From: MSN Nicknamepsychoteddybear24 (Original Message) Sent: 7/14/2006 11:21 PM
Chechnya Weekly - Volume VII, Issue 28
July 14, 2006
IN THIS ISSUE:
* Basaev's Death: Versions Abound
* Basaev's Death: Questions Without Answers
* Basaev and Moscow: An Ambiguous Relationship
* Basaev is Gone. Is the Rebel Movement Next?
* Zakaev Floats a Peace Manifesto
* Briefs
* Quote of the Week
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BASAEV’S DEATH: VERSIONS ABOUND
The circumstances surrounding the July 10 death in Ingushetia of Shamil Basaev, the Chechen rebel military commander and recently appointed vice president of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), remain murky. At 9:45 AM (Moscow time) that day, Interfax quoted “a source in Ingushetia’s law enforcement services” as saying that four militants had been killed in a “self-induced blast” during “a sweep operation” in the village of Ekazhevo, located in Ingushetia’s Nazran district. The source told the news agency that the rebels “were in two cars parked nearby” a KamAz truck that blew up, while Ingushetia’s Security Department told Interfax that the militants were inside the truck itself when it exploded. “The incident occurred at about midnight,” the news agency quoted the department as saying. “The bodies of four militants were discovered at the scene of the explosion.” A Security Department spokesman said that two bodies were identified as those of rebel “warlords” Tarkhan Ganizhev and Isa Kushtov. According to the department, the truck had been filled with weapons, ammunition and explosive substances that Basaev and his associates had intended to use for “high-impact subversive and terror attacks in the North Caucasus.” The Interfax report concluded: “The blast is believed to have been caused by careless handling of ammunition and explosive substances.” Likewise, the Regnum news agency, citing Itar-Tass, quoted Ingushetia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) branch as saying that the massive blast, which had the force of 100 kilograms of TNT, was the result of “careless handling of ammunition and explosive substances.”
At 10:37 AM, NTV television’s website, Ntv.ru, reported that a group of militants who had accompanied the explosives-laden KamAz truck in two cars with the intention of carrying out a large-scale terrorist attack had been “surrounded” on the outskirts of Ekazhevo and that four militants died “as a result of a spontaneous explosion of the truck.”
At around 4:30 PM on June 10, Russian news agencies reported that FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev had informed President Vladimir Putin that Basaev and a number of other “bandits” had been killed in a “special operation.” Patrushev said that the militants had been preparing a terrorist attack in Ingushetia aimed at “putting pressure on the Russian leadership” during the scheduled G-8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg. The FSB chief also stated—rather opaquely—that the operation to “liquidate” Basaev “became possible owing to the fact that a preparatory basis was created, above all in those countries where weapons were gathered that were subsequently ferried over to the militants in Russia.” Putin, for his part, was quoted as congratulating all of the special forces personnel who had planned and carried out the operation. He added, according to Reuters, “This is deserved retribution against the bandits for our children in Beslan, in Budennovsk, for all these acts of terror they committed in Moscow and other Russian regions, including Ingushetia and Chechnya.”
Several hours later, Interfax quoted an unnamed FSB source as saying that 12 other militants were killed along with Basaev, some of whom had already been identified. The following morning (July 11), Interfax quoted Ingush Interior Minister Beslan Khamkhoev as saying that the republic’s law-enforcement agencies were verifying reports that among the dead militants was Ali Taziev, the rebel commander and Basaev associate also known as “Magas,” who took part in the June 2004 attacks on Ingushetian law-enforcement installations.
Late on July 10, RIA Novosti quoted a “high-ranking source in the power structures of the Southern Federal District” as saying that information about Basaev’s whereabouts had been learned from someone in his “inner circle” and that his “destruction” was the result of “many months of purposeful work by the special services.”
Gazeta.ru reported late on July 10 that Ingush FSB sources had told it earlier in the day that the explosion had blown Basaev to pieces. Yet, the website noted that following Patrushev’s report to Putin, Ingushetia’s vice-premier in charge of the republic’s power ministries, Bashir Aushev, told Interfax that Basaev had been identified with “100-percent” certainty by his head, which apparently remained intact despite the force of the blast. Aushev also said that investigators recognized the “distinguishing characteristics of Basaev—his characteristic beard and his artificial limb in place of one leg.” All of Basaev’s “characteristic signs” had been discovered, Aushev said.
