Ethnic-clannish management system as a threat to national security 

Economic crisis, in the way it is now developing, gradually pulling into its downward spiral all the countries of the world, is advantageous for the United States. We are faced with the strategy of a controlled crisis in economy, worked out as far back as in the midst of the «cold war», and aiming at the exhaustion of the most dangerous geopolitical opponents. This can be understood by how aggressively and vigorously the U.S. is shifting the burden of the crisis on all other countries through the global financial system, and meanwhile is still possessed by imperial ambitions and continues to increase the military expenditure. 
Approximately the same was performed for the collapse of the USSR - then the United States also managed to provoke a controlled crisis and the fall in oil prices, disastrous for us, but not fatal for Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries, for instance. Today, when oil and gas are almost the only articles of our exports and the money that was saved up is disappearing, the U.S. has nothing else to do than to protract the crisis in order to bring Russia to a state when it becomes no longer able to support its subsidized regions. At the same time, within these regions through the agency of influence, acquired over the years of restructuring, everything is done to transfer all the accumulated and newly emerging social problems in the plane of interethnic and interconfessional relations. 
What for is needed discord in the Caucasus 
Particularly vulnerable in these conditions turn out the republics of the Northern Caucasus with clannish management system, which has established itself over the past few years. The ruling clans are apparently anticipating their historical doom in case the federal centre decides to modernize the system of governing the regions. If, say, Ingushetia already (or still) looks more or less tranquil, in Daghestan the events are speeded up and dramatized. The elite, which does not wish changes and is ready for everything to preserve the criminal-archaic clan pyramids, would like to present their personal selfish interests as national and common for all the Daghestani ethnicities, to sow distrust and cause a new burst of nationalist sentiments as in early 90's, when ethnic criminal groups began to share out the property left by the state to the mercy of fate. Already today, skillfully playing on the nationalist sentiments of the non-ruling ethnicities and clans or those removed from power, they are trying to direct the protest energy of the crisis against the policy of the federal government. The threat of imposing such scenarios to the republic is quite real. 
The so-called «Wahhabi project» of rejecting the Northern Caucasus from Russia is still functioning at present, but is rather developing as supplementary. It is financed through domestic sources (shady business). The major part of foreign assistance is training in foreign centers, as well as great informational support through various non-governmental organizations, funds, liberal mass media of the Russian and foreign type. 
We have already written earlier that the United States and its allies invest huge sums in the development of a monitoring network in the South of Russia, and collect information about the «sore spots» by the hands of our own scientists (somewhere an old land conflict or quite a fresh one, somewhere people did not share profits from a factory or restaurant, etc.) and about how they can be affected in order to turn a smoldering conflict into a «small war» with elements of terrorism and religious extremism. 
The most painful nerve in Daghestan today is the struggle for power. The time determined for the current President by the Constitution is coming to an end. The ethnic clans, standing behind him, also have their own, quite powerful criminal leaders, having become a component of the republican authorities, but always claiming to presidency. The figure of today’s President was then recognized as a compromise to prevent the frankly criminal ethnic leaders from coming to power. This has created a paradoxical situation, when a part of «the ruling ethnic group» is at the same time oppositional. This pseudo-opposition has its own media - for example, the infamous newspaper «Chernovik». 
The economic aspect of terrorism in Daghestan 
Recent «battles of local importance» in the Karabudakhkent district of Daghestan are already usual «seasonal field» works, or more precisely, forest works, with all their tragedy and losses from both sides. Soon the mountain slopes will be covered again with the dense green canopy of leaves and the harvest time will be at its height: a greater part of bandits will return to the «green». At that the seat of military operations in the republic may increase compared to previous years. And that is not because the ideas of religious extremism have received a greater support of the population than it was before. 
Probably, there will be two factors working here. First - the very «kickback» system of budgetary financing of Daghestan as a subsidized region. The interbudgetary relations within Russia are imperfect and they do not allow solve many financial problems of regional and municipal authoritative bodies. Centralization of funds in the federal budget and budgets of subjects of Federation, significant cross-flows between the budgets of all levels, low level of revenues of the regional and local budgets - all this deprives the regional and municipal governments of the power to address vital issues of their population, as well as to conduct a responsible fiscal policy on respective territories. 
But this is only half the truth, often voiced by the republican representatives in the federal center. The second half of this truth is that the system of budgetary relations exists only because the «kickbacks» and availability of the great stratum of shadow economy makes it advantageous for a narrow layer of anti-elites – both in the federal center and at the local level. As a result, local elites are in no way interested either in bringing the existing economy out of the shadow, or in the creation of new jobs and development of the real sector of economy in the subject. 
