Contributors: Vladimir Belaeff, Stephen Blank, Ethan Burger, Eugene Kolesnikov, Alexandre Strokanov
It has recently been suggested that Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin acts as the biggest spoiler of President Dmitry Medvedev’s
foreign policy initiatives (see David Kramer, “Putin is Medvedev’s
Biggest Spoiler”, Moscow Times, January 13, 2010). Indeed, as David
Kramer points out, the case could be made that Putin, for reasons
better known to him, regularly interferes at key junctures to upset or
altogether derail Medvedev’s key foreign policy initiatives. Is this
assessment fair? Would this be an indication of Putin’s continued
strong interest in seeking another presidential term in 2012? Where
does the buck stop in Moscow on international issues?
Kramer writes that last June “Putin stunned Medvedev and leaders in the
West by announcing a change in Russia's approach to pursuing membership
in the World Trade Organization (WTO), just when everyone thought that
Russia was about to cross the WTO finish line. Putin pulled the rug out
from under Medvedev by announcing that Russia would seek membership in
the WTO only in union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Putin's announcement
came as a complete surprise to everyone, including those in his own
government, and derailed a deal that finally had seemed to be within
reach of Russia after many years of trying.”
“The latest problems arose following a meeting between Medvedev and
Obama in Copenhagen on December 18,” Kramer continues. “They announced
that their negotiators were close to reaching agreement on the START
replacement treaty. Despite last-minute snags and sticking points over
inspections and telemetry, both sides expected to finalize the
agreement early in 2010 - that is, until Putin opened his mouth on
December 29 while on a visit to Vladivostok. Asked by a journalist to
name the biggest obstacle to reaching agreement on the arms control
treaty, Putin responded, ‘the problem is that our American partners are
building an anti-missile shield and we are not building one’.”
Kramer thus draws the conclusion that “depriving Medvedev of victories
seems to have become an objective for Putin. This is a reflection of
Putin’s deep sense of insecurity and manifests itself when he competes
with Medvedev for global attention and glory.”
Kramer also warns the Barack Obama administration against making a
huge mistake of choosing “between Medvedev and Putin as ‘most-favored
negotiating partner,’ or trying to artificially build up Medvedev
politically as the Russian leader ‘more amenable to improving
relations’.”
Is this assessment fair? Is Putin really jealous of Medvedev and
seeking to deprive the latter of opportunities to emerge as a viable
world leader, while bolstering his own domestic standing with foreign
policy successes? Would this be an indication of Putin’s continued
strong interest in seeking another presidential term in 2012? What does
this tell us about the workings of Russian foreign policy? Where does
the buck stop in Moscow on international issues? Does this increase
uncertainty over Moscow’s foreign policy initiatives and actions? How
does it affect Russia’s image abroad?
Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC :
Indeed, it seems as if Putin (as well as his principal subordinates
and beneficiaries) is deliberately undermining Medvedev’s foreign
policy initiatives, as well as many of his domestic programs. Putin
probably believes that he cannot allow Medvedev to emerge as a
legitimate power broker and a genuine national leader, who is prepared
to lead the country out of its current malaise/crisis, if the former
president is to regain his office and stature.
As David Kramer keenly recognizes, prime minister Putin (like the
pre-Mikhail Gorbachev Soviet leadership, and the current rulers in
Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela) understands that if most people
believe that there is a real external threat to the nation, and they
are not used to participating in their country’s political process,
they will tolerate deprivations of their freedoms, low standards of
living (from a relative perspective), and the absence of a real safety
net.
It is difficult to believe that an individual as smart as Putin
could possibly believe that the United States’ installation of a
limited missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland poses a
genuine military threat. Putin's preconditions for Russia’s joining the
WTO might be motivated by a desire to show the importance he attaches
to Russian-Kazakhstani relations, but with respect to Belarus, he might
simply want to derail the WTO accession process unless he gains greater
concessions.