Russia’s Pervy Kanal (First Channel) state television, meanwhile, reported on July 10 that Basaev was killed by a pinpoint missile strike on the column of cars in which he was traveling, similar to the missile strike that had reportedly killed Chechen separatist President Dzhokhar Dudaev in 1996 by homing in on his phone. On June 11, however, RIA Novosti quoted an unnamed official of Ingushetia’s Interior Ministry who dismissed this version of events, insisting that Basaev was killed when the truck carrying weapons blew up at the start of an operation to capture the militants.
The various versions of Basaev’s death put forward by Russian newspapers did nothing to clear up the confusion. Komsomolskaya pravda reported on May 11 the blast that destroyed the KamAz truck had been detonated by a radio-controlled explosive device attached to it by a Russian special services undercover agent. According to the daily—which cited sources in the FSB and the federal Interior and Defense ministries—three months ago, plain-clothes Chechen counter-intelligence agents tracked down Basaev in Ingushetia’s mountains, where he was briefing rebel field commanders. According to the newspaper, the Chechen counter-intelligence agents were able to buy informants from among the rebels in exchange for guarantees of safety for their families, after which both the regional and federal FSB began receiving information about Basaev’s whereabouts and planned operations. About a month ago, the informants reported that Basaev was planning to carry out a massive bombing in Nazran timed for the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg and that a KamAz truck would be used. The special services, according to the newspaper, paid a “tail” US$300,000-$500,000 to follow the KamAz truck and attach a radio-controlled bomb to it.
Vremya novostei, for its part, reported on July 11 that the events in Ekazhevo the previous day were the result of a Russian special services operation that had been in the works for half a year. According to the newspaper, intelligence agents set up a deal to sell weapons to Basaev and his comrades, and the arms transfer was set to take place in Ekazhevo on June 10. When Basaev and his comrades came to the village that day and approached the KamAz truck carrying the weapons, it was blown up along with the rebel warlord and his associates.
Izvestia reported on July 12 that Basaev’s death was the result of a “highly complex” special operation in which an unnamed foreign intelligence agency that had previously supplied weapons to the Chechen rebels “betrayed” the arms channel to Russia’s special services, who then attached a small amount of explosives along with a special “beacon” to a shipment of weapons destined for Basaev and his comrades. Using a Pchela unpiloted drone and a satellite uplink, Russian intelligence was able to monitor Basaev and Co. and trigger the explosion at the needed moment, Izvestia claimed. The newspaper elaborated on the putative hi-tech operation in its July 13 edition, reporting that a tiny transmitting antenna had been placed in a piece of plastic explosives that was part of a weapons shipment, which originated in Iraq and arrived in Ingushetia via Turkey and Georgia. According to the newspaper, the entire operation was assisted by U.S. forces in Iraq and neither employed—nor required the placement of—any agents within Basaev’s inner circle.
Kommersant, meanwhile, reported on July 12 that Basaev was likely killed as a result of an operation in which Russian special services booby-trapped a shipment of weapons that came to the separatists from abroad (“presumably from Georgia,” the newspaper added, noting that FSB chief Patrushev had hinted at a foreign connection) but had no idea that Basaev personally would be among those taking delivery of the weapons. “That would explain why the FSB did not claim responsibility for the blast immediately, thinking that the victims were ordinary militants,” the newspaper wrote. “The ‘special operation’ was announced after the body fragments were identified as those of Basaev, who had a $10-million price on his head.”
Kommersant speculated that Basaev was the main recipient of the arms shipment and went to oversee the divvying up of the weapons. According to this version, while he was watching the weapons being loaded, Basaev became interested in a piece of ordnance that was not on the shipping list and placed it on the ground to take a closer look, after which it exploded. It could have been detonated either by a hidden detonator or by remote control—although, according to the newspaper, it is unlikely that the Russian intelligence operatives could have seen that Basaev was among the militants receiving the weapons, even using night vision equipment.