In complex multinational entities - such as Daghestan - allocation of budgetary money increasingly boils down to the criminal-political ethnic clans having it out between each other. The higher is the degree of criminality and «mechanization» of the clan, the more it is represented in the power structures, and the more it has both, the higher is its share at «sawing up» the budget. Naturally, such a system of allocating the financial flows provokes ethnic clans to conceal the proceeds of their own businesses, and this taken away money is invested in equipping and maintaining of combat readiness both of the «Murid» mob and other religious-extremist groups. 
The population would be happy to get rid of the bandit dominance, but firstly, they continue to draw in the unemployed young people with no vocational training, providing them with weapons and semi-legal or legal work in security structures; secondly, the need for maintaining such semi-underground and underground armies by criminal-political ethnic clans is justified by the system of disposing the budgetary funds. The less is the power component – the less is the total share of funds of the entire ethnic clan, and therefore the share of the ethnicity. Although the population, that is ethnicities, rather get crumbs or something that cannot be «sawn up» and pilfered on the sly. 
In conditions of the crisis, aggressiveness of the ethnic clans is provoked by the decrease in financial flows from the center to the regions. This will primarily affect the working population dependent on wages and inflation. Elites having shadow incomes and access to the budget, have never economized and will never do it on their own luxuries. Hence the second factor: the economy of the subsidized region is progressing in going into the «shade». 
However, one can conceal incomes from the state, but nobody has been able to conceal them from the criminal community. Namely this money taken into the «shade» is spent for financing the two segments of the religious-extremist network: both the «Wahhabis» and the «Murid» criminal mob, which is the backbone of mini-armies of the criminal ethnic leaders. 
The main tasks for which, in fact, the existence of the «Wahhabi» network is allowed are the performance of very specific functions. 
Firstly, intimidating the society, creating an atmosphere of fear and terror. It is supposed - and this idea is transmitted to the society - that only a strong militant ethnicity is able to protect from such a «Wahhabi» threat. Other ethnicities - smaller and less militant – are allegedly not able to counter it.
Secondly, physical elimination of strong personalities - politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, potential leaders, holding different views on the future of the republic. 
Thirdly, undercover knockout of a «tribute» from the shady business, though recently considered increasingly as legal. Part of a «tribute» collected in such a way goes to the «common fund» of the Wahhabis, and another part - through the politicians and bureaucrats who have double ties - to the «common funds» of the ethnic clans («North Caucasus» has already written about this). 
Who is «drowning» the «Varangians» in the region and why? 
The consequence of high inter-ethnic and inter-clan (intra-ethnic) competition in the republic is that the struggle for «chairs» of heads of key ministries and agencies – both of the republican and federal subordination – becomes a serious «conflictogenic» factor. Inter-clan struggle for power and place at the public feeder leads to such an ugly phenomenon as selling the official «chairs» - taking into account the forces of paramilitary criminal gangs standing behind this ethnic group. It further proceeds to the «inheritance» of this «chair» by representatives of this certain ethnic group or even the next of kin of the first «buyer». Depriving of the «chair» - official resignation – under such a system of «assignments» occurs either as an armed raider capture or by shooting the claimants (if buying and selling is impossible). 
The shadow distribution of powers in the republic today is correspondent to the official power structure: the «ruling ethnicity» is at the same time the most militarized and having its own state ideology, as well as historical mythology justifying it, which is different from the historical mythology of other ethnic groups (each – having its own). The militarized structures controlled by the «ruling ethnicity» also include all the official power structures on the territory of the republic – except those of federal subordination; and unofficial paramilitary structures - mini-armies (each criminal leader has his mini-army, armed to the teeth, and the so-called «Wahhabi» terrorist network). 
We have observed partial mobilization of two mini-armies of such type when two criminal leaders of the «ruling ethnicity» were trying to divide the «chair» of Chief of the Daghestan Tax Service. In fact, a very illustrative political-and-power combination was played then. 
The ex-head of this federal structure was a Lezghin by birth. Since this is not the first chair, which has been taken away from the Lezghins over the recent years and given to representatives of other ethnic groups (loyal to the leadership of the republic), reaction of the Lezghin ethnic group (already largely neglected and removed from power, separated between Azerbaijan and Daghestan, where it is also subjected to discrimination and forced assimilation) was not just predictable, it was skillfully staged. The Lezghin youth was brought out to block the streets in protest against «national discrimination». 
