From: MSN Nicknamepsychoteddybear24  (Original Message)    Sent: 8/9/2007 1:31 PM
Chechnya Weekly - Volume VIII, Issue 32
August 9, 2007

IN THIS ISSUE:
* Rebels Respond to Kadyrov’s Threats with a Village Raid
* Dagestani Mothers Protest Abductions
* Policeman Killed in Ingushetia
* Chechen Authorities Order NGOs Back to Grozny
* Gazprom and Transneft Create Paramilitary Group to Thwart Pipeline Attacks
By Andrei Smirnov
* Chechen Musical Ensemble Seeks Asylum in Finland
By Andrei Smirnov
* Dokka Umarov Starts to Show His Teeth
By Mayrbek Vachagaev
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Rebels Respond to Kadyrov’s Threats with a Village Raid

Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov vowed on August 3 that the republic’s rebels would be completely destroyed by the end of the year. “I responsibly declare that in the time remaining before the end of the year the problem of the remnants of the illegal armed formations will be fully resolved,” Interfax quoted him as saying at the opening of a military training center in his native town of Tsentoroi. “Not a single militant, or, as we call them, shaitan, will remain in Chechnya.”

In what may have been a response, a group of rebels attacked the village of Tsa-Vedeno during the night of August 4-5, killing three people, including a two-year old boy, and burning three homes belonging to policemen. Kommersant, on August 6, quoted Dmitry Nikiforov, the acting head of the of the press center of the operational headquarters in Chechnya, as saying that approximately 10 rebels were involved in the attack and that they split into two groups – one of which headed for the homes of police and security officers in the village while the other setup a checkpoint at the village’s entrance. According to the newspaper, the attackers set up the checkpoint late at night when few people were driving in their cars, apparently hoping to stop law-enforcement or military personnel. However, the first vehicle they stopped was a Mercedes being driven by Zelimkhan Dzhabirov, the head of the legal department of a Grozny construction firm, and had two passengers – Nalchik resident Akhmed Eshiev and his two-year-old nephew, Artur, who were traveling to visit relatives in the area.

“Believing that he had been stopped by representatives of official power structures (the militants were in the same uniforms worn by spetsnaz), the driver Dhabirov not only stopped the car and got out of it, but presented his work ID,” Kommersant wrote. “However the militants, not waiting to figure out who they were dealing with, immediately opened fire with automatic rifles. Zelimkhan Dzhabirov was killed next to the car; his passengers [were killed inside it]. According to investigators, they may have been shot as undesirable witnesses: while Akhmed Eshiev lived in Nalchik for the last eight years, he was by birth from Vedeno and could have recognized someone among the militants. In order to cover their tracks completely, the militants burned the car.”

According to Kommersant, the second group of militants went to the homes of Yusup-Khadzhi Satovkhanov, a lieutenant with the Vedeno district criminal investigation department, and Saikhan Gatsaev, a member of the “Sever” battalion of the federal Interior Ministry’s Interior Troops. Not finding the servicemen at home, the militants forced their families out of the homes, which they then burned. “The militants beat the elders who tried to stop them,” the newspaper quoted local residents as saying. The locals also said that the militants were operating at a leisurely pace, but still left the village before military and police units arrived.

Nikiforov said the attack was carried out by a group of militants led by a 17-year-old Tsa-Vedeno resident, Turpal-Ali Dzhamalkhanov, who has been wanted since 2005 for an attack on police. Writing in Moskovsky komsomolets on August 7, Vadim Rechkalov reported that Turpal-Ali Dzhamalkhanov is in fact 27 and heads a gang made up of no more than six people that “was certainly operating with another gang in the attack on Tsa-Vedeno, if it was there at all.” Rechkalov reported that there are currently seven “bandit groups” totaling as many as 60 members operating in Chechnya’s Vedeno district.

Kommersant reported that law-enforcement officials believe the attack was an act of revenge for the reported killing of six rebels by members of the Vostok Battalion of the federal Defense Ministry’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division during a special operation near the Vedeno district settlement of Tazen-Kale. The rebels killed in that operation reportedly answered directly to Dokka Umarov, the rebel leader and president of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) (Chechnya Weekly, July 26). Kommersant noted, however, that the rebel attack on Tsa-Vedeno may have had “a political subtext” given that with this “small but loud” action, the rebels managed to call attention to themselves immediately after Kadyrov’s vow to wipe them out before the end of the year.

