Contents:

 

Overall Trends
I would say that the year 2007 might be referred to as “Caucasus on Fire.” I apply such an alarming title because Caucasus as a whole – not just the North Caucasus, but also the South Caucasus -- really changed within the past year. Clearly, roots of the current situation go back to previous years, previous centuries even, but there are more recent trends worth noting. 
Lack of Federal Control: The first trend is, at least in the South Federal District of Russia, that the level of federal control over regional politics has been dramatically reduced. On the ground one can hardly see that the North Caucasus is really part of the Russian Federation. Instead, the region appears to be made up of informal units that are not part of the whole country. I would call this a trend because the level of federal control has decreased gradually over the years, but has changed dramatically this year. I do not mean that these parts of the North Caucasus have strong separatist movements. What I do mean is that, judging by the level of management, implementation of the federal laws and programs, dealing with problems and challenges of the region, North Caucasus does not appear to be controlled by or to belong to the Russian Federation. 
Radicalization of the Civilian Population: The second trend became a really popular topic of conversation in 2007, even among journalists. It is has to do with the increasing level of radicalization of local religious groups, which contributes to active resistance (by violent means) throughout the North Caucasus. This process was clearly developing in the previous years, but in 2007 it became a real, tangible problem. Mostly, because armed resistance becomes less and less marginal as increasing number of supporters are joining such groups. As a result, there has been reemergence of the use of terror in the region. For a long period of time, especially after the school hostage-taking in Beslan, terror was not resorted to widely by rebel formations. However, recently, we have witnessed explosions of buses in Ossetia and Stavropol region, explosions in Dagestan and killings of the non-Ingush civilians if Ingushetia. In other words, we see the revival of the strategic tactic of using terror and targeting civilians as opposed to officials. 
Disenfranchised and desperate population: Finally, the third trend is a noticeable deterioration of the relationship between the local society and the local government. Although this is hard to quantify, it has become a serious problem in 2007. The financial and opportunities gap between those in power and the local population is so wide that the two simply function in distinct and separate realities. It is probably this gap that causes the first two trends outlined above. 
It is because of the gap that those that have the opportunity to leave the region and go to “Russia” or the West, do so. Others, very often choose the religious path and many of them contribute to the wider protest movements. Those left over, hope to secure, through family ties, positions in the administration, and that way bridge the gap. 
The young people understand that education is not important as there are no links between personal qualities and career opportunities. As a result, up to 70% of people on the ground do not have expectation of reaching any career goals. They are just trying to survive. This trend is particularly challenging, because the new generations will either move out of the region or join the religions resistance groups. With this predicament, nothing positive will happen for the region.

Ethnic Conflict: Ingushetia and North Ossetia
In 2007, the relations between North Ossetians and Ingush worsened. The animosity between the two nationalities has existed for years, as a result of the conflict in 1992 in the Prigorodny region, unfortunately this year we saw an increased level of hatred and tension between these two ethnic groups. All efforts that have been made since 1993 to build cooperation in the Prigorodny region are no longer noticeable. . 
In this context, it is important to mention the school hostage taking operation in 2004 in Beslan. It was important to the Ossetian community that a big number of the terrorists at Beslan were from Ingushetia. 
On the other hand, more recently, dozens of Ingush that have disappeared are detained in Ossetia because there aren’t any adequate detention facilities in Ingushetia. These developments further exacerbate the level of ethnic tension between the two groups. 
Also, there have been several murders of Ingush in the Prigorodny region. For example, on October 20, 2007 young Ingush boys were shot on the street in Prigorodny; more than 900 people took part in their funerals – that number clearly did not include only close relatives. These crimes, unquestionably, lead to the escalation of the conflict. We are not facing a frozen conflict here. We are facing an open ethnic conflict. 
Mr. Kozak, former Russian Presidential envoy to the South Federal District, noted that there are Ossetian groups that are responsible for kidnapping and killing of native Ingush on the Ossetian territory. We are aware that there must be mass graves in the forests of North Ossetia, probably, filled with dead Ingush. The level of conflict is very alarming. 