In any case, Kommersant quoted an “Ossetian pathologist” as saying that the remains believed to be those of Basaev appeared to have been blown up by a mine and that the victim was probably leaning over or squatting next to it. According to the newspaper, the remains had been removed from the scene of the explosion in two large plastic bags. It also reported that the body initially believed to be that of Ali Taziev, a.k.a. Magas, turned out to belong to belong to one Musa Mutaliev—at least according to a driver’s license found on the body. Since he was not known to law-enforcement authorities, he is believed to have been a driver hired by the militants.
Interestingly, Interfax quoted Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying during a press conference in Rostov-on-Don on July 12 that there is “not the slightest doubt” that Basaev had been destroyed, but adding, “The question arises: why is it necessary to carry out identification” of his remains. Ivanov said that if the FSB asked the Defense Ministry for help in identifying the body, the ministry would comply, but that he did not see why such an identification process was needed.
On July 13, Kommersant put forward yet another version of Basaev’s death. “The autopsy by the Vladikavkaz forensic morgue of the body presumably belonging to Shamil Basaev showed that he was killed by means of a homemade explosive device filled with pieces of wire,” the newspaper wrote. “Such bombs are the proprietary production of the Dagestani terrorist group ‘Sharia.’ This may be evidence that the death of the terrorist was the result not of a special operation conducted by the FSB, but of a settling of accounts between the militants or a blood feud.” Kommersant reported that according to “operational information,” Dagestani rebel leader Rappani Khalilov, a.k.a. Rabbani, whom it described as “a specialist in the industrial production of shrapnel,” is currently hiding along with his “brigade” somewhere in the woods along the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia. “This Wahhabi has already won respect among the militants and is continuing to make a fast-rising career. It is possible that last weekend, Rabbani, who was formally subordinated to Shamil Basaev, decided he no longer needed the commander.”
BASAEV’S DEATH: QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS
Writing in Novaya gazeta on July 13, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan put forward a series of “questions without answers” about Basaev’s reported death. They asked, first of all, why there has been no official version of Basaev’s death. “Patrushev told the president that Basaev died as the result of special operation,” they wrote. “The details, he omitted. Then the following versions made the rounds of the newspapers, citing sources in the FSB: an FSB agent put an explosive device on the truck; Basaev was killed by a rocket aimed at [his] mobile telephone; Basaev died as a result of an accident—the truck hit a pot-hole; Basaev was captured earlier, interrogated, killed, [and his] body was thrown into the truck, which was then set on fire from a Shmel [flamethrower]. In all of these cases, a quick and graphic identification of the body is ruled out.”
Soldatov and Borogan then asked why the Russian special services did not show Basaev’s body, as they did in the cases of Aslan Maskhadov and Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, whose dead bodies were graphically shown on television and in photographs. They also asked how Basaev had been positively identified. “‘Sources in the special services,’ through various newspapers, are pushing the version that [Basaev’s] body was torn up by the explosion, but that Basaev was identified by his beard. If the head is so recognizable, they wouldn’t hesitate to show it on RTR [state television]; if not, then how can a person be identified by his beard in the absence of a face? We remind you that we’re talking about a body found at the epicenter of an explosion that made havoc of a heavy KamAz [truck].”
In addition, the Novaya gazeta writers asked why the separatist Kavkazcenter.com website confirmed Basaev’s death the same day it happened, given that the Chechen rebels in the past have not confirmed the deaths of their leaders or commanders before their bodies were shown on television. They also asked why Basaev needed to get weapons from abroad, given that in the past, he had made do with weapons acquired domestically, and what he was doing in the town of Ekazhevo, where, according to Soldatov and Borogan, a large number of local Ingush police officers live. “How do you explain why such an experienced underground operator as Basaev disregarded the elementary rules of conspiracy?”
Finally, the two journalists asked who had carried out the operation that ostensibly killed Basaev. “The special services of Ingushetia did not take part in the operation, nor, according to our information, did the sub-units of the FSB’s Special Operations Center. In the area where the operation was carried out, however, even if it involved an agent with a mine, a group of spetsnaz should in any case have been moved in. That was not done. So who is going to get the medals?”