Vadim Rechkalov, for his part, put the Tsa-Vedeno raid in the context of the increase in rebel activity since the spring. “Since then, Kadyrov and the bandits have been regularly challenging one another,” he wrote. “But Kadyrov's position is much more complicated than the gunmen’s. Not only is he supposed to destroy them, but he also has to create the image of a peaceful life in the republic. Fortified checkpoints and peaceful life are incompatible. But the gunmen are posting their scouting parties at the dismantled federal checkpoints. Mountain villages without armored personnel carriers look entirely peaceful, but they are completely vulnerable to nocturnal raids.” (See Mayrbek Vachagaev’s article below.)

Kadyrov visited Tsa-Vedeno on August 5 and sacked the head of the Vedeno district’s department of internal affairs, Rasul Isaev, replacing him with Khizir Saipulaev, who was a company commander in the Chechen Interior Ministry’s PPSM-2 [Police Patrol-Post Service] regiment. As the Caucasus Times reported on August 6, Kadyrov said that in attacking Tsa-Vedeno, “the bandits tried to show that they are still capable of something, but as a result, they got dirty money and people’s condemnation.” He added that the “satans” who took the life of an innocent child “hold nothing sacred.” According to the website, Kadyrov attended the funerals of those who had been killed in the attack and gave 100,000 rubles (nearly $4,000) to each of the families of those killed and 500,000 rubles (nearly $20,000) to each family whose house was destroyed.

Kommersant, on August 7, quoted Nikolai Kalugin, who is acting as Chechnya’s chief prosecutor while Valery Kuznetsov is on vacation, as saying that the republic’s law-enforcement system in general bears responsibility for the Tsa-Vedeno attack. “Operational information that an attack was in the offing was not received and preventive measures to avert it were not taken,” he said. Chechen Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov said on August 7 that the names of those who took part in the attack on Tsa-Vedeno were already known and expressed confidence they would soon be captured, RIA Novosti reported.

The separatist Kavkaz-Center website, for its part, posted an item on August 8 stating that the spokesman of the Southeastern Front of ChRI Armed Forces had “confirmed that on the night of August 5, a Special Operational Group (SOG) conducted a pinpoint operation in the village of Tsa-Vedeno, in which three houses belonging to active members of the ‘Sever’ munafiq [hypocrite] gang were burned down.” The website also claimed that in carrying out the rebel Sharia Court’s ruling sanctioning the destruction of the homes, “mujahideen brought out the family members of munafiqs (women, men, children) without causing harm to them.”

As for the murder of Zelimkhan Dzhabirov, Akhmed Eshiev and his two-year-old nephew, and the burning of the Mercedes in which they were traveling, Kavkaz-Center quoted a spokesman for the Chechen command as saying: “We officially state that the mujahideen had nothing to do with the murders. We do not know these people [the victims] and the Chechen authorities do not have any complaints against them.” The website stated it was able to “confirm” that “three civilians, including a child, were killed a few hours after the mujahideen had left the village” by “the kafirs [infidels] and munafiqs who entered the village after the mujahideen had left and conducted a so-called ‘cleansing operation.’” After discovering that it did not belong to the rebels, they burned the Mercedes.

According to Kavkaz-Center, two of those killed in Tsa-Vedeno – Akhmed Eshiev and the two-year-old Artur (who, according to the website, were father and son, not uncle and nephew) – had long ago moved outside of Chechnya because Kadyrov had killed 24 members of their extended family, including women and young children, after coming into conflict with Akhmed Eshiev’s bodyguard.

The Tsa-Vedeno raid was not the only act of violence in Chechnya during the past week. Agence France-Presse reported on August 8 that two Russian servicemen had been killed the previous day in Grozny. The news agency quoted Chechen police spokesman Amin Deniev as saying that “criminals” had opened fire with automatic weapons and grenade launchers on Russian Interior Ministry forces, killing two soldiers. He also said that police in the village of Gekhi had found and destroyed a homemade bomb that was the equivalent of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) of TNT. RIA Novosti reported on August 5 that two rebels were killed and two policemen slightly wounded in a shootout on the outskirts of the village of Staryi Achkhoi in the Achkhoi-Martan district. Ekho Moskvy reported on August 4 that unknown attackers had fired on the commandant’s office of the Interior Ministry’s Interior Troops in the town of Shali. According to the radio station, two civilians were wounded by shrapnel from the grenades fired by the attackers, while no servicemen were hit in the attack.