Then were killed Salikh Gusayev and Zaghir Arukhov - the most outstanding, honest and intelligent politicians of the Southern Daghestan, having consistently taken the post of a Minister for Information Policy, Nationalities and Foreign Relations. Previously they were tried to be intimidated and forced to cede the «chair», which allowed a representative of one ethnic clan control the informational space of the republic. 
Then started avalanche-like losses of the «Lezghin» posts in the republic. The most significant can be considered losses of «chairs» of the Republican Prosecutor and Chief of the Tax Inspectorate. 
It is obvious to most Daghestanis that such sequential exclusion of Lezghins and other Lezghin-speaking ethnic groups from the political space of the republic is not accidental. Therefore, the reaction of Lezghins themselves, as well as other ethnic groups, was easy to foresee. 
And while the Lezghins were holding meetings and exposing themselves, allegedly «not letting» an official from Moscow – Radchenko – get to his workplace, for this «chair» grappleв the real claimants: three clans of the «ruling ethnicity». And it almost came to an armed conflict of two clans. If not for the impatience, peculiar to these people, things might have followed the designated scenario and the third clan remaining «in the shade» would get everything, but the stupid thing with kidnapping of Radchenko («North Caucasus» was following this story) led to the failure of a brilliant combination. 
This is the visible outline of the events, but behind it there are serious miscalculations of the personnel and national policy of the federal center in the republic. 
The fact essential for the understanding of what is happening is that some time before (after a Lezghin) for the post of the Public Prosecutor was appointed a Russian - Tkachyov. For almost a year was taking place a frank persecution of the Prosecutor – «Varangian» by that very pseudo-oppositional press. Not mincing words, they were accusing him of all sins – beginning with incompetence to corruption, and on these grounds they even accused the federal center that it «does not trust» the locals and sends its «Derzhimords» (note: in Russian literature “heartless and slow-witted executor of commands from the top”) - these are quotations from sponsored articles. Their aim boiled down to the fact that control over appointments even to federal agencies would be completely given to the local authorities and it is desirable that representatives of appropriate ethnic groups would take those posts. 
Of the same order was the political-and-power performance, staged on the occasion of the appointment of another «Varangian» - Radchenko – as the chief of the Federal Tax Inspectorate. The last act of this story with his kidnapping - is already downright hysterics. 
It is hoped that those who now yearn for the «chair» of the President of Daghestan will not undertake any other adventures of force. No less nervous is the state of the authorities. How to explain the so-called «public rallies» in support of the current President? As if someone does not know how people are gathered for such «rallies». 
The ruling clans are afraid of a «Varangian» in the presidential chair, but the incumbent President has long ceased to be a political figure compromise for all the ethnic clans (and, above all, for the pseudo-opposition). As for the majority of representatives of other, not ruling, ethnic groups, they would be happy if the federal authorities retained the right to appoint heads of regions. Though this meaning a greater responsibility of the federal government for the appointee. 
According to a prepared law on that the local branch of the party having won the elections will have the right to nominate a candidate for the post of the regional head, the entire system of «kickback-shady» financing of terrorism, as well as the ethnic clannish system of government in Daghestan which has given rise to it, will stay put. To become sure of it, it would be enough to look through the pre-election regional lists of parties that can win. The new law can just seriously increase the «purchase value» of places on party lists. 
What can be the way out? 
There is a need for replacing «anti-elites» with new managers, who would be vitally interested in developing the regions they are charged with, because this will directly affect their career (and not the value of «kickbacks» from the transfer and other inflows from the center). This would help not only voice the problem, but start really solving the two major issues. 
1. Bringing regional economies out of the «shadow». As a result - a smaller subsidization, less corruption and a smaller terrorist threat. 
2. Formation of a single human resource and extraterritorial career advancement of appointees in line of command. In other words, at the federal office in any region can and should work a professional appointee of any nationality, regardless of the titular nation, prevailing in the region. Naturally, the titular ethnic groups of the regions must be confident in their career advancement at the federal office – both in Caucasian and other regions, and this advancement will also be dependent on their tolerance and adaptability. 
The issues of improvement of national and federal relations in Russia today are extremely important. It is no accident, that when being the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin pointed out that «the problem of the optimal division of powers and functions is the basic question of conducting the economic policy in the country as a whole, and in the regions». 
This is especially important in conditions of the economic crisis and growth of external threats in the North Caucasian direction.