The effects of the kidnappings are many-fold because family vendetta is still practiced in the region and family clans tend to be very extensive. This was apparent in the kidnapping by the federal security service of two brothers from a prominent and large Aushev family. On their way back to Ingushetia from Astrakhan, the Aushevs were kidnapped in Grozny by security forces. (One of the Aushev’s was previously kidnapped and probably detained in North Ossetia, on suspicion that he supported the rebels. When it became apparent that he did not, as he didn’t even live in the Caucasus, he was tortured until he agreed to cooperate. The second time he was kidnapped because of his failure to cooperate as agreed.) The brothers’ kidnapping led to protests, demanding their release, that was attended by hundreds of people and organized by the family members. In the end, the two brothers were set free. These mass protests, which started as human rights related pickets, transformed into political, even revolutionary protests by the end of 2007.
Young Ingush leaders, young Muslims, definitely see federal authorities as backing up Ossetia, and they definitely see a clear reluctance, on the part of federal authorities, to facilitate Ingush return to the Prigorodny region. Months ago I attended a trial in the court of North Ossetia and Ingushetia in which evidence of torture was presented. There submitted evidence was attesting to forced confessions by individuals who admitted that they were involved with Shamil Basayev’s group. The accused were native Ingush; the judge and police were Ossetian and the verdict was 24, 23 and 18 years of prison. 
So it is evident that the interethnic conflict that was frozen for years became unfrozen, and people from both sides participate in the instigation and escalation of the hostilities. The things, that are currently going on in Ingushetia were also caused by the lack of sensitivity, on the part of the prosecutor, towards Ingush detainees on the territory of North Ossetia. This is also inflaming the conflict. 
We should mentioning that regions of North Caucasus are closely linked to South Caucasus, as many South Ossetians (de-jure part of Georgia) live in the Prigorodny region. The Ossetian-Ingush conflict is also fueled by this fact. By many in the Caucasus, this detail is seen as a Moscow supported Christian Orthodox intervention into the traditional Muslim region and as a part of the broader political support for the South Ossetia. 

Ingushetia
Today a war is taking place in Ingushetia. I use the term “war” because the attacks that take place there are of a larger scale than the attacks, for example, in Iraq. Regular attacks started in August 2007, but they increased in the month of September. The reduced level of incidents during winter time is typical for the Northern Caucasus. It is not only the Russian bear that sleeps during the winter time – mountains are hard for anyone during this unaccommodating period. The level of continued violence demonstrates that no solution was found in spite of the 2500 additional federal troops deployed into the region. 
There are two main problems causing the violence. First one is a wide and growing civil distress and civil protest against the federal authorities. The other, and perhaps more crucial problem, is the tension between various groups within the local population itself. This is why I strongly disagree with those who say that Ingushetia is the “next Chechnya”. The roots of the conflict and the targets of attacks in Ingushetia are quite different. Unlike in Chechnya, “Ingushetiazation” would not be successful as it has, in a way, already taken place. One can say, that Ingushetia is showing a more developed model, which would be faced by Chechnya immediately after Kadyrov is gone. 
Unlike in Chechnya most people who are armed in Ingushetia are fighting against more than just federal forces. People are shooting at the local police officers and local bureaucrats. They are fighting against local administration, not against the federal. Relatives of the Ingush President Zyazikov are especially targeted because of the rampant corruption and mismanagement on the local level. In a three month period – August, September and October – we witnessed a number of terrorist operations, which have been so successful on such a small territory that it remains hard to explain how so many attacks can take place and how these attacks are organized when there is a huge number of federal forces and local authorities who are trying to keep the situation under control. 
Another aspect of the conflict is violence directed against the non-Ingush civilians. Incidents of Russian, Roma, and Korean families being killed in their homes, is clearly a form of terrorizing. The specific type of civilians (non-Ingush) that have been singled out and killed is indicative of something different taking place than what we normally think of as resistance. Experts have various theories regarding the motivations behind these civilian murders. For example, one of the explanations is that this is an FSB provocation to destabilize the security situation in the region. On the other hand, some in Ingushetia suggest that Russian civilians should be seen as supporters of the Russian colonial rule. 2007 was not the first time civilians were killed in Ingushetia; unfortunately we have examples from previous years as well. We cannot say with confidence that these killings were organized as a provocation by the FSB, although, this belief is very popular among civilians in Ingushetia. 