Rebel leader Dokka Umarov said in a statement posted on the Kavkaz-Center website on July 30 that his forces are “ready for any kind of big event,” are capable of conducting “large-scale military operations” and will “act in such a way that will be beneficial for us and when we will decide that we need to act.” He also claimed that there has been “a large influx of young mujahideen” into the rebel ranks as of late.

Kavkaz-Center claimed on August 6 that Umarov visited Grozny on August 4, holding a conference with the commander of the Central Front of the ChRI Armed Forces, Abubakar Basayev, and several "amirs." The separatist website quoted an unidentified source as saying that Umarov was accompanied by his personal guard and a special protection unit and visited several districts of the capital, where he met with local residents.

"One of the meetings with inhabitants of Jokhar [Grozny] took place next to the Press Building," Kaka-Center reported. "Tens of people were able to meet with the President of the ChRI and to ask questions. The appearance of Dokka Umarov in Jokhar created panic among the invaders and their stooges, as well as rumors about a forthcoming assault on the capital by units from the ChRI Armed Forces. The invaders began to advance armored vehicles and to transport troops from Khankala and Sheikh Mansur Airport." The rebel website claimed that the pro-Moscow Chechen authorities set up roadblocks reinforced with armored vehicles on many roads and crossroads, and that "munafiqs" [or hypocrites, as the rebels call the pro-Moscow Chechen forces] "hastily moved" their families to Moscow, Rostov and Nalchik, among other places.

August 6 was the eleventh anniversary of Operation Jihad, the large-scale rebel assault on Grozny in 1996 that led to the final ceasefire in the first Chechen war. (See Mayrbek Vachagaev’s article below.)

Dagestani Mothers Protest Abductions

RIA Novosti reported on August 4 that units of the Dagestani Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) special-purpose troops came across a criminal group in the Dagestani village of Kadyrkent on August 2, and killed four militants in a shoot-out. An officer of the FSB’s main intelligence directorate died and one policeman was injured in the battle. The news agency reported that a policeman was killed in Dagestan’s Sergokalinsky district as he was driving to work on August 4 after unidentified attackers fired on his car. According to RIA Novosti, it was the second attack on a law-enforcement officer in the Sergokalinsky district. Reuters reported on August 3 that a rebel was killed when commandos raided an apartment building in Dagestan’s capital, Makhachkala. According to the news agency, the raid followed the discovery nearby of a car filled with explosives. Three other rebels surrendered to police in the incident. Meanwhile, the deputy head of local police in the town of Buinaksk, Abdulmashid Rasulov, was shot dead from a car as he was walking to work. Reuters reported that he had previously been targeted by militants.

Meanwhile, Kavkazky Uzel reported on August 3 that the “Mothers of Dagestan” organization was holding a demonstration in Makhachkala to protest the kidnappings in the republic. According to the website, a group of mothers of kidnapping victims announced a hunger strike that they said they would continue until Dagestani President Mukhu Aliev received them. According to the “Mothers of Dagestan,” 22 people have been abducted in Dagestan, of whom four were found, one was murdered, two are in the hands of the authorities and being tried and one was ransomed. The protesters adopted a resolution stating: “An anti-constitutional and illegal undercover militarized body operating in Dagestan is abducting people in violation of the constitution. These people either disappear without a trace or after some time, emerge in torture chambers of the law-enforcement bodies where they ‘confess” under duress.” The resolution also demanded the resignations of Dagestan’s chief prosecutor and Interior Minister, punishment for all those guilty of killings and abductions and revocation of the law “On banning Wahhabism and other extremist activities in the Republic of Dagestan.” (See Mayrbek Vachagaev’s article below.)

Policeman Killed in Ingushetia

On August 6, a policeman was killed in the Ingush city of Malgobek. According to Gazeta.ru, an unknown assailant shot Alikhan Albakov twice in the head after he parked his car in his garage and was heading toward his apartment. Meanwhile, a resident of the city of Karabulak, Ibragim Gazdiev, was kidnapped on August 8, Kavkazky Uzel reported. According to the website, witnesses said they saw Gazdiev's car blocked by another car near the city administration building, after which armed persons in camouflage uniforms and mask came out of the second car, forced Gazdiev out of his car and into theirs and drove off in an unknown direction.