BASAEV AND MOSCOW: AN AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP
Given the contradictory versions of Basaev’s death in the press and the fact that the Russian authorities erroneously declared Basaev dead on a number of occasions in the past, it is not surprising that some observers remained skeptical about whether he was in fact dead this time. On July 12, Interfax quoted a member of the Mothers of Beslan committee, Aneta Gadieva, regarding the announcement that Basaev was among those killed in the Ingushetia blast: “We are not sure that it is really him.” Likewise, Novaya gazeta correspondent Anna Politkovskaya said in an interview published in Italy’s La Repubblica on July 11 that given the absence of definitive proof of Basaev’s death, it was “quite likely that in six months he will reappear, as happened with [Osama] bin Laden.”
According to Politkovskaya, there was more to Basaev’s relationship with the Russian authorities than met the eye. “Basaev was always playing a double, if not triple game,” she told La Repubblica. “When a big PR operation was needed, in Moscow or in Grozny, he always appeared. I would not be surprised if he had reached an agreement with the [Russian] special services to simply put down his arms and disappear. He was played out: as a leader of the military wing of the rebels, though he already had little significance. He was always ready to leave under favorable conditions.” Asked what Basaev’s “departure” would mean for President Vladimir Putin politically, Politkovskaya said, “According to his [Putin’s] logic, it’s a victory. It is the next step in the virtual war that he [Putin] has been conducting for several years and that justifies his power.”
Ruslan Martagov, the Chechen political scientist who in the mid-1990s was a spokesman for the Moscow-installed government of Doku Zavgaev, was quoted along similar lines in the July 14 edition of Moskovskie novosti. “I think that Basaev is alive and well, like [Djokhar] Dudaev,” Martagov told the weekly. “In both cases, an operation to remove their [the Russian authorities’] people from the game took place—it’s easiest of all to do this by staging their deaths. Basaev knows very much about the hidden motives for the first and especially the second Chechen wars. Huge money and very big people were put into operation there. Basaev is no fool and could not have failed to ensure himself maximally in case events began to unfold in a way unfavorable to him. You might remember that he more than once spoke about having kompromat on well-known politicians that would come to light if something happened to him. Dudaev said the same thing. So where is that kompromat?”
Likewise, the commentator Aleksandr Minkin wrote in Moskovsky komsomlets on July 12 that while “many powerful people in Moscow” probably breathed a sigh of relief upon hearing the reports that Basaev had been killed—and even had a drink to celebrate—they quickly began to worry. “But what if the one-legged devil had an archive somewhere?!” Minkin wrote. “And what if he gave orders that in the event of his death, particularly interesting documents should be published in newspapers in the West? And, thinking about this, they probably had another drink (this time, to steady their nerves).”
Like Politkovskaya and other observers, Minkin argued that Basaev should have been captured alive. “So that he could tell us in court how he had managed to travel throughout Russia for such a long time, to rest in sanatoriums and even to make trips abroad,” he wrote. “So that he could say who he had bought weapons from; who he had paid to get out of encirclement.”
BASAEV IS GONE. IS THE REBEL MOVEMENT NEXT?
Observers were split over the impact that Shamil Basaev’s reported death might have on the separatist movement. In an article published by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Timur Aliev, the IWPR’s Nazran-based Chechnya editor, quoted Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky as saying that Basaev’s death would fundamentally change the situation in the North Caucasus. Babitsky said that Basaev’s death meant that “one of the last people who personified the resistance” formed during the period of Djokhar Dudaev “has now gone” and that Basaev’s work to cultivate “militant groups and underground groups” in the neighboring republics of the North Caucasus would “weaken significantly.” Babitsky added, “In Chechnya itself, there will be no substantial changes. What are termed ‘military actions,’ these acts of sabotage, are in a general state of decline.”
