From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 1/27/2007 3:58 PM
Saturday, January 27, 2007
Is Moscow Creating Its Own Realities In Chechnya?
Tim Bristow
January 26, 2007

The long-term consequences of the recent assassination of Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov may be more severe for Russia than the short-term gains. While political expediency may be a priority for the Kremlin in its search for support for an increasingly unpopular military confrontation, Maskhadov's removal may present it with a number of more awkward future scenarios in the separatist region.

Most analysts have long considered Maskhadov as relatively moderate. He in fact recently tried to reach out to Russian President Vladimir Putin by declaring a unilateral ceasefire and putting forward a conditional offer of bilateral talks. Maskhadov's death has caused concern among observers that the Kremlin has cut itself off from the only realistic path toward a peaceful solution to the Chechen conflict. This in turn, some believe, may sway Chechen public opinion further toward adopting a more radical approach in the future.

Such concerns are not unfounded. Although it is true that the more radical Chechen elements accepted the recent ceasefire in a show of solidarity with the Maskhadov leadership, the differing approaches of Maskhadov and radical leader Shamil Basayev in particular underscore the very different values that both men subscribe to. While Maskhadov was more inclined to distancing himself from religious leadership, the radical Basayev is unashamedly Islamic in his approach to governance. Basayev expresses the views of a very distinct minority in Chechnya, a region which until now has been overwhelmingly secular in its socio-political identity. This in turn has led a number of analysts to claim that without a viable alternative to Maskhadov, Chechen public opinion may begin to lean toward the more radical approach espoused by Basayev.

The Kremlin has continually attempted to justify its intervention in the region in terms of international terrorism. In explaining the conflict in such terms, Putin was seeking to tap international support and sympathy for his cause by equating the Chechen conflict with the US war on terror. The predictable effects of such moves are that many within and outside Russia have come to see the conflict in more religious terms.

The official Kremlin line appears to encourage speculation that the insurgency has inherently radical religious aspects. However, while a small number of separatists may be strongly motivated by a religious fervor, the vast majority of Chechens do not subscribe to the kind of radical Islam put forward by Basayev and his supporters. In fact, while religious zeal may constitute the identity of fighters such as Basayev, the cause of separatism is a much more powerful motivator for the people of Chechnya.

By playing upon international fears of an Islamist threat, however, Putin is seeking to portray the struggle in almost exactly the same way the US administration portrays its war on terror. This, however, disguises a number of very important and often ignored differences between the US efforts in the Middle East and Russia's own attempts to subdue the separatists in Chechnya.

The first and most important difference is the cultural religious atmosphere of the Caucasus itself. Radical Islam gains most of its support through radical Imams. In Chechnya, however, this is not the case. While the region is very distinctly Muslim in culture, its Imams are of a different nature and outlook than those found elsewhere. This means that the views of radical leaders such as Juma Namangari in Uzbekistan lack the support given to the same kind of religious leaders in other parts of the world. While religion may form a part of the identity of Chechnya and surrounding areas, it is not as politicized as the extreme Wahabbi versions. In fact, the Chechen people have more of a history of contesting Islamic extremism than in accepting its principles. This stands in stark contrast to the Kremlin's current rhetoric on the conflict.

Observers have long underlined the purely separatist, anti-Russian nature of the Chechen conflict, rather than its religious overtones. Corruption has also long been an important factor in fueling separatism.

Whatever reasons Moscow may have had for not negotiating with Maskhadov, the fact remains that any short-term diplomatic solution to the conflict has now been exhausted. While alive, Maskhadov offered a slim hope of a peaceful solution that was more likely to ostracize the radicals than to include them. His death brings the personality of his erstwhile rival Basayev to the fore and with him, radical Islam. If Putin was unable to prove a connection with radicalism before Maskhadov's death, he can now point to the new status-quo as a justification of his previous policies. Moreover, without a secular leader like Maskhadov, the Chechen people may feel the pull toward radicalism an irresistible counterpoint to Russian occupation.

For Putin therefore, Maskhadov's death accomplishes two major goals. Firstly, he can point to Basayev and declare that there is "no legitimate partner to negotiate with". Secondly, he is able to point to a possible increase in radicalism as a further justification for his military actions in the breakaway republic. What long-term consequences the Kremlin's decision to kill Maskhadov will have, however, is yet to be determined although most regional experts fear an intensification and arguably also a further radicalization of the Chechen conflict.

http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=19769