Kavkazky Uzel reported that 44 people have been kidnapped in Ingushetia since 2005 and that, according to the Chechen National Salvation Committee, at least 13 kidnappings have taken place in Ingushetia and North Ossetia this year. Local residents believe that law-enforcement officials in North Ossetia are involved in the kidnapping of Ingush, the website reported.

Meanwhile, in an interview with Interfax published on August 3, Ingush President Murat Zyazikov played down the recent upswing in violence in his republic (Chechnya Weekly, July 5, 12, 19, 26; August 2) while blaming it on outside forces. “Talk of a worsening situation in Ingushetia is farfetched,” he told the news agency. “This is simply provocation and slander. The situation is under control and we have everything in order. Law-enforcement officers are investigating crimes. They believe that the attacks were a reaction to the energetic efforts of law-enforcement officers to root out crime. Unfortunately, such crimes occur in other parts of the country, not just in southern Russia. In general, the fight against crime is a hot topic throughout the world. These things should not be exaggerated.”

Zyazikov added: “I believe that these provocative actions constitute an attempt by certain forces in Russia and abroad to turn Ingushetia into a site for reaching some of their narrow objectives. Someone is very unhappy that Ingushetia is on the road to development. However, nobody will force us to abandon it. Ingushetia is on the frontline of the struggle for the [territorial] integrity of the Russian Federation.”

Nezavisimaya gazeta reported on August 2 that Ingushetia is turning into “the main exporter of instability in southern Russia” and that if Zyazikov and his security officials are unable to reverse this, Ingushetia could join the ranks of Russia’s “unviable regions” and reap all the attendant consequences, including “liquidation through incorporation” – meaning absorption into a revived Chechen-Ingush republic. According to the newspaper, Kadyrov is capable – using his inimitable methods – of imposing order on Ingushetia, which would not only earn him the reputation as “the unifying father of the fraternal Vaynakh nation,” but also strengthen his position in the North Caucasus. “Greater Chechnya” would stand a good chance of becoming the dominant region in southern Russia, with Grozny becoming “the real capital of the Southern Federal District,” wrote Nezavisimaya gazeta.

Moskovsky komsomolets wrote this past May that the Chechen authorities, backed by Moscow, are poised to impose a political merger on Ingushetia, with Kadyrov placing allies in key posts inside Ingushetia’s Interior Ministry and the two republics eventually merging into “a single Checheno-Ingush republic under Ramzan Kadyrov’s control.” Both Kadyrov and Zyazikov denied such reports (Chechnya Weekly, May 24 and 31).

Chechen Authorities Order NGOs Back to Grozny

Chechen government officials told representatives of more than 20 non-governmental organizations on August 2 that they had two weeks to move their regional headquarters to Grozny. According to Reuters, nearly 30 NGOs – among them international charities such as Medecins Sans Frontieres and World Vision – work in Chechnya, but because of security concerns and official restrictions on movement, many base their operations in neighboring Russian regions. “There is information that funds allocated for humanitarian needs are misused,” Ramzan Lechakhadzhiev, head of the external relations department of the Chechen presidential administration, told Reuters. “To stop this, all headquarters and warehouses should be located in Grozny. They should move here if they want to continue their work.” The news agency quoted the head of one NGO operating in Chechnya, who requested anonymity, as saying: “Moving offices, especially for big organizations in two weeks, is just not possible. I think a lot of organizations are thinking about moving to Grozny anyway, but they don’t want to feel like they’re being pressured...I’m a little bit unclear on what basis they could force such a move.”

Interfax on August 7 quoted Amnesty International Russia director Sergei Nikitin as saying: “It is not clear which section of the law the Chechen authorities have in mind in making this demand.” The news agency also quoted Rachel Denber, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Central Asia division, as saying that humanitarian organizations have a number of reasons for not wanting to be based inside Chechnya, concerns for security being among them. The website quoted an anonymous representative of another international NGO as saying: “They want to gather us all together so that it will be easier to control us.”