Babitsky told Corriere della sera that it has become extremely difficult for rebel forces to obtain weapons or food. In the same interview, he “admitted” that Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov enjoys tremendous popularity in the republic, Lenta.ru reported on July 11. Babitsky told the Italian newspaper that the rebels would continue to operate inside Chechnya because their new leader, Dokku Umarov, had been in charge of operations inside Chechnya, while Basaev had been responsible for operations outside the republic. Still, the Radio Liberty correspondent told Corriere della sera that “the resistance has no serious prospects today, not just to win, but [even] to conduct an armed struggle.” At the same time, Babitsky said that the moment the situation in Russia and Chechnya changes, “the dissatisfaction that is now driven inside will immediately rush through that crack.” This dissatisfaction, he said, is the result of an entire complex of historical resentments. Babitsky interviewed Basaev for ABC News’ “Nightline” program last year (Chechnya Weekly, August 03, 2005).
In her interview with Italy’s La Repubblica, published on July 11, Novaya gazeta correspondent Anna Politkovskaya said that Basaev’s death would not mean an end to the war in Chechnya. “The head of the terrorists has died, but a generation that cannot imagine a life without war has already grown up in the Caucasus,” she said. “And the principle issue has not been resolved—[that of] the Kremlin’s pressure, forcing people to live according to Russian traditions; the contempt of Russians for Caucasians. It [the killing of Basaev] can be compared to the killing of [Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi: he is dead, but the fight continues.”
Likewise, Sergei Markedonov, head of the Department for Inter-ethnic Relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, warned Russian politicians against assuming that Basaev’s removal from the scene would mean a decline in rebel activity. “The death of Shamil Basaev does not mean an end to the terrorist war against the Russian state,” he wrote in a piece posted on the Politcom.ru website on July 12. “Moreover, unfortunately, the mistakes and miscalculations of the authorities themselves mean that Basaev-ism will not disappear as a socio-political phenomenon. Corruption, the aloofness of the authorities in the Caucasian republics, the absence of any prospects for ‘unconnected businesses’ or [possibilities] for career growth are pushing many inhabitants of the region toward radical Islam, which today is much more dangerous than the ‘Ichkerian idea’ that Shamil Basaev was fighting for. Today, Chechnya is part of the ‘Islamic terrorist international,’ and Basaev’s removal does not significantly affect this situation.”
Markedonov continued, “Every unlawful action by administrators [and] employees of the law-enforcement structures works for the benefit of new ‘Basaevs,’ who have before them the example of a successful multi-year resistance against a nuclear great power. The death of Basaev cannot cardinally disorganize the terrorist underground in the North Caucasus, because even the death of such a terrorist does not destroy the ‘web of terror.’ Given all of Basaev’s authority in the Caucasus, in Central Asia and in the Middle East, Shamil was only a successful field commander. One of many.” It is “entirely possible,” Markedonov added, that there will now be a bloody power struggle between the younger, more radical rebel commanders who were held in check by Basaev’s authority.
ZAKAEV FLOATS A PEACE MANIFESTO
On July 13, Chechenpress published a “Manifesto for Peace” signed by Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) Foreign Minister Akhmed Zakaev. According to the separatist website, the manifesto was approved at a July 5 meeting in Berlin of ChRI Foreign Ministry officials and ChRI representatives in European countries, but its publication was delayed by news of Shamil Basaev’s death.
The manifesto, which states that its aim is to attract the attention of the G8 leaders who are meeting in St. Petersburg, states that the conflict between Russians and Chechens that has been ongoing for two centuries “has endangered the very existence of the Chechen people.” It says that the ten years since the May 1997 peace agreement signed by the two sides have seen a resumption of hostilities that has caused the death of more than a hundred thousand people—according to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people— “and forced an even greater number of refugees to leave the republic, brought further destruction of the material basis of society and made life for the remaining population extremely hard.”
The ongoing conflict has led to “increasingly barbaric violations of human rights—torture, abductions, illegal imprisonments and terrorist acts—and has weakened or destroyed moral values in society,” the manifesto states, adding that “religious traditions have been undermined by the influence of foreign ideologies,” and that the young generation has lost any prospects for a decent life in the future. The conflict, it says, has destabilized “the whole of Northern Caucasus by aggravating ethnic conflicts and by jeopardizing its potential to become a prosperous zone where all different ethnic and religious groups could live together in peace.”