What we can say is that some of the recent attacks, allegedly organized by the rebels, are very strange and differ markedly from how rebels normally operate. For example, during the incident in July, a person was shooting at the FSB and administration building with the grenade cup discharge from a very secure area of the presidential building. The attacker did not aim to destroying the buildings. Instead the act was purely symbolic. But following that attack, in one of the neighboring villages (Ali-Urt) very aggressive mop-up operation was carried out, resulting in a lot of people getting beaten, including very young and very old civilians. This is not a typical tactic of the rebels – to provoke aggression against the civilians. Also, Mr. Kalimatov, a very high ranking FSB officer sent from Moscow who was investigating kidnappings and attacks on civilians, was killed. Some 100 bullets were fired at his car. A similar instance occurred in October in Kabardino-Balkaria, when an officer was allegedly kidnapped by the rebels, but the format of kidnapping did not resemble usual fighters’ methods. All of these incidents sound very suspicious. Rebels don’t usually kidnap or assassinate this type of people.
In other words, while there are different perceptions of what the roots of instability might be in Ingushetia, or who is behind them, the results are quite clear – people in Ingushetia are the least secure people in the Russian Federation today. In August 2007 there were more that 15 incidents of violence and in September more than 25, both of which are big figures of a territory as small as Ingushetia (1,700 sq. miles). Now days, for political reasons, one’s entire family can easily be killed. In fact, today, from the point of view of personal civilian security the situation in Chechnya is more secure than the situation in Ingushetia. The situation in Ingushetia has destabilized to the point that the presence of neither federal nor local control is evident on the ground. 
Who is funding the fighters and terrorists? If you think funds come from the Middle East, that is not a correct assumption. Ironically, the family of the president of Ingushetia is funding them. Already twice now, once in late February 2006 and once in March 2007, rebels kidnapped an old and highly venerated relative of President Zyazikov so that the family would pay a large ransom for his release. Regardless of whether $10 million, $12 million, or a lesser amount has been paid, we need to be aware of the fact that this money goes to support the rebels. 
If Zyazikov relatives had been killed, it would have seriously damaged the picture of stability the authorities are trying to impress on the outsiders. In fact, the Caucasian Knot reported that an oral order was given by the Ingush government not to report to the mass media incidents of terrorist attacks. This is the kind of reality Zyazikov’s government wants to present to the world. There are some successes in the attempts to bring back to Ingushetia’s native Russians, but at the same time ethnic Russians are still being targeted and killed. These types of contradictions point to two different realities present in Ingushetia today; one that is being put forth by the government and the other representing the actual situation on the ground.

What is Zyazikov’s role and position? Does he have any control over the situation, or is he simply retaining power because that is how Moscow wants it for now? Is his situation indicative of that of others in the region?

Let me describe the current ‘dead end’ situation in the North Caucasus that has come about as a direct result of the unsuccessful and short term approach of the federal government. National elites in the North Caucasus were comprised of strong regional leaders, like former president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev. Not all were as overwhelmingly popular as Aushev, but they were powerful in their respective regions. Today, republic leaders are more controlled and more dependent on federal authorities. That was the main federal plan: to empower leaders who are less rooted in the local elites. Prominent local leaders tend to support a regional agenda instead of the federal one. For example, Aushev chose to address local issues over the federal ones. He was playing different clans against one another, using the federal authorities, and achieving much more control in the republic than federal authorities could. Under the current arrangement, the local leadership controls only part of the elites, and none of the population. If the population resists, it is brutally repressed. In other words, the leadership, well represented in the current Ingush President Zyazikov, is responsible for providing a nice picture and covering up all the cracks in the society. This arrangement is, apparently sufficient for the federal authorities and their loyal elite and these are main ingredients of the Northern Caucasus ‘sauce’. 
Under the new weak president in Dagestan, President Aliev, federal authorities are much stronger than they were for years before. This is due to the following reasons: the weakened national movement and increased federal interest. And still, the level of terror in Dagestan keeps growing, because the political leadership is so weak and strategic decisions are not being made. There is no one among the elite of the republic capable of discussing the challenges. Absence of such a community gives no hope that strategic issues would be resolved. 