One should not be mislead by the recent growth on the Russian
Trading System (RTS) stock exchange as a sign of Russian economic
health. There is a difference between price and value. The game being
played by some is to drive Russia’s stock prices up before liquidating
their holdings and moving their profits offshore. The Russian economy
is in trouble and Putin cannot claim credit for past successes while
disclaiming responsibility for the present situation.
U.S. president Obama’s foreign policy team hopes that it can
establish a cooperative relationship with president Medvedev – an
individual without one foot in the Cold War. While there are many
capable analysts/commentators on the political dynamics in Russia who
believe that manifestations of a Medvedev/Putin split on policy issues
is merely a smokescreen, it is difficult to believe that, given the
extent to which the president and the prime minister differ on key
issues.
Putin’s and Medvedev’s different interpretations of the country’s past
lead to a debate over Russia’s future. When Medvedev discusses the need
to turn state-controlled enterprises into joint stock companies,
prohibiting senior government officials from holding sinecures where
they receive huge salaries in large government-controlled companies
(even though individuals within the state service are prohibited from
engaging in entrepreneurial activities), and the reasons his
anti-corruption efforts have not yielded the results he had hoped,
president Medvedev is making not very veiled criticisms of Putin.
Thus, it is understandable that Putin should feel increasingly
insecure. He could be losing the support of those who have been his
strongest backers. The power vertical seems not to have survived: power
is devolving into the hands of regional leaders. Without a political
explosion, change in Russia must come from within. Prime minister Putin
does not want members of the Russian political and economic elite to
seriously entertain the idea once coined by Svetlana Medvedeva in an
interview with an Italian journalist, that the time has come when her
husband should cease being president in name only.
Alexandre Strokanov, Professor of History,
Director of Institute of Russian Language, History and Culture, Lyndon
State College, Lyndonville, Vermont:
Certainly, the assessment made by David J. Kramer in his article
“Putin is Medvedev’s Biggest Spoiler” has nothing to do with reality
and is just another example of a mistaken approach to see Putin and
Medvedev as two politicians who represent absolutely different
directions of Russian foreign policy. For every reasonable analyst, it
is quite obvious that Medvedev and Putin are two sides of the same
coin, called the Kremlin.
Kramer’s assertion that “depriving Medvedev of victories seems to
have become an objective for Putin. This is a reflection of Putin’s
deep sense of insecurity …” is just plain wrong. It could be explained
by a lack of understanding of Russia by the author, although, Kramer
was a deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for Russia in the
previous administration in the White House.
In reality, Putin does not need to be jealous of Medvedev, because
his rating in the country remains very strong and above the ratings of
the current president. In the minds of most Russians, Putin is still
the unquestionable leader of the “tandem,” and the remaining two years
before the next presidential elections are unlikely to change this
situation.
It is also quite obvious that Putin never abandoned his interest in
seeking another presidential term in 2012, but it does not necessarily
mean that he certainly will run in the elections. The question of who
will be the next president won't be decided until 2011 and it will be
the result of a complex and uneasy agreement within the Russian elite,
considering the circumstances in Russia itself and around the world,
rather than the simple personal wish of Putin or Medvedev.
Those two cases that are presented in Kramer’s article have not so
much to do with Putin-Medvedev relations as with Russian foreign policy
objectives in general. Let’s consider the first case, which is the WTO.
Actually, the idea voiced by Vladimir Putin about joining the WTO
together with Belarus and Kazakhstan is a good one. First of all, it
shows that in the eyes of the Kremlin, a working Customs Union takes
priority over Russia’s membership in the WTO.
On other hand, as informed observers remember, Medvedev in his own
words said that "if it weren't for the highly cautious U.S. policy on
Russia's WTO accession, and bluntly speaking, if it weren't for the
blocking by the United States, we would have been there long ago."
Additionally, we should not forget the Georgia factor and the potential
veto to Russia’s joining the WTO from Tbilisi, although the key to this
again is still in Washington. That is why it is really important for
the Kremlin to act in accord with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and in a way
to use them as locomotives that will bring the whole train of these
three together into the WTO.