Zakaev also notes in the manifesto that Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected president of Chechnya in “free and fair elections” that were officially recognized by Moscow, launched a “substantial peace initiative” in 2005, proposing unconditional talks with Moscow and declaring a unilateral one-month-ceasefire for the month of February 2005. Nevertheless, “this initiative remained without any reaction from the Russian side and Maskhadov was killed on March 8 of last year,” the manifesto notes.
Against this backdrop, Zakaev writes that “urgent action” is needed for a peaceful solution of the Chechen conflict—one that guarantees security for the people of Chechnya and respect for human rights and law, establishes “political power structures, based on free and fair elections” and creates “the conditions for economic and social development for normalizing life and allowing the return of the refugees.”
“Our people have fought during all the years of the first and second wars, defending independence,” the manifesto states. “In view of the Russian aggression against our republic, we have always considered independence as the fundamental means to achieve peace for the Chechen people and guarantee their security. If in accordance with international law, however, any other solution for peace with the Russians can be found for achieving the aforementioned goals, we are ready for corresponding negotiations.”
The manifesto continues, “Through our conflict with the Russians, a wave of violence has overwhelmed our society and the neighboring republics of the North Caucasus. Therefore, it is necessary to apply all energy to achieving a general accord and reconciliation in Chechnya. For this, not only are amnesty measures necessary, but also means of reconciliation—like truth commissions—with the active participation of the family members of the victims of violence.” The manifesto also says that foreign assistance has to be mobilized to aid in Chechnya’s reconstruction.
“We realize that continued warfare and violence will not yield a solution to the conflict,” the manifesto concludes. “Therefore, we declare that negotiations with Russia have to start without preconditions. We condemn all forms of violence against the civilian population, including terrorist acts.”
BRIEFS
--IRAQI INSURGENTS EULOGIZE BASAEV
The al-Qaeda-linked Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq posted an Internet statement on July 12 expressing condolences on “the martyrdom” of Shamil Basaev. According to the SITE Institute, the group stated, “As Emir Ibn al-Khattab and Abu al-Walid al-Ghambi were killed before him, Basaev is considered one of many within a ‘prolific’ nation, the Russians and ‘apostates’ are warned to not find happiness in his death.” SITE also quoted the group as urging “the Chechen mujahideen” to “continue on the path of jihad,” and praying, “We ask Allah to reward our martyr the highest place in paradise, bless the blood and carnage he created and make the Ummah of Islam seek light from him.” On July 9, the day before his reported death, the separatist Kavkazcenter.com website posted a statement from Basaev expressing the “enormous gratitude” of “the mujahideen of the Caucasus” toward “those who destroyed the diplomat-spies in Iraq” and calling the murder of the five Russian embassy employees in Iraq a “worthy response” to “the murder by Russian terrorists” of former Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in Qatar in February 2004. The Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq claimed responsibility for the killing of the five Russians.
--DAGESTANI POLICE SHOOT IT OUT WITH MILITANTS
Interfax reported on July 12 that three militants were believed to have been killed when security forces stormed an apartment in a residential building in the town of Buinaksk where the rebels were hiding. A spokeswoman for the Dagestani Interior Ministry told the news agency that a fire broke out in the apartment, from where sounds of explosions had been heard, which were most likely caused by exploding ammunition. On July 12, Kavkazky Uzel quoted Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgerei Magomedtagirov as saying that the rebels had arrived in Buinaksk to “trace the movements of the heads of the law-enforcement organs of the republic and prepare terrorist acts in respect to them.” On July 9, the separatist Kavkazcenter.com website posted a message from the “Dagestani Front” declaring that “the Muslims of Dagestan” had taken a “bayat,” or oath of allegiance, to “the new Emir of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus Dokku Umarov.”
QUOTE OF THE WEEK
“Basaev’s death may have been [the result of] a special operation of the Almighty. But no way was it a Patrushev special operation, and when people claim as their own achievement something for which they should thank their lucky stars, one gets the impression that have no other achievements to claim.”--- Journalist and commentator Yulia Latynina, from an article posted on the Ej.ru website on July 10.
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