August 10, 2009
Ramzan Kadyrov's Evolving Political Credo
by Liz Fuller
Ramzan Kadyrov's career trajectory, from the poorly educated son of a
Muslim cleric to one of the most powerful men in Russia, epitomizes Mao
Tse-Tung's classic pronouncement that "political power grows out of the
barrel of a gun." But Kadyrov's recent statements reflect a desire for
a redefinition of the powers of federation subject heads that would
strengthen his position even further.
When
Kadyrov was first promoted to the post of Chechen prime minister in
March 2006, educated Chechens ridiculed his inability to express
himself coherently in either his native Chechen or in Russian, which he
speaks with a marked Chechen accent.
There has
been little if any improvement in his elocution over the past three
years, a failing that only serves to highlight the contrast between his
spontaneous verbal pronouncements (earthy and peppered with folk
wisdom) and the more polished and sophisticated views expressed in his
published interviews, which some observers believe are heavily edited
by his advisers.
There are, moreover, discrepancies and
inconsistencies between Kadyrov's responses over the past several years
to very similar questions.
Meanwhile, as his iron grip on
Chechnya has intensified, his political views on certain issues have
become increasingly radical.
Relations With MoscowIn
many respects, however, the vision Kadyrov outlines of the kind of
polity he wants Chechnya to become, its relations with the federal
center, and his own role as republic head is consistent. He defines
Chechnya as "a federal subject like any other" and as "an integral part
of Russia," not as a "state within a state," and says he sees "no sense
in a division of powers between the republic and the federal center."
Kadyrov
has publicly rejected the prospect of Chechnya becoming a sovereign
state, on the grounds that it is too small to survive as such given the
high birthrate and the lack of any natural resources except oil, which
will run out one day, "and then what shall I [sic] do as a separate
state?"
At the same time, he clearly perceives the
relationship between Chechnya and Moscow as entitling Chechnya to
unlimited subsidies from the federal budget -- plus the revenues from
the oil extracted on its territory -- with a minimum of reciprocal
responsibilities.
Chechnya should, Kadyrov has argued
repeatedly, again become a multiethnic and multiconfessional republic.
To that end, he has vowed to try to persuade all ethnic groups -- not
just Chechens, but Russians, Kumyks and others who fled during the
fighting of 1994-96 and 1999-2000 -- to return.
At the same
time, Kadyrov sees Chechnya as the preferred, if not the sole, homeland
of the Chechen people, arguing that if the tens of thousands of
Chechens currently living in Europe do not return to Chechnya, they and
their children risk assimilation and loss of their national identity
over the next couple of decades. Whereas in October 2007 Kadyrov told
"Rossiiskaya gazeta" that the Chechen authorities were not in a
position to finance the return to Chechnya of Chechens living elsewhere
in Russia and to provide them with housing and jobs, the same newspaper
quoted him on February 10, 2009 as saying he hopes to establish a fund
to provide financial support for Chechens who wish to return from
Europe.
In the same October 2007 interview, Kadyrov affirmed
that Chechnya has advanced from postconflict reconstruction to
intensive economic development. He said Chechnya should become "the
most developed region of the Caucasus" but admitted that this requires
building a new, technology-focused economy. The obstacles to doing so
are the lack of a trained work force (registered employment is around
50 percent, the real figure is closer to 74 percent) and general
reluctance to invest in a region perceived as still unstable and
plagued by official corruption.
Self-Styled StrongmanKadyrov
defines his own role as guarantor of the Chechen Constitution, and
acknowledges his duty to abide by Russian law and to serve his people
and "the people of Russia." But he has also implicitly questioned (in
an interview with the news agency Regnum in January 2009) the
expediency of the current relationship between the federal government
and the leaderships of the federation subjects, arguing that the powers
of the republic head vis-a-vis his subordinates should be enhanced.
In
that interview, he explained that "thanks to the system of 'divide and
rule,' we ourselves create opposition to the leader of the region. Take
my functions, for example. The president confirms me, but at the same
time he appoints the heads of a whole string of Chechen Republic
structures. We and they have the same status. The one thing that
distinguishes me is that I am the guarantor of the constitution. But
how can I ask them to work if I am not authorized to do so? If I were
not Ramzan Kadyrov, then no one would have restored order here. I know
this system from the inside -- I have the authority my father
bequeathed to me and everyone here knows that if he does not serve the
people he will not continue to live here."
That uncompromising
attitude to his subordinates also extends to what passes in Chechnya
for the political opposition, as represented by the regional affiliates
of various small Russian opposition parties. Kadyrov told Regnum that
"the term opposition is not acceptable to me -- if someone wants to
serve his people, all doors are open to him" and that "I didn't meet
with the opposition in order to conduct a dialogue between equals."