Svetlana Gannushkina, chairwoman of the “Grazhdanskoe sodeistvie” (Civil Assistance) Committee, said she considered the demand unlawful, adding that the question of where aid groups are to be located must be decided in conjunction with the federal authorities. Indeed, Interfax on August 8 quoted Ella Pamfilova, head of the Russian president’s council for the development of civil society institutions and human rights, as saying that the Chechen authorities have no right to demand that aid groups working in the republic relocate their offices and warehouses to Chechnya. “International humanitarian aid organizations must choose where to work by themselves,” she said. “It is their right. Of course, they could be asked to move to Chechnya and offered proper conditions for their work. But no administrative diktat is possible. Everything must comply with the law.”

Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, meanwhile, told Interfax: “We are not dictating our terms. Nothing of the kind. However, if humanitarian aid organizations want to help Chechnya and the Chechen people to overcome the current serious economic problems quickly, we must work hand in hand. I have instructed Deputy Prime Minister Lema Magomadov, who is responsible for social welfare, to inform international humanitarian aid organizations that they should move their offices and warehouses to Grozny.”

Gazprom and Transneft Create Paramilitary Group to Thwart Pipeline Attacks
By Andrei Smirnov

On July 5, the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament, voted in favor of letting Gazprom and Transneft, the two state-owned companies that control natural gas and oil pipelines in the country, create private paramilitary groups to protect the pipelines. The law was initiated by the Kremlin, so there is no doubt that President Vladimir Putin will sign it. In fact, Russian security officials who are worried about possible attacks on pipelines are behind this initiative. The law’s author is Alexander Gurov, a former police general who frequently lobbies in the State Duma for decisions favoring the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service (FSB). At the same time, the concerns of the siloviki are shared by the top Russian officials. Gurov told correspondents that “a couple of terrorist acts and the environmental disaster that will follow will be enough to immediately call Russia an unreliable supplier of energy resources” (Blotter.ru, July 5).

Today, Gazprom controls all gas pipelines in Russia while Transneft controls all oil transportation pipelines. Acts of sabotage and the bombing of pipelines are already a reality in Russia. In 2005 and 2006, here were several major explosions on the gas pipeline that exports Russian gas to Azerbaijan. These acts of sabotage may have influenced the Azerbaijani government’s decision to stop importing gas from Russia. Another result of these explosions was that the Azerbaijani authorities stopped extraditing Chechen rebels wanted by the Russian authorities.

Bombings of oil and gas pipelines and of power lines have taken place several times during the last two years in such North Caucasian regions as Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai. The Russian authorities are now focusing on the city of Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai, a key port for the export of Russian oil. A rebel attack on the city or an explosion on the pipeline that brings oil to the port could seriously affect Russia’s oil exporting capabilities. In late July, anti-terrorist military exercises were held in Novorossiysk.

However, attacks on oil and gas facilities are possible outside of the North Caucasus. On August 6, the Supreme Court of Tatarstan, an ethnic republic in the Volga region, sentenced to various prison terms members of a Tatar and Chechen sabotage group that had carried out 11 bombings of oil, gas, and power facilities in Tatarstan, Kirov Oblast, Ulyanovsk, Samara, and Bashkorstan from 2004-2006. This group is probably not the only one of its kind. Last year, Chechen rebel leader Dokka Umarov established two “fronts” in Russia: “the Volga Front” and “the Urals Front.” In September 2006, the leadership of the “Volga Front” claimed responsibility for the bombing of a pipeline in Volgograd Oblast that exports gas from Central Asia through Russia. On June 6, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev expressed concern about the growing number of supporters of radical Islam not only in the North Caucasus, but also in the Volga region (NTV, June 6).

Despite the clear need to enhance the protection of the pipelines in Russia, not everybody in the country agrees that private Gazprom and Transneft troops, who will be allowed to purchase and carry weapons, are really needed. For example, the independent Novaya gazeta newspaper asked why these paramilitary formations were needed when there are special departments in the FSB and the Ministry of Industry and Energy whose duty is to prevent acts of sabotage on pipelines (Novaya gazeta, July 20). It is quite possible that the establishment of Gazprom and Transneft armies has another purpose: to allow the FSB to deflect responsibility if a serious attack on pipelines really occurs.

Andrei Smirnov is an independent journalist covering the North Caucasus. He is based in Russia.

