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Laurent Vinatier: "The Chechen diaspora in Moscow is based on other networks, far removed from Basayev and Maskhadov"
Article published in 15/10/2005 Issue


By Célia CHAUFFOUR in Paris

Translated by Ellie FORSHAW

The divided and splintered Chechen diaspora we knew has evolved. The forces that divide it have changed. We must now look beyond internal friction, towards a still emerging structure and renewal of the diaspora networks.
If it is organised, the Chechen diaspora could gain legitimacy, as well as lobbying powers and influence the resolution of the conflict. The groundswell of opinion in the Chechen diaspora – especially in the Russian capital – could have its say during the run-up to the Russian presidential elections in 2008.
For the time being, this scenario is still premature, but the stakes are very real. We interviewed Laurent Vinatier, expert on the Chechen question and PhD student at the IEP (Institute of Political Studies) in Paris.


Did the death of the Chechen leader and resistance commander Aslan Maskhadov affect the diaspora, to the point of reigniting alliances and divisions?

Absolutely. The death of Maskhadov brought new divisions and restructured the political groups at the heart of the Chechen diaspora. In Turkey, before March 2005, there were deep divisions between the Maskhadov followers, and those who came from a group that had supported Ruslan Gelayev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. Although this latter group supported the policies of Maskhadov on the surface, it was also in a position to consider quicker compromises for peace in Chechnya.

Nowadays, those divisions have changed somewhat. In Turkey, that particular group has faded out of sight. But in Europe, the Chechens are trying to bring back the idea of creating a Chechen political force other than that of the resistance organised around Maskhadov. The initiatives are beginning to emerge in Strasbourg with a few Chechen representatives, but also in Germany (Germany has a 10,000-strong Chechen community, as has France, out of a total of 50,000 - 60,000 Chechens currently residing in Europe), where some Chechen representatives from the civil society are thinking about organisiing the diaspora in Europe and turning towards Moscow’s Chechens.


Can the European Chechen diaspora reasonably hope to acquire some political force?

Yes, but it needs to get organised and gain a stronger legitimacy. However, the European diaspora is still fundamentally weak. The Chechens who live today in France, Germany or Belgium are still thinking only of their own personal survival. As for the rare Chechen moves towards organisation, their scope is essentially to aid the recently arrived refugees.

The steps towards a structured diaspora remain to be taken, even if some people from within the diaspora are making such an attempt. For the time being, the only visible initiatives are undertaken by those who would like to get in touch with other networks or receive political backing from former recognised Chechen leaders.

Some of Maskhadov’s emissaries in Europe became spokespeople for the resistance movement. Have they lost their credibility?

It is difficult to say. Most of Maskhadov’s ministers, including Oumar Khanbiev, were taken on in Abdul Khalim Sadullayev’s government, and are now identified with the deputy Prime Minister, who is none other than radical warlord Basayev.

The scope of their political vision in Europe is diminished because of this, and their position as lobbyists is fundamentally weakened. Although they are still legitimate vis-à-vis Chechnya, they are no longer credible vis-à-vis the Europeans as a showcase of the Chechen resistance in Europe.

At any rate, that particular question is now irrelevant because in Chechnya, the resistance no longer exists politically. That is, it only exists in such a radical form that it is no longer a negotiating partner. Neither Europe nor the Kremlin will recognise it, even though it a homogeneous resistance group that defends coherent ideas – that of political Islam. But it is no longer a viable partner and neither are its European contacts.

On the contrary, the Chechen diaspora in Moscow relies on other networks, far from removed from Basayev and Maskhadov. It also has a different history. The Zavgayev family, for example, originates from the north of Chechnya and relies on networks different from those in the south, which, politically and historically, support independence.
This does not mean that Basayev does not have any networks in Moscow, even if we do tend to overestimate them. Although there are Wahhabite groups in Moscow, they have no visible political weight.


The stakes are truly political. Can the diaspora in Moscow really have such political strategies?

The Chechen diaspora in Moscow does not follow the politics of the Kremlin in Chechnya, because it refuses to take the resistance into account, it refuses to acknowledge the guerrilla, and stakes everything on just two networks: Kadyrov’s, from the Benoi clan, and Aklhanov’s.

The great Moscow Chechen networks are divided into two different political strategies and candidates who are most likely to access power. Thus, there is a sort of competition within the diaspora in Moscow, on what Russian policy to follow in Chechnya. Certain groups would have preferred to put forward other people for the Chechen presidency. I’m thinking mainly about Malik Saidullayev’s attempts.


You mentioned a possible alliance between the Moscow and European Diasporas. What would be at stake in such an alliance?

An alliance between the representatives of the European and Moscow diasporas would bring stronger lobbying vis-à-vis the Kremlin to bend or change Russian policy in Chechnya. The idea would have some weight politically and would also be an alternative to a situation that is currently at a stalemate.

No one in the Diasporas has yet spoken publicly of this possibility. But the idea of an alliance, albeit premature for the moment, would be of interest for two obvious reasons. Firstly, in Moscow, some Chechens have the power to lobby the Kremlin. This Chechen diaspora, which is more structured, is led by people who are quite high up in the Russian government, so they benefit from a social status and a network strong enough to put forward its ideas before the Kremlin.
Secondly, the Chechen population in Europe is steadily growing in numbers and would have a say in what happens in their country. The population could be a credible political weight that would be substantial and legitimate. This also means that other Diasporas, such as those in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, are politically dying.