Under the leadership of Muscovite Kanokov, the new president of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), we see the same low level of federalism in the republic. The needs of the society are neglected, but the local elites are backed by the federal control. In other words, through leaders like Zyazikov, who are weak, the Kremlin ensures that issues it places as top priority are dealt with and it does not care about the rest. For this reason, the removal of federal forces from the region would substantially reduce the federal subsidies in the North Caucasus and lead to ousting of such leaders as Zyazikov or Kadyrov. This type of governance, will not last for too long. There is a growing opposition to the Zyazikov’s administration. There is also a kind of an understanding between local forces and the rebels, because both want to get rid of Zyazikov. They are showing the federal center that Zyazikov is weak and that the federal center should get rid of him. Through different means, both forces are trying to reach that goal. A similar situation is taking place elsewhere in the North Caucasus.
Federal government cannot remove Zyazikov using existing procedures. By appointing regional leaders instead of having them elected, it is even more complicated for the federal center to remove them from power under pressure from the population without serious consequences. It makes the federal authorities look weak, because it demonstrates that the official chosen by the federal government was unfit to govern. It also sends a clear message that you can achieve the change of government through protests. Policymakers in Moscow are worried that removing Zyazikov would inspire popular dissent elsewhere in the region. 
Similar situation is found in Dagestan where the republic president Aliev cannot fire the head of a corrupt local, administration because if he did so, the next morning, in dozens of other villages and cities, people would try to use similar methods to remove officials which are truly corrupted, or just represent a different clan. 
Protests of this kind happened in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in 2004, when hundreds of people occupied the government premises and federal officials were forced to negotiate with the crowd. Similar thing happened in North Ossetia after the Beslan attack when thousands of people were trying to get rid of president Dzasohov by organizing protests on the main square, but federal officials did not respond to their requests. Excluding Chechnya, the level of government control is so low in the North Caucasus republics, that local presidents can easily lose their offices as a result of mass protests.
In other words, federal authorities created, not only in the Caucasus, but throughout Russia, conditions under which protest movements cannot change the local administration or even successfully oppose it, even through legitimate means. Perhaps, the only exception to this Russia-wide trend would be the Stavropol region, neighboring Chechnya. A Just Russia, a “sovereign” opposition party founded by the Kremlin, won parliamentary elections, but soon the top leader was arrested and lost all of his positions.

Chechnya
The level of resistance in Chechnya has been decreasing. However, according to the official statements made by a Chechen mufti in May 2007, dozens of young Muslims are joining resistance formations in the mountains (as many as 200-300 according to the official numbers, although, unofficial statistics are even higher). So while the level of resistance is lower than in previous years, the number of fighters has not decreased greatly. The rebels in the mountainous areas are neither under the regional government’s nor under federal control. The number of attacks in Chechnya has not gone down significantly enough to consider the area safe. One thing that has changed are the perpetrators of violence. Now days, state actors are much more responsible for human rights violations than the rebel fighters. Also, unlike in places such as Dagestan, North Ossetia and Stravopol region where explosions often take place and a number of people die as a result, violence in Chechnya is not random. It main targets are officials. 
I strongly disagree with human rights reporters with respect to significance of the reconstruction efforts in Chechnya. Yes, about 250 buildings have been built or reconstructed in Grozny with the federal money during 2007 (reports of the local operator, “Spezstroi” of Russia provides a number of 10, 000 buildings during the past 2 years). However, this alone does not qualify as a success. Yes, they are reconstructing buildings, but more importantly, the extremely high level of unemployment in Chechnya – which is a much bigger problem – is not being addressed. An enormous amount of funds was spent on the reconstruction of the airport and other buildings symbolic of good governance, which is important, but it is more important to reconstruct the factories that provide people with jobs. It is not clear why this has not been done – perhaps, because it is easier to present the image of new Chechnya through new buildings. Also, this way it is easier to steal federal funds. A lot of buildings have been double-funded officially from federal sources; in reality money has been taken from the local authorities, while local workers did not get promised salaries. During interviews for the Caucasian Knot, officials have confirmed this information, that salaries are being paid to the workers in cash, that local bureaucrats are tasked with funding the reconstruction of specific buildings and streets even. But not all are happy with this type of arrangement. Some bureaucrats are quitting their jobs and leaving the region. As a result, thousands of workers are experiencing delays in salary payments or have not been paid at all. 