Chechen Musical Ensemble Seeks Asylum in Finland
By Andrei Smirnov

On August 7, Mikhail Sturshe, a Finnish human rights activist and a supporter of Chechen independence, told Kavkaz-Center that a Chechen vocal group, Zhovkhar, which means “pearl” in Chechen, had sought political asylum in Finland. The report posted on the rebel website said the reason that the group members gave for their decision was that it is impossible to have a normal life in Chechnya nowadays.

Zhovkar is the most famous Chechen female vocal group. Formed in 1993, it consists of female singers and male musicians who accompany them. The news that the band had decided not to return to Chechnya shocked the Russian authorities. Initially, officials in the pro-Russian Chechen government’s Ministry of Culture refused to comment on the group’s flight. After the initial silence, an explanation was found: Chechen Minister of Culture Dikalu Muzikaev told journalists that the six members of the band (four women and two men) who asked for asylum in Finland were in fact not members of the group but simply members of the republican philharmonic society. Muzikaev then admitted that these people were indeed members of the vocal group but that they had quit Zhovkar on their own accord late in July and that their trip to Finland was private and without any connections with the Culture Ministry. According to the minister, these four young women and two young men had asked him to permit them to travel to Finland, but he refused and so they resigned. As for the other part of the group, Muzikaev said it was in Grozny and was getting ready for the “Peace to the Caucasus” Arts Festival.

The Interior Ministry of Finland has officially admitted that six Chechen artists and eleven of their family members have sought political asylum in their country, but the Russian authorities are doing their best to demonstrate that this is nothing serious. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov said that no politics were involved in the fact that the artists had asked for asylum in Finland. At the same time, he described the decision of the singers and musicians to stay in Finland as “political adventurism” (Gazeta.ru, August 8). Like Cultural Minister Muzikaev, Kadyrov repeated that only four of the people who requested asylum in Finland really belonged to the group. Kadyrov hinted in his statement that the artists simply wanted to move to a country with much higher living standards.

Dairy Kozak, the Russian presidential representative to the Southern Federal District, also said that “living conditions are not ideal in the Chechen republic” and that “people want to live where the conditions are better.” At the same time, Kozak echoed Ramzan Kadyrov and Dikalu Muzikaev by saying that most of the group’s members continue to work in Chechnya (Gazeta, August 8).

Analyzing the comments of the Russian officials, one can see that all of their statements are almost identical and appear to be well-coordinated. According to the official version, politics played no role in the incident, the artists sought asylum simply because they wanted a better life, and only a few members of the group went to Finland while most are still in Chechnya.

Nevertheless, even Russia’s state-controlled Channel One television had to admit that those who stayed in Finland amounted to almost half of the group. On August 7, Channel One aired a short old video of the group’s concert during a news program, noting that four of the six female singers in the video had escaped to Finland and that the group was now looking for new singers.

“The core of the group whom we met back in 2004 stayed in Finland,” Oksana Chelysheva, deputy executive manager of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, told Radio Liberty (Radio Liberty, August 8).

Regardless of what the officials are saying, it is clear that the flight of the group is a serious blow to both Kadyrov and the Kremlin. Zhovkhar was supposed to play a special role in the upcoming propagandistic event – the “Peace to the Caucasus” Arts Festival. The festival was supposed to serve as further proof that everything is fine in Chechnya. Kavkazky Uzel reported that on July 29, Chechen Prime Minister Odes Baisultanov ordered that preparations for the festival, which is to be held in Grozny in September, get underway. Two thousand dancers and singers from all over the North Caucasus, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, will take part in the festival. According to the Chechen Human Rights Information Center, the authorities want to close the largest refugee centers in Grozny and kick the refugees out into the streets in order to have places for the festival’s guests to stay.

Considering the importance of the festival in creating a positive image of Kadyrov’s Chechnya, the stir provoked by Zhovkhar’s flight to Finland may damage the very idea of the “Peace to the Caucasus,” which is aimed at making everybody believe that the Chechen war has ended.

Andrei Smirnov is an independent journalist covering the North Caucasus. He is based in Russia.


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From: MSN Nicknamepsychoteddybear24    Sent: 8/9/2007 1:31 PM

Dokka Umarov Starts to Show His Teeth
By Mayrbek Vachagaev

The past month has undoubtedly been one of Dokka Umarov’s fiercest and most productive since he assumed command of the resistance movement. Day after day in July and early August, reports from the North Caucasus have been reminiscent of a chronicle of war.

