RFE/RL: From Byzantium To Grozny- Russia's U-Turn Toward Zakayev
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posted by circassiankama on August, 2009 as CHECHNYA
August 17, 2009
From Byzantium To Grozny -- Russia's U-Turn Toward Zakayev
by Aslan Doukaev
It is not for nothing that Russia considers itself to be the successor
and spiritual heir to the Byzantine Empire. Just like the long-vanished
realm on the shores of the Bosporus, Russia straddles Europe and Asia,
and its culture, political tradition, and way of life reflect both
influences.
Ordered
in mysterious ways, both Byzantium and then Russia engaged in politics
that were viewed by others as opaque, duplicitous, and hypocritical. In
their heyday, they exerted real influence on the world stage, but their
disastrous decline was precipitated not so much by external pressures
or infighting among the ruling class as by their excessive fondness for
dogma, and their inability to evolve and embrace change.
For
all their reputation for somnolence, corruption, intrigue, and
occasional descent into paranoia, however, Russian rulers, courtiers
and bureaucrats, just like their Byzantine predecessors, have been
anything but uncreative, inflexible and lacking in ideas. Even today, a
Russian politician can perform U-turns and somersaults that would turn
any acrobat green with envy.
Witness, for example, the Kremlin's
recent overtures to the exiled Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev. Over the
past two months, officials from the pro-Moscow administration in
Chechnya have been conducting negotiations
with Zakayev purportedly aimed at the "consolidation of the Chechen
people." One of those officials, Chechen parliament speaker Dukvakha
Abdurakhmanov, confirmed last week in London that their mission was
endorsed by both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin.
Just two years ago, however, Putin, then Russian
president, issued a public demand that Zakayev, who had received asylum
in the United Kingdom, be extradited to Russia to face criminal charges.
"There
is no need to sift through any archives for this," Putin told a news
conference at the end of a G8 summit. "We have the evidence -- video
footage of his criminal activity."
'Why? Why?'
Last
September, Putin accused Britain of providing a safe haven for Russia's
enemies, in clear reference to a group of Russian emigres, including
Zakayev. His country's relations with the U.K. would never recover,
Putin declared, as long as London remained a base for anti-Kremlin
dissent.
"Why are you allowing the territory of Great Britain to
fight Russia? Why do you allow Great Britain to be used as a launch
pad?" he asked a bemused group of foreign journalists and academics at
a meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. It would be like Russia
letting IRA terrorists use Russia as a safe haven to plan attacks, he
claimed.
So why the volte-face? Why have the Russian
authorities abandoned the old and worn-out
"we-never-talk-to-terrorists" mantra so quickly?
There are two possible reasons.
First,
Russia never truly believed Zakayev had ever been involved in any
terrorist activities. When the Russian Federation sought Zakayev's
extradition from Britain in late 2002, the materials presented by the
office of the Russian Prosecutor-General to the court in London did not
contain any charges of terrorism, though in the media Russian officials
routinely branded him as a terrorist.
Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the Russian leadership seems to be increasingly frustrated
with the situation in Chechnya and with its current head, Ramzan
Kadyrov. Since November 2008, at least four known critics of his regime
have been murdered execution-style in Russia and abroad. Kadyrov
strenuously denies any involvement, but those killings, no doubt, have
caused the Kremlin diplomatic and political embarrassment.
Deteriorating Security
To
add insult to injury, the security situation in Chechnya, after a
period of relative calm, has begun to deteriorate again, with a recent
upsurge in bombings and attacks. If anything, Kadyrov's leadership
style, his dictatorial ways, brutality, and contempt for justice only
fuel resentment and impel more young men and women to join the ranks of
the insurgents.
The Zakayev team will probably attempt to
capitalize on Kadyrov's failures and present an alternative program for
Chechnya's stabilization at "a world Chechen congress" that the two
negotiating parties have agreed to convene within the next few months.
Zakayev may also call for a more vigorous investigation of the recent
killings, an amnesty for thousands of Chechens currently serving
lengthy prison sentences on charges of "participating in illegal armed
formations," and the re-burial of several prominent Chechen leaders,
such as Djokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov.
Finally, the prime
minister of the Chechen separatist government-in-exile is likely to
appeal to the Russian authorities not to persecute the families and
relatives of the alleged rebel fighters, as such reprisals only furnish
another steady source of recruits for the insurgency.
Zakayev's
agenda appears to differ radically from that of the pro-Moscow Chechen
negotiators, who seek primarily to rally Chechen factions behind the
Kadyrov leadership. However, the Kremlin's tacit approval of the
negotiating process and of the forthcoming Chechen congress may signal
a realization that a change of course is essential if Chechnya is ever
to be truly stabilized.
Exactly how far the Russian leadership
is prepared to go is still unclear. The inner workings of Russia's
Byzantine politics are as difficult to decrypt as ever.
Aslan
Doukaev is director of RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service. The views
expressed in this commentary are his own, and do not necessarily
reflect those of RFE/RL.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty © 2009 RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.rferl.org/content/From_Byzantium_To_Grozny__Russias_UTurn_Toward_Zakayev/1801249.html
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