In my opinion, this is why Kremlin’s “Kadyrov project” has not been a great success. The region is not going in the direction of sustainable development. Instead it is developing as a republic highly dependent on the politically motivated investments. 
Yes, many buildings have been built, but Chechnya needs modernization, not merely reconstruction. Modernization is not taking place in any of the developing sectors except in roads development. The roads are the only example of a successful attempt to modernize the republic. But transfer through Chechnya to Baku is still considered very dangerous by most of businessmen, mainly not because of the regular attacks of the rebels, but due to the high level of corruption of police and despotism of the local authorities. This is why simply roads are not enough.

Dagestan 
In Dagestan, on the one hand, the number of attacks targeting civilians is increasing, but on the other hand, the number of human rights violations resulting from law enforcement operations is not. Although Dagestan is not a stable territory, the political leadership has made some positives steps. For example, on November 9, the Makhachkala court issued a verdict declaring 3 persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activity, innocent. There have also been court verdicts made against corrupted officials. The leadership of Dagestan employs a different approach even towards counterterrorist operations, even though they remain under the jurisdiction of the local Ministry of Interior, which is under federal control. For instance, residents of houses damaged in counterterrorist operations have been reimbursed for the damages they incurred - for three operations last year up to 13 millions of rubles (more than half a million dollars) have been paid in compensation. It is important to mention that such reimbursement should be provided according to the federal law, but since 2006 federal law has not been effectively enforced. Therefore these decisions were made by officials on the local level. 
Despite their efforts, however, the level of terrorism in Dagestan is not decreasing. Mostly, I believe, because law enforcement agencies are not adequately dealing with the spiritual leadership of Muslims in Dagestan. On this note, it is important to mention the continued collaboration between the police and the DUM (Muslim Spiritual Governance Body – an organization that among other things compiles lists of Muslims who do not follow what is considered the official procedures of Islam). Some of people placed on those lists really are Wahhabits, but many are not. Actually it is easy for any religious person, especially if they are young, to get on the “suspect” list. Praying five times a day in the mosque, having obtained higher level of religious education, abstinence from smoking and drinking – these habits, that are very usual for many Muslims, make one a target of special attention. Those who are suspected are placed under surveillance, their phones are bugged, some of them are detained from time to time, etc. 
These practices are widely used in all of North Caucasus, including Adygea, but in Dagestan they are of special importance. Dagestan is traditionally widely known as a region where teaching of Sufi Islam is very popular. There are a number of very famous teachers and sheiks, who do not only lead the mosques in their regions, but have an important role in their local communities. Two most popular such figures are located in Buinaks and Derbent regions. Some of them have hundreds, and some even thousands of spiritual devotees (murids). The most famous among them work in the capital and among highly positioned bureaucrats. Although current top level leadership of Dagestan is not very religious and most of them have a strong soviet background, there are enough murids in the DUM and some other important state institutions. (While not officially part of the administration, DUM de-facto does belong to the government structures and has even been supervised by the ministry, dealing with the “national issues”. DUM supervise all trips to Hadj and education on religious topics). 
So all of these facts are important only because of one reason – Wahhabits in the region are in strong clash with the Sufi teachers, who also compete among themselves. Their tensions are mainly on the ideological level, but the DUM takes advantage of its very close cooperation with the police and authorities in general and uses administrative, not rhetorical instruments, to ensure its control (in Dagestan the DUM controls more than 60% of the mosques) . Under these conditions, peaceful Wahhabis, and many other Muslims of Dagestan who are not a part of the officially controlled mosques find themselves specially targeted by the police and local administration. Needles to say, this type of unfair treatment of the peaceful and marginal religious groups turns many of their followers to support the rebel fighters. This is a general trend for the entire North Caucasus region , but in Dagestan it particularly exacerbates the existing conditions, as it is one of the most religious regions of the Russian Federation. 
Unfortunately, the positive steps taken by the administration, do not deal with this situation. A lot has been done to reduce the repressive role of the police, to reduce social injustice and to make special operations against rebels and terrorists better targeted (although in Dagestan, as in the rest of the North Caucasus, this should be called special assassinations, because most of the time no one is captured, usually all people get killed, including women). In other words, a lot is being done, but not enough.
