From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 3/12/2006 1:12 PM
Developments in Chechnya

For more than a year, Russian authorities have been claiming that the situation in Chechnya has normalized and that the people displaced by the conflict can safely return home. In reality, the situation in Chechnya has shown no signs of stabilization—the republic remains an active conflict zone, with both sides responsible for serious human rights and humanitarian law violations.

In 2003, Russian authorities took several steps that were supposed to advance the stabilization process. They adopted an amnesty law encouraging the surrender of rebel forces,34 and promised to pay compensation for houses and property destroyed during the war.35 The constitutional referendum held in March 2003 and presidential elections scheduled to take place on October 5, 2003 have been hailed by the government as the major landmarks on the way to a political solution of the Chechnya problem.

None of these steps has visibly changed the dynamics of the conflict, however.

The amnesty did not prompt a large-scale surrender of rebel forces—according to the Chechen procuracy, only 126 former fighters were amnestied as of August 18, 2003.36 The number is insignificant, considering that several thousand rebel fighters are currently operating in Chechnya.37 Instead of welcoming the gesture, Chechen forces marked the announcement of the amnesty with the largest open attack on federal troops since the beginning of this year, storming the town of Argun.38 At the same time, by extending the amnesty to federal servicemen, the Russian government has created yet another tool for shielding its troops from accountability for crimes committed in Chechnya.39

As mentioned above, the promises to pay compensation appear to have been designed as an effective measure for pressuring internally displaced persons to return to Chechnya, rather than as a remedy for past abuse or a step toward normalization.

As for political stabilization, many independent observers, including leading Russian human rights defender Liudmila Alekseeva, believed that the March referendum was flawed and expressed serious doubts that the October elections could be fair and democratic.40 Moreover, although the number of abuses, especially forced disappearances, had decreased slightly during several weeks before and after the referendum, it then skyrocketed again. The Chechen minister of internal affairs admitted that in the month following the referendum nearly fifty people disappeared in Chechnya.41 In mid-August he released new figures, saying that nearly 400 people disappeared in Chechnya since the beginning of the year.42 During its missions to the region, Human Rights Watch as well as other human rights organizations, continued to document cases of summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention, and looting in Chechnya.43

Instead of advancing stability, the announcement of presidential elections seemed to have incited a new escalation of violence in Chechnya. In the summer of 2003, reports of armed clashes involving large groups of rebels and leading to numerous deaths on both sides appeared virtually every day. Official field reports confirmed that the situation was far from stable. For example, in a weekly report on August 11, 2003, representatives of the United Federal Group of Forces reported that federal positions came under fire on twenty-one occasions, nine armed clashes took place, and about 140 explosive devices were disarmed. Federal forces, for their part, reportedly killed thirty-six rebel fighters and arrested fifty others. SU-24 fighter-bombers and SU-25 ground attack aircraft completed thirty-four missions, and helicopters completed about 500.44

Recent developments in Chechnya clearly demonstrate that Russian authorities cannot guarantee the security of returnees, and by compelling internally displaced to leave Ingushetia, the authorities deliberately put their lives and safety at risk.

34 Decree “On the announcement of amnesty in connection with the adoption of the Constitution of Chechen Republic,” adopted by Russian State Duma on June 6, 2003, Rossiiskaia gazeta, June 7, 2003. The amnesty granted immunity from prosecution to Chechen rebels who surrendered before September 1, 2003, as well as to federal servicemen. It did not apply to those accused of “grave offenses,” such as premeditated murder, rape, or hostage-taking.

35 Government of the Russian Federation, Decree 404 “On the procedure of paying lost housing and property compensation to permanent residents of the Chechen Republic who suffered during the settlement of the crisis in its territory,” July 4, 2003.

36 Statement by Chechen prosecutor Vladimir Kravchenko, cited by ITAR-TASS World Service, August 18, 2003. Unwillingness of Chechen forces to surrender may be attributed both to the limited character of the amnesty and to the controversial results of the previous Chechnya amnesty adopted in 1999. The Moscow Helsinki Group has alleged that out of 500 who turned in their weapons under the law, most have since been killed or disappeared. See Matt Bivens, “War Amnesty Is Well Wide of the Mark,” The Moscow Times, June 2, 2003.

37 According to Chechen Prime Minister Anatoly Popov, there are currently 2,000-3,000 rebels operating in Chechnya. See, “2,000-3,000 Rebels operating in Chechnya – PM,” Interfax, August 26, 2003.

38 Alexander Raskin, “Argun breakthrough,” Izvestia, June 9, 2003.

39 One of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch proves this allegation. See below, case of Imran Guliev.

40 See for example, Ivan Sukhov, “Intriguing Arithmetic,” Vremia Novostei, August 13, 2003. The officially reported turnout during the March constitutional referendum was 85 percent, out of which 95.97 percent approved the new Constitution, consolidating Chechnya’s status as part of Russian Federation. The figures sharply contrasted the eyewitness accounts of deserted polling stations and cast doubts on the fairness of the electoral process. Lord Judd, the Council of Europe's rapporteur on Chechnya, resigned in protest at the conditions in which the referendum took place. See also Natalie Nougayrède, "La Russie organise un simulacre de référendum en Tchétchénie," Le Monde, March 25, 2003; “The vote of the dead souls—Chechnya's flawed referendum on a new constitution,” The Economist, March 29, 2003.

41 The figure was released by Alu Alkhanov, Chechen interior minister. See “Chechen kidnappings continuing despite referendum: officials,” Agence France Press, April 24, 2003.

42 “Nearly 400 people disappear in Chechnya this year,” ITAR-TASS, August 17, 2003.

43 For details, see Human Rights Watch, “Into Harm’s Way;” Human Rights Watch, “On the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya.” See also regularly updated chronicle of the events in Chechnya and Ingushetia published by the Memorial Human Rights Center, available at: http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm (retrieved August 24, 2003).

44 Cited in: Viktor Paukov, “When guns go off, the police are silent,” Vremia Novostei, August 12, 2003.

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/russia0903/2.htm