In
fact, consumed as he is with an obsessive need to exercise absolute
power, Kadyrov cannot tolerate any perceived challenge to his
authority, however insignificant or geographically remote. He has
pressured almost all key figures in the government of Chechen Republic
Ichkeria (ChRI) President Aslan Maskhadov, with the notable exception
of current ChRI leader Akhmed Zakayev, to return to Chechnya on his
terms.
Zakayev, for his part, continues to respond to repeated
predictions by Kadyrov of his imminent return to Grozny by saying that
he has no intention at present of doing so. Indeed, one reason why
Kadyrov is now seeking actively to encourage Chechens in Europe to
return home may be that while still abroad they are beyond his control.
(He cannot send hit-men to kill all of them the way he did former
resistance fighter Umar Israilov in Vienna in January 2009.)
The War On 'Wahhabism'There
is a curious disconnect between Kadyrov's attitude to "wahhabism" as an
ideology and to the young militants who take up arms in its name. In
2007, he argued that wahhabism can and should be successfully countered
by promoting a sense of national self-identification. To that end, he
has promulgated a brand of ethno-territorial nationalism based largely
on popular Islam but that also selectively borrows, and in some cases
grotesquely distorts, the symbols and rituals of Chechen sufism while
ignoring its essence. More recently, however, he has blamed the
continued appeal of "wahhabism" on the inability of the Chechen clergy
to demonstrate its flaws.
Kadyrov's comments on the magnitude
of the threat posed by the Islamic resistance are demonstrably at odds
with the situation on the ground. Over the past two-three years, he has
consistently estimated the strength of the resistance at no more than a
few dozen "bandits," and confidently predicted that they will be
rounded up or killed within a matter of months, predictions that have
proven to be utopian.
For example, on June 17, Kadyrov ordered
police to wipe out all resistance fighters in both Chechnya and
neighboring Ingushetia within two weeks. Then on June 27, he told
Rossiya television that after talks with the Russian Interior Ministry
he had issued orders to wipe out all remaining resistance leaders on
Chechen soil within one month.
Neither deadline has been met.
Moreover, Kadyrov has been forced to admit publicly that young men (and
some women) continue to head for the forests to join the resistance
ranks. After appeals to those young fighters to surrender went
unheeded, he warned that they risk being mercilessly hunted down and
killed.
Kadyrov has also condoned, if not explicitly ordered,
reprisals against the families of those young fighters who violate
Russian law. Those punitive measures range from withholding pensions
and child benefits to torching the families' homes.
Asked on
August 7 by a "Gazeta" journalist whether that approach does not in
fact constitute a violation of Russian law, Kadyrov responded angrily
that he is acting to prevent others from violating Russian law. In
other words, he appears either to believe that the end justifies the
means or to consider himself above the law. Indeed, on at least one
occasion, he has implied that Chechen tradition (or his interpretation
of it) takes precedence over Russian law: He has declared that the
Chechen authorities will conduct their own investigation into the July
15 abduction and murder of human rights activist Natalya Estemirova.
Reinterpreting Recent HistoryMany
aspects of Kadyrov's interpretation of the events of the past 15-20
years in Chechnya are open to question. He has emphatically denied (in
an April 2009 interview with "Rossiiskaya gazeta") ever having fought
on the side of the resistance during the 1994-96 war. At the same time,
he has admitted having as a boy regarded ChRI President Djokhar Dudayev
as "a national hero."
In a statement in December 2006 to mark
the 12th anniversary of the Russian attack on Chechnya, Kadyrov blamed
the onset of the war on "the shortsighted and irresponsible policies of
the political leadership of both Russia and Chechnya at that time." But
he now argues that both the 1994-96 war and that of 1999- 2000 were the
result of a conspiracy by "international terrorism" to weaken and
dismember the Russian Federation, and that Chechnya heroically "saved
Russia" by taking on itself the brunt of those attacks.
That
simplistic interpretation ignores the concerted efforts undertaken by
the Russian leadership in 1994 to undermine Dudayev, and the unanswered
questions surrounding the unimpeded incursions into Daghestan in August
1999 by the radical Islamist wing of the Chechen leadership. The
Russian leadership adduced those attacks as justification for launching
a new war in Chechnya one month later.
As for the political
situation within Russia as a whole, Kadyrov deplored in his January
2009 interview with Regnum what he termed general moral degradation and
an erosion of patriotism that, he claimed, together pose a potential
threat to national security. He argued that "if someone does not love
his people, his religion, his homeland, he will never serve properly in
the armed forces...a strong state needs strong soldiers."
Kadyrov
went on to warn of the threat posed by Russian nationalism, affirming
that "there should be no nationalists in Russia, which is a
multi-national state. If I were leader of the country, I would propose
a draft law to the State Duma that would designate nationalists
terrorists."
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