From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 2/13/2006 12:50 PM
“North” and “South” join “East” and “West”
The Republic Anti-terrorist Centre (the former Security Service of the Chechen President) will be undergoing new structural changes. It will soon become a special unit under the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia .
By Ruslan ZHADAEV
The United Group of Troops (Forces) (UGT/F) in the North Caucasus , at least that part of it that belongs to the MIA of Russia, will soon be replenished by the addition of two new units. There are plans to create two motorised special battalions on the basis of the Anti-terrorist Centre (ATC). It has probably already been decided to call the new units “North” and “South” by analogy with the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) special unit battalions “East” and “West”, which are part of the 42nd Division of the Ministry of Defence of Russia and made up of ethnic Chechens.  The “North” special unit battalion of the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia will be deployed in the valley area of the Republic, whilst the “South” unit will be deployed correspondingly in the southern, mountainous region.
According to several accounts, the “South” battalion will be deployed in the Vedenskii region of the republic, which soldiers like to call Basaev’s “ancestral estate”. The “North” unit meanwhile will possibly be “settled” in the Grozny region, but there have been reports that it could be deployed to Grozny , on the territory of the former 15th military base.
There will be 500-700 men in the units, which will be under the command of the military commandant’s office of the republic. Staff from the ATC are already actively preparing the necessary documents for the transition to their new capacity. Service in the battalions will be by contract, and the average wage for the rank and file will be from 15-18,000 roubles a month. This is several times higher than the money received by the ATCs today.
At the moment many of those working for the ATC are pleased with the decision to practically re-deploy them to the MIA of Russia, although it is possible that before long they will be quite disappointed with the new service.
Firstly, if you believe the reports of the Russian press, it was announced at a meeting of the regional operational headquarters held recently at the Khankala military base, that priority tasks for the UGT will include the “activation of the military commandant’s offices to aid the local authorities, branches and units of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Chechen Republic to maintain civil order and safety, perfect law-enforcement anti-terrorist operations and involve the Chechen MIA in undertaking “spot” work to neutralise the criminal underground”.
Those serving with the group of Chechen troops in the new battalions “North” and “South” will undertake some of these tasks side-by-side with the Russian security forces. This means that fighters from “North” and “South” will be effectively drawn into active participation in the military activities against the separatists (as their colleagues from the Ministry of Defence “East” and “West” have been).
Secondly, both the Security Service of the President of Chechnya and the Anti-terrorist Centre, were in essence partisan-type units. There was practically no serious military discipline, no military subordination and none of the usual tactical, artillery, physical, drill or other exercises usually carried out by soldiers in the army were run. It is unlikely that any of the former ATCs will be enamoured of observing military rules, rigorously carrying out orders from superiors and other such delightful aspects of military service. It has been known for a long time that Chechens are outstanding fighters but that they do not like to observe military discipline at all.
Thirdly, it is not quite clear why it was necessary to create two battalions of special units, which will be under the command of the Interior Troops of the MIA of Russia, on the base of the republican ATC. It is not because the police generals are following the example of the army generals and want their own “toy” in the shape of divisions made up of natives. Like irregular units such as the “Wild Division” from the First World War. Perhaps the desire behind it is to set the behaviour of the local units of the security forces to rights, but there are other possibilities too. The reformation of the ATC and the introduction of the reformed units into the Interior Troops of the MIA of Russia is indisputably symbolic as it marks the conclusion of the latest stage in the so-called “Chechenisation” of the war in Chechnya, which will end with the fight against the armed adherents of Chechen independence being run by Chechnya’s own forces. This decision is on the surface of things and means that at the expense of reducing the number of the Russian military contingent on Chechen territory there is a parallel growth in the number of this kind of formation made up of Chechens themselves. From this we could surmise that the situation in the republic is no longer so worrying for the federal centre that they cannot trust the Chechens themselves with controlling it.
This decision also has, however, its own “rocks under the water”.
The introduction of these battalions into the Interior Troops of the MIA of Russia may mean that Ramzan Kadyrov does not have the means to maintain them and is saving good money by doing this. There is also a second version – that these people have been specially removed from being under Ramzan’s command (as Vice Premier of the government he only controls the security forces of Chechnya, whilst the “North” and “South” battalions will be directly responsible to the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia), in order to take away his military support and provide the “feds” with control over “yesterday’s fighters”.
Depending on which of these versions is true, if either, it would clarify the nature of relations between Ramzan Kadyrov and Moscow . How far does Moscow trust or not trust him? In the first case, Ramzan is so sure of his favouritism or lobby in Moscow that he is ready to be relieved of direct control for those who were under his command before. In the second case, the Kremlin either does not trust Ramzan or is just being very careful.
As we have no answer to these questions yet we have to wait and see how events unfold, whilst recognising that in any case Ramzan Kadyrov will remain a key figure in Chechnya .
They say that during a conversation with Joseph Stalin a European politician told him that the Vatican was the most powerful government in Europe . To which the “Leader of all Peoples” puffed on his pipe and replied, “Is that so? So, how many tank divisions does it have?”
In Chechnya today the show is still being run by the “man with the gun”. This means that the number of bayonets behind concrete individuals decides a lot, if not everything. The federal authorities, having steered towards “Chechenisation”, are slowly but surely continuing to increase their efforts in this direction. In reports on the military conflicts and “special operations” that have taken place on the territory of the Chechen Republic it is very rare now to hear of Russian military involvement. The local security forces and units made up of local inhabitants took the lead some time ago: the OMON (Special Police Division), the special forces regiment of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Chechen Republic , the PPC (Patrol Point Service), the “oil” regiment, the “East” and “West” battalions. Now “North” and “South” can be added to this list.
But will this lead to peace in our land?
Translated by Claire C.RIMMER
"Chechen Society" newspaper, #02, 25 January 2006
http://www.chechensociety.net/cho/cho53/053_01_en.htm