former president.
The absence of civil society actors and independent experts undercuts the credibility of the new institution, strengthening the perception that the creation of the commission was dictated by pressure from above rather than social demands and conceived as a public relations stunt. Others highlighted the futility of such measures, if not accompanied by changes on the ground, improving economic conditions and robust anti-graft and job creation incentives.
Shortcomings
Last March's twin suicide bombings in Moscow metro, which left at least 38 people dead and scores wounded, again called into question the effectiveness of Russian policies vis-à-vis the North Caucasus. Photos of a juvenile, pistol-holding girl, identified as one of the perpetrators, native of Dagestan Dzhanet Abdullayeva, swirled around the world, raising fresh questions about the roots of radicalization in the region. What some dubbed as one of the deadliest and most sophisticated attacks in Russia in recent years brought to the fore not only the persistent failures of Russian policies but the emergence of a new epicenter of violence that is rapidly becoming a breeding ground for militants.
Violence in Dagestan reached dire proportions in 2010, as some pundits began to portend a civil war. Magomedov's visible shift in rhetoric didn't remedy the rapidly deteriorating security situation as his most conspicuous failure was the inability to quell the unrelenting violence that began to spill outside the republic, reaching the Russian capital and fanning anti-Caucasus sentiments among the Russian populace.
Attacks on infrastructure objects, municipal officials, clerics, civil society actors and ordinary civilians became a recurrent feature of Dagestani life. According to the Caucasian Knot, out of 1,710 casualties in the North Caucasus in 2010, 685 occurred in Dagestan, which made it the deadliest republic in the region last year. These included 124 fatal casualties among security servicemen and 176 alleged militants. Nearly 150 isolated clashes involving security forces and militants took place as did more than one hundred bombings or explosions. The ACPC data indicate a steep, multi-fold spike in assaults on police officers as well as increased casualties in civilians and alleged militants.
Attacks on military and strategic objects multiplied. One of the most salient cases was the September 7th attack on the Irganai hydroelectric plant. Also in September, a suicide bomber attacked a military training ground in Buynaksk, killing five people and injuring over 30. The assaults underscored the resolve of the military underground to target specifically security servicemen and officials, undermining federal forces' tenuous efforts to combat insurgency.
The same month, the head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin made staggering comments that the situation in the North Caucasus is tantamount to a war, with militants inflicting at least five to six losses among the Interior Ministry troops every day.Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoryk said at the same time that from the beginning of 2010 until September, the number of terror attacks in the North Caucasus increased four-fold. Against this backdrop, Russia stepped up its military presence in the region, deploying an additional contingent of security forces into the republic to "safeguard order and ensure security" in the runup to the municipal elections in October.
Amid military augmentation and talks of a possible imposition of counterinsurgency regime in the republic, thousands of Dagestanis cast ballots on October 10 thin the elections, which many saw as marred by violence and fraud. A massive gunfight erupted in the Khadzhalmakhi village, where 4,500 ballots were reportedly snatched. The head of the village was killed in the row.
In a feeble attempt to address the escalating crisis, Magomedov initiated the creation of an internal battalion drafted from local residents, drawing on the example of Chechnya. A 300-man battalion was formed by the end of the year. In an interview with Kommersant, Magomedov explained that the idea behind the establishment of the new forces was "to recruit people, deeply knowledgeable about the republic and the local mentality, in order to combat insurgency". In contrast to Chechnya, where former militants were co-opted into the republican battalions, Magomedov emphasized that amnestied fighters must "return to peaceful life" and would not be
drafted.
Vasily Panchenkov, press spokesperson of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, announced the decision at the end of last September. The goal was to create new force structures, tasked with "finding and liquidating gang groups". Panchenkov's words that the battalions would include "those whose relatives died at the hands of militants" raised alarm among critics, fearing that the troops would be guided by the local unwritten rules of blood feud rather than the Russian law.
Other observers underscored the unfeasibility of forming Chechen-style troops in multi-ethnic Dagestan, where the political landscape is dominated by the agitated interplay of ethnic and clan interests. Novaya Gazeta reported in November that the first battalion, stationed near capital Makhachkala, was being trained by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's fighters. In Chechnya, similar entities became infamous for their involvement in torture, abductions and harassment of family members of suspected militants. Critics also highlighted that there is no shortage of military forces in the republic and that the internal battalions would have a mission other than providing security. Dagestani authorities' willingness to build on the Chechen experience raises legitimate concerns that the force structures were envisioned as tools of control and agents of intimidation aimed at eliminating dissent and coercing citizens under the pretext of anti-terror struggle.
The escalating crisis thwarted Magomedov's capacity to entice investors. President Medvedev publicly castigated the Dagestani leader for "working slowly" and threatened that the volume of the support from the federal center would be contingent on "the quality of the republican leadership". When Magomedov lamented that the bleak security conditions deter investors and businessmen, Medvedev's unsympathetic reply ("You are the president, you have taken up this job") epitomized the Kremlin's dwindling support for the current Dagestani leadership. Federal subsidies decreased substantially in 2010. While in 2009, 82% of Dagestan's budget was financed through federal funds, in 2010 the percentage fell to 75%. Magomedov might credit the government on "lowering the subsidized nature" of the republic, but Medvedev's words prove that the decrease was rather an indication of failures than accomplishments.
