April 22, 2009
RFE/RL
Chechnya Remains Bound To Moscow By Economic Weakness
by Liz Fuller
Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov has hailed the April 16
announcement of the end of the 10-year counterterrorism operation in
Chechnya as an acknowledgment that Islamic radicalism has been defeated
and as heralding a badly needed economic upswing in the republic.
By
contrast, many commentators in Moscow and abroad have construed it as
the latest in a long series of concessions by Moscow, one that has
further augmented Kadyrov's already considerable power and removed the
last constraints on his imputed plan to transform Chechnya into a de
facto independent state within the Russian Federation.
Kadyrov's
hyperbole is misplaced insofar as the Islamic resistance still moves
freely throughout Chechnya's mountainous southern regions, staging
ambushes and hit-and-run attacks against the various police and
paramilitary formations loyal to Kadyrov. And foreign investors are
unlikely to start flocking to Chechnya in the midst of an ongoing
global recession.
Inherited Laws, Parties
True,
Kadyrov wields personal power, and enjoys a degree of impunity
vis-a-vis Moscow, incomparably greater than that of any other
federation subject head. That relationship is rooted in an unwritten
agreement whereby Kadyrov's protector, Vladimir Putin, granted him
carte blanche to use whatever means he considered expedient to break
the back of the resistance and secure the absolute submission of the
civilian population in return for Kadyrov's unswerving loyalty to
Moscow.
But Chechnya today still remains a long way from qualifying as a viable state within a state on at least two key counts.
First,
an independent state needs its own constitution and laws, even if these
may be closely modeled on those of another state, and its own political
parties. Chechnya, however, has been meticulous in bringing its laws
and constitution into conformity with those of the Russian Federation.
The only political parties registered in Chechnya are the regional
branches of all-Russian parties. Elections, both national and local,
have been rigged to demonstrate overwhelming support for the
pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, which holds 37 of the 41 seats in the
republic's parliament.
Financial Dependence
In
addition, Chechnya depends on subsidies from the federal center for up
to 90 percent of its annual budget. Moreover, Moscow has provided huge
additional sums for postconflict reconstruction and restitution
payments for families whose homes and properties were destroyed during
the fighting. It is that steady intravenous drip of money from Moscow
that keeps the republic afloat.
And the Russian leadership
insists on retaining a controlling stake in the one natural resource
that could render Chechnya even partially economically self-sufficient.
Its oil reserves are controlled by a joint venture in which
Grozneftegaz, a subsidiary of the state-owned Rosneft, owns a 51
percent stake. Rosneft then exports and refines Chechen oil and
transfers a share of the profits to Grozny. All efforts by Kadyrov, and
by his late father before him, to wrest total control and to have an
oil refinery built in Chechnya to obviate the need to export crude for
refining have been resolutely rebuffed by Moscow.
Indeed, it is
doubtful whether Chechnya could survive as a quasi-independent state
just on the profits from exporting oil. Annual oil production is
currently estimated at less than 2 million tons. Kadyrov himself in a
recent interview with "Rossiiskaya gazeta" affirmed that he does not
need sovereignty as "one day the oil will run out, and what would I do
then as an independent state?"
Curious Hybrid
Chechnya
under Kadyrov thus presents a curious hybrid: a polity in which one man
wields virtual absolute power, by virtue both of the leeway granted him
by his masters in Moscow and the military units at his disposal that
ruthlessly target perceived disaffected elements both within Chechnya
and abroad. At the same time, Chechnya is, and will remain,
overwhelmingly dependent on subsidies from Moscow to sustain the
economic and political status quo (how much do the salaries of
Kadyrov's private armed forces alone cost every month?).
Trumpeting
the end of the counterterrorism operation does little to alter that
equation. And Moscow will still retain some leverage over Kadyrov.
Although some Russian forces will be withdrawn from Chechnya, up to
30,000 will remain -- outnumbering the various paramilitary, police,
and security units loyal to Kadyrov. And despite having made a
seemingly arbitrary decision to call an end to the counterterrorism
operation, the Kremlin could equally arbitrarily launch a new one,
either throughout Chechnya or -- as it does on a regular basis in
Daghestan and Ingushetia -- in a particular village or region, just to
remind Kadyrov which side his bread is buttered on.