There is only one difference. Whereas in the past, military operations took place in Chechnya, and the heat of battle was experienced in light of the Chechen resistance movement, today, Dagestan and Ingushetia have emerged onto center-stage. In these two regions, armed groups have become so active that they have begun to threaten Russia’s plans for the pacification of the Caucasus.

The policies of Moscow’s protégés in the regional governments of the North Caucasus have also changed: one after another, they have begun to duplicate a crude version of Ramzan Kadyrov’s policies by attempting to conceal various incidents involving shootings or armed attacks. In Chechnya, a similar tactic has been practiced for ages, whereby it is permitted to talk about successes, but certainly not permitted to mention the daily armed attacks and shootings throughout the republic. Currently, such cover-ups are taking place in other republics as well. For example, in Ingushetia, the government attempted to cover up a gunfire attack on the motorcade of President Murad Zyazikov, which took place on July 21 in Magas.

In response, the authorities have begun to attack residents suspected of being sympathetic to the guerrillas. One example of such retaliation is the killing of a young resident of Ingushetia, Magomed Barkinkhkhoev, who appears to have been killed by Kadyrov’s security forces. Barkinkhkhoev was abducted by unknown assailants shortly after leaving a mosque in the center of the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingushetia, on July 27. Nothing was known of his fate until his body was found in the Urus-martanovskii district of Chechnya on August 1. Chechen law enforcement officials issued a statement claiming that Barkinkhkhoev was a guerrilla and had been shot while resisting arrest.

The official version of the events, however, is highly implausible, for several reasons. First, a few minutes before his abduction, Barkinkhkhoev found time to make a telephone call and said that he was going straight home, which does not seem very consistent with the report that he was preparing for an imminent armed confrontation. The young man’s relatives believe that he was arrested by Kadyrov’s security forces on a tip-off and then driven into Chechnya. It seems likely that the police later killed Barkinkhkhoev in order to cover up the incident once they realized that he was innocent. In addition, there is also the fact that Barkinkhkhoev’s body was found in Chechnya, not Ingushetia, where he was last seen. This sequence of events suggests that Kadyrov’s forces now feel empowered to abduct and eliminate people not just in Chechnya, but also in the neighboring republics.

Following this incident, the President of Ingushetia, Murad Zyazikov, made no effort to improve the situation by carrying out major changes in his policies. Instead, he decided to improve his image by a propaganda blitz featuring daily reports on television and in the press in praise of the President of Ingushetia. In recent days, steps have also been taken to close the only independent internet publication, www.ingushetiya.ru [1].

Further measures have been taken to give the appearance of vigorous action being taken against radical groups. In early August, a Makhachkala Islamic goods shop was closed on the grounds that it was selling Islamist literature [2]. Closing shops that sell Islamist literature is the authorities’ favorite method of fighting extremism, and such shop closings are ordered several times each year. Yet it is far from clear that these measures really affect the distribution of anti-state literature. For example, a book by Magomed Kebedov attacking Sufism was published in Moscow last year and is now on sale in Moscow's bookshops and in mosques in other parts of Russia. Kebedov is considered to be the spiritual leader of Dagestan’s Salafists. Indeed, in 1999, he became the head of the Islamist de facto state in Dagestan. Since then, he has been placed on Interpol’s wanted list. The fact that a book by such a figure is now openly available in the Russian capital shows the limits of the authorities’ power in controlling the flow of information and in particular the weakness of shop closings as a counter-insurgency measure.

Against this background, the authorities in the North Caucasus are themselves increasingly divided. In particular, relations between the President of Dagestan, Mukhu Aliev, and the republic’s Minister of the Interior, Adilgerei Magomedtagirov, have now taken the form of an open conflict. The tension between them results from the fact that Magomedtagirov was appointed by President Putin in order to serve as a kind of counterweight to the local strongman, Aliev. Now, public outrage at a wave of kidnappings has given Aliev an opportunity to undermine Magomedtagirov. Kidnappings committed by men in camouflage (believed to be members of the security forces) have recently become a serious problem for the republic. For example, whereas in 2002, there were 81 such incidents recorded, in 2006, more than 150 were registered. By the end of last month, a total of 71 reports of abductions had been filed since the beginning of 2007 (RIA Dagestan, August 1). Human rights organizations and the NGO “Mothers of Dagestan” are now demanding the resignation of the republic’s Minister of Interior on the grounds that he is responsible for this situation (Kavkaz.memo.ru, August 6). Mukhu Aliev has attempted to turn this public anger to his own advantage by using it against Magomedtagirov. In his most recent statement, Aliev demanded an investigation into the murder of numerous members of the security forces.