The second case is about the START agreement, presented with the same
misunderstanding. In reality, it is obvious that both Russian leaders
want this agreement to be signed and ratified. President Medvedev in
his words always stresses the importance of the agreement, as well as
the gradual progress achieved through the negotiations. He also warns
that ratification should happen in synchrony with the United States. At
the same time, prime minister Putin simply points at issues that remain
to be discussed and resolved through mutual compromises. However, it
does not mean that they contradict each other. Just the opposite, with
each of them playing their own roles but directed to the same goal -
Russian national interests. The interests that the United States still
has to recognize if it wants really productive relations with Russia.
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands:
The difference in foreign policy approaches between Medvedev and
Putin is a difference between an informed idealist and an informed
pragmatist, who both strive to restore Russia’s greatness. This
difference permeates all aspects of policy, not only foreign policy.
Both men appear to have the same or largely similar foreign policy
approaches to Europe, the Former Soviet Union, China, South America and
the rest of the world, except the United States. Putin views the United
States as a “wolf” whose appetite can only be tempered by strength, no
more illusions, thank you. Medvedev seems to believe that the two
countries, one being fundamentally an embodiment of admirable liberal
values and the other steadily aspiring to such, can overcome
accumulated misunderstandings and become real 21st century partners. As
you believe in common values and court your prospective partner, you
try to trust him and make all sorts of goodwill gestures and
concessions.
Since becoming a global player after World War I, the United States
has consistently treated Russia as a geopolitical rival that must be
contained to preserve the dominant American position. And whether it
was the Tsar, Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, Boris Yeltsin or Dmitry
Medvedev, this fundamental approach has never changed. Ideology,
values, personal friendships or anything else played only secondary and
never the decisive role in this calculation. Economic Siamese twins
relations between the United States and China is the most glaring
example of how geopolitics drives values and the other rhetoric into
obscurity.
If you are an idealist, you persevere or experience a hard
awakening. Medvedev is persevering. Putin, on the other hand, does not
let him give out Russia for good words and tokens. In this respect he
is a spoiler of Medvedev’s foreign policy. This is certainly the view
from the other continent. From Russia, the view, at least to me, is
quite different. Putin holds down the idealistic fervor of his protégée
and saves Russia from the “wolf.”
Vladimir Belaeff, President, Global Society Institute, Inc., San Francisco, CA:
And so the quest for hypothetical friction between Medvedev and
Putin continues. Of course, two alleged examples do not a pattern make
– the “discoveries” of contradiction between the two men remind one of
the “discoveries” of the face of Jesus Christ or the Virgin Mary in the
toasting spot patterns of pancakes and tortillas, which are
periodically reported by the lesser educated from the more
superstitious regions of the Western Hemisphere.
The story of Russia’s accession to the WTO is well documented in the
media. According to the media records, the narrative quoted by Frolov
is not entirely accurate. The context and sequence of actions was as
follows:
After quite a few years of essentially zero progress on negotiations
of Russia’s entry to the WTO, Putin publicly articulated that Russia
would postpone its entry into the WTO. Only after this pronouncement
did many of the key WTO players begin making assertions that Russia was
“walking away” from a “nearly done deal.” And a few weeks later it was
Medvedev who reiterated Russia’s plans to eventually join the WTO.
Thus, the actual sequence of pronouncements is the reverse of what is
narrated by the referenced article, and the “near readiness” for
Russia’s entry to the WTO was declared by non-Russian sources after
Putin’s announcement – there was no evidence of such readiness before
Putin’s statement. In fact, now –several months after the events – the
WTO has still not admitted Russia as a member. So one must ask how
Russia was “on the verge of joining the WTO” (a WTO partisans’ recent
claim) before Putin’s declaration – if membership is still eluding it.
Thus, Putin did not “spoil” Medvedev on WTO membership: Putin spoke
before Medvedev, not after. And Medvedev did not “spoil” Putin, either
– he just reasserted that Russia intends to join the WTO, at some
future point – which is a step that Putin did not reject in his earlier
pronouncement.
