April 07, 2009
Is Chechen Leader Losing Moscow's Trust?
by Liz Fuller
Just two years since his inauguration as Chechen Republic head, the
chances that Ramzan Kadyrov will still occupy that post one year from
now appear to be dwindling fast. Informed observers believe the Russian
leadership has finally realized that Kadyrov constitutes both an
embarrassment and a potential threat.
Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev has pointedly restricted his contacts with
Kadyrov to the bare minimum, while during a meeting in late March,
Kadyrov's erstwhile patron, Vladimir Putin, subjected him to tough
questions about the use of federal funds. Just days later, a source in
the Russian presidential administration rejected as premature Kadyrov's
March 24 claim that on March 31 the Kremlin would formally announce the
end of the "counterterrorism operation" in Chechnya.
Since his
inauguration as Putin's successor in last May, Medvedev has met
one-on-one just once with Kadyrov, in late July. On that occasion,
their discussion reportedly focused on postconflict reconstruction,
unresolved social problems, and preparations for the October elections
to a new Chechen parliament. Kadyrov assured Medvedev that equal
conditions would be created for all political parties participating in
that ballot.
In the event, however, only the pro-Kremlin Unified
Russia and A Just Russia won parliamentary representation in a ballot
in which many objective observers concluded the turnout figure had been
wildly overstated. When Medvedev traveled to Ingushetia one month later
for two hours of talks with newly appointed President Yunus-Bek
Yevkurov, he did not combine that trip with a visit to Grozny to assess
firsthand the reconstruction of which Kadyrov habitually boasts, an
omission that some observers have construed as a deliberate snub to
Kadyrov.
Putin, for his part, met with Kadyrov in Moscow in
August to discuss the economic situation in Chechnya, and then traveled
to Grozny in mid-October to attend the formal inauguration of the
grandiose Heart of Chechnya Mosque. The preference shown to Putin over
Medvedev in the reporting of their respective activities by the
official Chechen website chechnyatoday.com may reflect Kadyrov's desire
to retain Putin's support.
Cracks In The Facade
Few
would dispute the magnitude of what Kadyrov has achieved in terms of
postconflict reconstruction both in Grozny and in other towns and
villages. But much of the reconstruction work is of poor quality; and
it has been financed by virtually unlimited subsidies from the federal
center, augmented by supposedly "voluntary" monthly contributions from
budget-sector employees.
And it is impossible to estimate what
proportion of the funds allocated by Moscow for reconstruction, or for
the various federal programs for education and housing, or as
compensation for those whose homes were destroyed and relatives killed
during the fighting of the past 14 years, was diverted for other
purposes either there or by Chechen government officials. Nor has
anyone dared to ask where Kadyrov finds the money to maintain a stable
of thoroughbred racehorses and indulge his taste in luxury sports cars.
There
have recently been signs, however, that Moscow is now looking more
closely at how budget funds are spent. Chechnya's new prosecutor,
Mikhail Savchin, said on March 23 that his office registered 10,000
violations of budget law in 2008 alone; one week later, on March 31, he
estimated the number of violations of anticorruption legislation over
the same time period at 1,500, regnum.ru reported.
The
second accomplishment of which Kadyrov regularly boasts is the alleged
neutralization of the resistance as a political and military force. He
has repeatedly claimed that only a handful of resistance fighters are
still holding out in the mountains, a claim at odds with his regular
threats to hold responsible the parents of young people -- both men and
women -- who still flock to join the resistance ranks.
That
the resistance is now more active in neighboring Ingushetia and
Daghestan than in Chechnya is primarily due to the psychological
exhaustion of the older generation of Chechens and the atmosphere of
terror that surrounds Kadyrov and his thousands of armed guards.
In
addition to sidelining the armed resistance, Kadyrov also claims credit
for the return to Chechnya of several prominent ministers in, or
supporters of, the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria leadership in exile. But
at least some of those who have returned acknowledge off the record
that they did so only in response to blackmail or threats. And the most
prominent leader in exile, Akhmed Zakayev, remains in London despite
repeated announcements by Kadyrov over the past year of his imminent
return to Grozny.
Other former Kadyrov allies who broke with him and left Russia
have been killed.
The former commander of the Gorets (Mountaineer) battalion, Movladi
Baysarov, and former State Duma Deputy Ruslan Yamadayev were shot dead
in broad daylight in Moscow in November 2006 and September 2008,
respectively, and resistance fighter Umar Israilov, who joined
Kadyrov's bodyguard under pressure, was gunned down in Vienna in
January 2009.
A further weakness that could be held against
Kadyrov is his inventive rhetoric. In a recent interview with
regnum.ru, for example, he affirmed that "Chechnya saved Russia" by
taking upon itself the brunt of "Islamic terrorism," and that Chechnya
not only serves as a moral beacon for the rest of the Russian
Federation -- which is plagued by prostitution, drug abuse, and other
social evils -- but that it serves as a catalyst for reviving and
promoting patriotism.
Those commentators who still consider
Kadyrov's position vis-a-vis the Kremlin unassailable point to the
systematic removal of any political figure in Chechnya who could serve
as a potential challenge, including Sulim Yamadayev, former commander
of the Vostok battalion of the Russian Defense Ministry's 42nd
Motorized Rifle Division.
But that argument misses two crucial
and interrelated points. First, if the Kremlin decides that Kadyrov is
a liability and should be physically removed, it could easily blackmail
a member of his entourage to do so. And second, there are several
potential leadership candidates currently based elsewhere in Russia
who, in contrast to Kadyrov, are not tarnished by the use of arbitrary
violence against the Chechen population, and who are far better
qualified for the position of republic head in terms of their political
savvy and management skills.
Medvedev has already set a
precedent for bringing in new and untainted leaders from outside when
he proposed Yevkurov as president of Ingushetia last October, and then
when he brought in Dmitry Dmitrienko, former deputy head of the State
Fisheries Agency, as governor of Murmansk Oblast two weeks ago.
Liz
Fuller is co-editor of RFE/RL's commentary and analysis desk. The views
expressed in this commentary are the author's own, and do not
necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL 
