The risk that the Olympics will be used to launch an insurgency attack is a central security concern for Russia right now. However, this debate has so far failed to include any discussion of the South Caucasus states interests, and furthermore the urgent need for Moscow to redraw its post-2014 strategy for the North Caucasus region.
In the last six years, a patron-client relationship between Moscow and the North Caucasus has been established. The region has received more money from Moscow, specifically because of the Olympics. However, this money has not been invested in solving socio-economic problems. On the contrary, it has strengthened the local authorities, who support the region's ‘shadow ruler'- the Salafi movement under Doku Umarov's ‘Caucasus Emirate'. It is expected that after the Olympic games, official Moscow will not able to invest the same kind of money in the region. Moscow will face a dilemma: if they cannot continue to provide financial support to the local elites- buying their loyalty and independence from the local authorities, the Salafi movement will win the hearts and minds of the local population, who suffer from political, social, and economic isolation. Moscow needs a broader, more regional approach to open up this area. This is possible through more interaction between the North Caucasus and South Caucasus.
This is an opportunity for Azerbaijan and Georgia, both of which have borders with the North Caucasus, to do something long overdue: increase their influence in the region. Interestingly, this could be in the interests of both Russia and the West. The region is ‘Russia's soft underbelly', an area that poses risks not only to Moscow, but also to the South Caucasus. The central threat is the spreading of religious influence. Western interests were suddenly and tragically brought to the fore with the Boston Marathon bombings earlier this year.
So, what can Azerbaijan and Georgia do?
Georgia's North Caucasus policy under Saakashvili was put into action after the 2008 August War. The policy sought to make Georgia more attractive to the Northern Caucasus nations- dispelling the negative publicity image following (largely propagated by Moscow), and also to create a psychological ‘buffer zone' between the North Caucasus and Russia. This became the ‘New Caucasus' policy, declared by President Saakashvili before the UN General Assembly in 2010, where pledged to "promote a vision for a free, stable and united Caucasus". The strategy included opening a Russian language TV channel, establishing parliamentary links, easing visa regulations, and recognizing the Circassian genocide. While building ties with the region was a positive strategy, there was also failure of vision in that the policy made use of information war tactics (notably with the genocide recognition), and did not in reality change the attitudes of Abkhazians and Ossetians. Further, the policy frustrated the US. Moscow reacted by suggesting that Georgia was assisting North Caucasian militants; following this, the new Georgian government has amended the rhetoric and is discussing possible cooperation with Moscow for the Sochi Olympics.
For its part, Azerbaijan faces challenges from the North Caucasus in the form of the possible reinvigoration of the Lezgin separatist movement, which Russia has used as a threat against Azerbaijan. Secondly, there is the bigger threat that the jihadist movement will spread in northern Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan's chief card in the North Caucasus is its shared Muslim identity, and secondly its ability to invest in the region and increase trade turnover with bordering Dagestan. Azerbaijan has had strategic cooperation agreements since 2011 with three of Russia's Northern Caucasus republics: Karachay-Cherkess, Dagestan and Ingushetia. Dagestan should be at the forefront of Azerbaijan's North Caucasus policy, as there are real economic opportunities. For example, the trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Dagestan was 202 million USD in 2009, 180 million in 2010, 257 million in 2011, and 254 million in 2012. Overall, Azerbaijan is in first place for Dagestan's foreign trade turnover. Dagestan is significant because it lies about 500 kilometers east of Sochi, and has in recent years become the center of North Caucasian. By building economic ties, Azerbaijan could reduce security threats as well as devaluing Moscow's separatism card.
Joint efforts by Georgia and Azerbaijan could make the North Caucasus a buffer zone between the Caucasus and Moscow. There are several opportunities here:
Firstly, investment --Azerbaijan's Muslim identity means it has closer ties with the region, which can help build trade contacts. This is already happening; business people from Azerbaijan regularly go to the North Caucasus and meet with local authorities, to discuss investment options.
Second, as suggested by Jon Chicky, a long time observer of the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Georgia should provide physical and virtual access to open information and education. This will go a long way in diversifying what is now generally a binary situation -- a Moscow-oriented or a Salafist-oriented information sphere. In addition, they should offer cheap tourism opportunities to open up the region.
A multi-pronged strategy of investment, educational opportunities, business relationships, and civic contacts could change the stereotypes held by North Caucasus people about the South Caucasus. A ‘soft power' dynamic could open the way to showing the ‘other' Caucasus to the North Caucasus nations, which have fallen victims to enduring wars and economic suffering. In this way, Azerbaijan and Georgia can develop a psychological ‘buffer zone'; the key is that patience is required, as this region remains politically very volatile.