While the dire security situation could be one of the factors that deter investors from injecting their money in Dagestan, flagrant corruption is another potent element. Commenting on Magomedov's agenda to "consolidate the Dagestani society in the fight against extremism", rights activist and unionist Isalmagomed Nabiev argued that "the authorities in Dagestan should first and foremost consolidate the society in the fight against corruption and other practices that erode the institutions of power". Nabiev's remarks are illustrative of the growing sentiments among Dagestanis, with an overwhelming majority of the population viewing graft as a far greater evil than terrorism, according to Novoe delo poll. This mounting abyss between public sentiments and government priorities undermines Magomedov's endeavors to stabilize the republic while garnering his people's support and retaining the Kremlin loyalty.
The problem of corruption, meanwhile, is inextricably linked to that of security and intricate clan relations. It remains of paramount concern to Dagestani residents since it rests on one of the most entrenched features of Dagestani politics – its clan-based nature. A few influential families, with Magomedov hailing from one of them, wield substantial economic resources and vie for power positions allowing access to government subsidies, which generates a mind-boggling income gap and disenfranchises youths outside the clan system.
The clan elite-based system not only alienates ordinary citizens and undermines the social fabric of the republic but it also serves to keep the North Caucasus under tighter central control. Magomedov's father ushered in the system of clans and solidified it to render clan rivalry a permanent feature of Dagestani politics. The Kremlin's decision to install Magomedov in lieu of clan outsider Aliyev suggests that the overarching federal policy is one of supporting the clanstacitly and coaxing them into adopting a Kremlin-dictated policy instead of undoing the system of ethnic and clan elites altogether.
Despite Magomedov's pledge to wage an uncompromised battle against extortions and his assurance that "no one is above the law" in the republic, local authorities allow little room for public control , independent media and civil society watchdog institutions necessary for bringing shady business and political practices under public scrutiny. Last summer, lawyer Sapiyat Magomedova was severely beaten on the premises of a police department in Khasavyurt.Magomedova handled the cases of individuals accused of involvement with the military underground. Instead of prosecuting the perpetrators, the authorities initiated a case against the lawyer for allegedly offending an investigator from the Khasavyurt prosecutor's office.
Local rights group Memorial recorded a spike in attacks on Dagestani lawyers and journalists engaged in sensitive cases as well as several cases of abductions by security forces in 2010. The existing legal tools, including the infamous anti-Wahhabi law of 1999, enable the authorities to persecute and harass rights defenders and abort any attempts of investigation into anti-insurgency measures. According to activists, lawyers who dare challenge the unlawful practices risk being prosecuted for complicity in terrorism or simply being harassed, bereft of any possibility for legal redress. The cases of assaulted lawyers and journalists remain the most inadequatelyadjudicated in Dagestan.
Meanwhile, Magomedov's government appears to turn a blind eye to their grievances, with the president himself hardly evoking human rights and political freedoms in his speeches. With routine coercion against lawyers, courts become increasingly redundant institutions as Dagestanis are less likely to lodge their complaints but prefer to settle scores within the republic's clan-based system.
Conclusion
Magomedov's proclaimed goal of molding an inter-Dagestan dialogue and consolidating the society in the fight against extremism as well as attempts at reconciling with alternative Islamic movements are unlikely to succeed unless the head of the republic undertakes tangible measures to rectify the growing gap between people's sentiments and the government agenda. While the local authorities, backed by the central government, may prioritize security and continue to aggrandize the military presence in the republic, public concerns appear to revolve overwhelmingly around the long-standing issues of corruption, the ingrained clan-based system and lack of rule of law.
To address the security limbo, Magomedov needs to mediate between a myriad of criminal gang groups underpinned by divergent clan interests in addition to tackling radicalization. To prove the genuineness of his commitment to eradicating corruption, the president must ensure transparency in the flow of government subsidies and allow uninhibited social control in the form of independent journalists, lawyers and activists able to conduct probes into malpractices. Civil society needs to be accorded a more prominent role in forging a successful dialogue with Salafis and repentant militants.
Magomedov's appointment signaled the Kremlin's renewed reliance on clan politics as an instrument of control. His inability to launch a meaningful dialogue with adherents of Salafi Islam underscore the pitfalls of his limited mandate, made accountable to the federal centre as opposed to the Dagestani population. In the Russian political landscape, any attempts at changes by North Caucasus leaders will go awry without the Kremlin support, which suggests that the central government continues to favor iron-fisted policies as opposed to reconciliation and aborts local efforts at practicing alternative approaches.
Magomedov came to power with the full realization of the enormity of challenges facing him, as was evidenced in his initiative to convene an inter-Dagestan forum. His acknowledgement that the republic was at a tipping point, however, has yet to translate into real-life and bold measures to break away from the former policies of neglect and state-sanctioned abuse of power and violence. As the republic is descending further into chaos, the adoption of such measures appears all the more pressing.