But this step has not yet been taken. Firstly, because the situation in Chechnya itself is still complex, but also because the Kremlin refuses any compromises. Basically, there is, as yet, no political position to take.


And yet, it seems that the Chechen diaspora in Moscow stands out because of its established political ambitions…

In Moscow, businessmen and the old diaspora – which arrived at the beginning of the first war – became interested in politics from the year 2000, when the Kremlin clearly designated Akhmad Kadyrov as president. Later, in 2002, after the hostages were taken at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, it was clear that all opportunities to negotiate with the resistance had been abandoned.

From 2002, when Aslan Maskhadov was no longer considered by the Kremlin as someone to negotiate with, there was a political vacuum to be filled in Chechnya. To sum up, the freedom fighter leader was no longer an obstacle for Moscow’s Chechen networks. That explains the number of Moscow Chechen nominations, including those of Malik Saidullayev and Hussein Djabrailov, for the 5 October 2003 presidential elections. They had believed that the Kremlin would choose one of them to perpetuate Russian policy in Chechnya. That strategy fell through, but they have not given up.


Have these networks had time to regroup around new strategies?

Yes. After the failure in the 2003 presidential elections, certain networks began to rethink their strategy. The proof of this is the appointment of Alou Alkhanov as current Chechen president. He benefited from support from the Moscow Chechens belonging to the Aslambek Aslakhanov network. The latter is now Putin’s counsellor on the issue of Chechnya.


So one of the Chechen diaspora networks in Moscow has succeeded…

Indeed, we can speak of success for a certain branch of the Chechen diaspora in Moscow. But it’s a relative success that is rather temporary, because the problem of the presence of Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya remains – he does not belong to any of Moscow’s Chechen networks.


How do different networks work within the Chechen diaspora in Moscow?

It’s first and foremost a question of political clans, which include businessmen. They have an economic motivation with no real political project – their priority is their financial and personal interests. To conduct business in the north Caucasus, they need a stable situation in Chechnya. This group is very individualistic and is made up of three or four notorious Moscow Chechen businessmen.

The second big network has a different profile. It relies on the old diaspora, which arrived about ten years ago, after Dudayev came to power. They are mainly from the old Chechen communist party and some of them are members of the Duma. Akhmed Zavgayev, the brother of Doku who became First Secretary of the autonomous republic in Grozny in 1998, before being dismissed by Dudayev, is a member of the Duma. Doku is currently working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Moreover, i is impossible to draw up a religious profile. Islam is used by all these networks to federate and make themselves known. The religious support is essentially Sufi. And certain branches even stretch as far as Chechnya. But religion is only one tool among so many others to gain new authority in both Chechnya and Moscow.


Is obtaining legitimacy within Chechnya that important?

To accede to power in Chechnya, the Chechens in thr Diasporas need connections within the Chechen borders. If the candidacy of a Moscow Chechen is to be accepted by the Kremlin, the leader must be able to federate several thousand people within Chechnya.

The Moscow diaspora must also make the Chechnya Chechens forget that they spent a lot of time in Moscow, and therefore they must prove that they have found contacts again in their country. This can be achieved via Sufi networks, but it is not restricted to them. There are also humanitarian aid projects in Chechnya, led by Chechen businessmen in Moscow who want a foothold in Chechnya. These are two important mechanisms.

Moreover, there are men in Chechnya – less in the public eye and therefore less exposed – who did not fight with Basayev and who could thus be seen as having a very strong legitimacy. This is the case of the old chief of Maskhadov’s presidential guard, who became a warlord after the death of the freedom fighter president. And then there are also Gelayev’s relatives.

However, the Chechen diaspora in Moscow tends to create its own legitimacy with help from the civilian population, not the fighters. And never with the radicals. The principal Chechen networks in Moscow have contacts in Chechnya, or try to build up or rekindle a network. It is a relatively new process. Attempts to gain a foothold once more in Chechnya attest to the political aims of Chechen networks in Moscow.


These networks remain fragile. Can they escape the delicate position of building a coherent political project without upsetting the Kremlin? Can they become strong and legitimate enough to impose themselves?

It all depends on them. They must build a base of legitimacy that is strong enough to win against the Kremlin. There can be two sorts of legitimacy, the first within Chechnya, with popular backing. But also – and this is a relatively new development – legitimacy within Russia. They can try to use certain forces developing within Russian civil society.

In my opinion, Chamil Beno’s idea that created the Great Russian Islamic Heritage movement in March 2005 – which was a people’s movement, not a political one – comes into this idea of Chechens trying to find contacts within the Russian civil society. There are no other initiatives yet, but they could emerge, especially via the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers or liberal forces.

If we had to give a timescale to Moscow Chechens influencing the situation in Chechnya, I don’t think it would be before 2008, during the presidential campaign that could address the question. The diaspora could then have an obvious role to play. But in the meantime, the networks are just getting ready, organising themselves and building their own legitimacy.



© CAUCAZ.COM | Article published in 15/10/2005 Issue | By Célia CHAUFFOUR

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