In the example of the negotiations for a renewed START agreement,
the public facts are that both Medvedev and Putin have commented on the
complications of the process. Putin in Vladivostok reminded his
audience of the known fact of American expanded plans for ABM coverage
– a factor fully germane to strategic arms control (as demonstrated in
earlier strategic weapon control treaties). And almost simultaneously,
Medvedev noted the difficulty of current negotiations and pointed out
Russia’s requirement of synchronization of ratifications of the new
START by the national legislatures of the signatory countries – as a
pre-condition for the implementation of the treaty by Russia. Again,
the two statements by Medvedev and Putin do not contradict each other –
they are complementary and refer to different aspects of a complex
treaty, which is undergoing a fully expected, complex negotiating
process.
Thus, the allegations of Putin as a “spoiler” of Medvedev do not
appear to be supported by the examples provided, and two reported
instances of alleged contradictions are not convincing, especially
considering the inaccuracies in the narratives of the “evidence.”
Also, one must compare instances of alleged “contradictions” between
the two gentlemen with the many more instances of genuine collaboration
between them. The fact that such an objective comparison is not
presented undermines the hypothesis and exposes a possible latent
subjectivity of the original premise.
Neither Putin nor Medvedev are “spoilers” for their respective
opposites. And the brown toast marks on that pancake are not an image
of Mickey Mouse, imprinted by mysterious gods.
Professor Stephen Blank, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA:
There is no doubt that Putin and Putin's entourage are actively
sabotaging many of Medvedev's foreign policy initiatives or conducting
their own policies. Wherever one looks, arms control, Latin American
and Far Eastern energy policy, the WTO, etc. we see Putin, Igor Sechin,
et al blocking Medvedev's attempts to improve ties with the West, or
actively seeking to worsen those ties, e.g. by scuttling the arms
control treaty, calling for military bases in Latin America, abandoning
the WTO for a Customs Union and always seeking to blame America for
everything.
It should be clear that not only does this faction oppose improving
ties with the West, they are also relying upon or deliberately
fabricating worst-case scenarios and threat assessments. There is also
little doubt that its “law enforcement structures” are participating in
this rivalry, as shown by the military's support for the bases in Latin
America that Sechin sought, complaints about arms control, and the
intelligence services' fabricated threat assessments.
These trends highlight two of the fundamental lacuna in Russia's
aborted democratization project, the failure to establish any kind of
legal succession pattern by which one ruler succeeds anther or
democratic control over these intelligence and military-police
structures. Yeltsin's failures to do what needed to be done here left
the way open for a recrudescence of those forces and the asphyxiation
of democratizing trends in Russia, with the consequences we now see.
Anyone trying to make sense of contemporary Russian foreign policy
must understand that it derives its modus operandi and psychology from
this obsession with the concentration of power in a single hand, the
idea of legal nihilism (without which Medvedev could not function
either), and the accompanying belief that since Russian politics
resembles the Mafia, the rest of the world relates to Russia in the
same way that rivals relate to each other in the Kremlin.
Internalizing that lesson would be a great benefit to those of us
who seek or purport to be experts on the system. Naturally, this
rivalry renders Russian foreign policy even more unpredictable than it
normally is, for nobody knows what the policy is today or what it will
be tomorrow. But it is not a mistake for the Obama administration to
deal primarily with Medvedev. After all, he has the formal authority to
conduct foreign policy and we need not negotiate on the basis of
Putin's agenda. Moreover, the administration can, if it should ever
choose to do so, tell Moscow that it has reset relations and then
refuse to make any unreciprocated concessions to Russia on Iran, arms
control, the WTO, or the CIS. After all, it is Russia that is becoming
weaker in the CIS and whose economy is in greater and more structural
decline than is the United States. If anything, the rivalry in the
Kremlin justifies taking a principled, tough, but forward-leaning U.S.
posture. What it does not justify are concessions to Russia to win
over Putin, whose policy is inveterately anti-American.
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