In addition, there is now speculation that Dokka Umarov himself could turn up in Grozny. The report by an information agency linked to the Chechen opposition that Umarov had actually been in Grozny is undoubtedly a well-organized propaganda exercise. It is hard to verify this incident, however, and the very fact that Chechens already think that Umarov could visit Grozny, and even “meet and talk to” residents of the capital, is itself a breakthrough for Umarov [3]. In fact, Umarov could visit Grozny without difficulty. He does not need to make any particular arrangements for this purpose since he grew up there, knows every neighborhood and undoubtedly has widespread support there. This support does not only come from guerrillas, but also from all who support Chechnya’s independence from Russia. If anything, finding supporters is easier in the capital than in some mountain village, where outsiders are more conspicuous and where local residents by and large are less politically engaged in the Russo-Chechen conflict.

In short, Dokka Umarov has managed to do what has been impossible since the death of Shamil Basaev: to take overall command of the resistance movement throughout all the republics of the North Caucasus. Thus, the stage appears to be set for an escalation of military conflict in the region. There are indications that such an escalation is now beginning. On August 5, Chechen resistance fighters attacked the village of Tsa-Vedeno and burned down three houses belonging to security officials of the pro-Moscow government. The attack on Tsa-Vedeno and the reaction of the pro-Moscow government indicate that Dokku Umarov is now playing a game that does not fit at all with Moscow’s numerous claims concerning the alleged pacification of Chechnya.

Moscow’s own behavior suggests the Kremlin shares this view. The large-scale military exercises being conducted in the North Caucasus are officially explained as part of the preparations for the Sochi Olympic Games in 2014. However, this story seems unlikely, since after all, the Sochi Olympics will not take place for several more years. Rather, the goal of these exercises is to prepare for a possible expansion of military operations in the North Caucasus. The base in Botlikh and reports of the construction of a training base immediately outside the village of Makahzoi (Cheberloveskii district, Chechnya) demonstrate just how necessary it is for Russia to constantly increase its forces in this region (Groanyi-inform, July 26).

Today, Dokka Umarov has the imperative to show that the resistance movement is still active and can strike at the most inconvenient moment for the Russian government. This is because Umarov’s main weakness is his own lack of military successes during his two years of leadership, which stands in marked contrast to the victories his own subordinates have racked up in neighboring republics. Now, Umarov needs to reassert his authority with military successes of his own. The question is where such attacks are most likely to take place. The appointment of Amir Magas as the commander of all armed forces in Chechnya is not an indication that Magas himself will conduct a military attack in Chechnya. Ingushetia, Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria are much more familiar terrain for Magas, who is Ingush and was formerly the commander of the Ingush jamaat. It is most likely that Magas will try to stage attacks in these republics. Thus, Dokka Umarov has only one option, which is to organize an escalation by the fighting groups in Chechnya itself, in order to gain authority at the expense of the Chechen leaders and the jamaats located within Chechnya.

In light of these developments, Ramzan Kadyrov’s claim that he will destroy all Chechen resistance movements by the end of the year is nothing but a propaganda move in the run-up to the Russian presidential election of 2008 (RIA Novosti, August 3). All that is certain is that the Chechen resistance forces will also try to give some kind of “gift. Ultimately, what kind of gift it will be is up to Dokka Umarov.

Mayrbek Vachagaev is a PhD candidate in Social Sciences at the University of Paris. He is the author of the book, "Chechnya in the 19th Century Caucasian Wars."

Notes

1. Address by leading officials of Ingushetia concerning the need to close the Internet site, ingushetiya.ru; reported in Ingushetia and Serdalo newspapers, August 7, 2007.
2. Closing of the Islamic goods store “Sunna” in Makhachkala; report on Kavkaz.memo.ru, August 4, 2007.
3. There has been no confirmation of this visit from independent sources. The source of my information is Kavkaztsentr, August 6, 2007.
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