It is my estimate, that there are hundreds of people organized in four main groups that are actively organizing assassinations. For a long time these operations were very targeted and focused on police and state officials only (among variety of assassinations there is quite a number of those that have purely criminal and political motives). As in some other parts of the North Caucasus, there was an undeclared war between the fighters and the police structures. Especially since police are responsible for the terror investigations. Police has to report successes, they need to show results of the investigation, and this work is really hard. It is easy to torture an innocent Wahhabi, who has never been a part of any illegal activities, but whose point of view differs from the official one. It is important to note that in Dagestan, in contradiction with the federal laws and the Russian Constitution, there is discrimination on religious basis. According to the law N15, translated into English and published on Caucasian Knot (HYPERLINK http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/docstext/engdocs/id/1207093.html) Wahhabism is prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation. On the regional level, the police even have the right to abuse such religious dissidents. 
Unfortunately, in 2007 we have seen the other side use new tactics as well. The rebels or the underground armed formations now target civilians. Main tool - explosions on the streets and in public places – is very reminiscent of what has been happening in Iraq. Such change in tactics forces analysts to define those behind the attacks as terrorists.
Dagestan is a territory where the level of corruption in the regional administration directly reflects special regional conflicts, especially in Botlikh known for its history of mass protests against the authorities, where the local administration operates with such disregard for the interests of the local population that the residents find it hard to live in the region. Already for many years the “price list” for a variety of government positions has been widely known in the republics of the North Caucasus. However, in Dagestan, the level of corruption in the administration is probably most extreme. Caucasian Knot, at one point, published a list of relatives in all the government agencies. The administration and the society live, as we say in Russia, in a parallel reality. It nearly looks like a contract - people don't obstruct bureaucrats in their attempts to steal and in turn authorities try to maintain some level of justice. 
Traditionally, there has been a lack of fertile soil, for agricultural needs, in the mountains of Dagestan. So at times, when due to rampant corruption in the administration, people lose the right to use the little land that is available and new conflicts spark up. We see similar trends in places such as Kabardino-Balkaria, but with a lower level of tension. 
These types of injustices make the region very unstable and provide the protest movement with much wider public support. 
Summary: Although we have seen some positive developments over the past few years, the negative trends in Dagestan continue to be more pronounced and add to further development of internal conflict. Some of the most problematic trends include: violent armed clashes in parts of the republic; a complex and unresolved tension between various religious groups; high level of corruption and heightened awareness among the population of the social injustices.

Kabardino-Balkaria
Much like in Dagestan, in Kabardino-Balkaria the local government has been able to make some positive steps, but it nevertheless does not sufficiently control the situation. The level of violence in Kabardino-Balkaria has increased this year and attacks are now regular. This is an important fact considering that after the events on October 13, 2005, when militants organized an attack on the government institutions in the republic’s capital Nalchik, both violence and organized activities of young Muslims have been markedly reduced. However, the current upsurge in violence reminds us that these groups are still active. In fact, according to local experts, the organizers of the attacks in Nalchik are still hiding on the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria. 
A clash between the elites is also taking place in Kabardino-Balkaria, which further complicates the security situation. The situation is similar to that in Dagestan where dozens of policemen and bureaucrats have been killed in the past year. Although these killings are classified as terrorist attacks, in reality they are motivated by business interests. 
Inter-ethnic clashes between the Balkar and Kabardin communities have been flaring up as a result of the asymmetrical representation of Kabardins in the local administration. The main point of contention, which incites Balkar-organized protests, is the new legislation on land distribution. However, the authorities in the republic do not take the Balkar complaints seriously and try to silence their opposition. An NGO representing the interests of the Balkars, “Council of Balkar People”, was closed in January 2008. Previous to closing the organization, authorities tried to influence the group. Similar tactics have been used in other parts of the Northern Caucasus: In Ossetia, the independent group “Voice of Beslan” was closed; in Ingushetia, a court hearing is taking place against a local group, the “Chechen Committee of National Salvation.” In general, such attempts to stifle independent voices marginalize the society. Especially in cases when NGO in question truly unites the interests of a big segment of the population. It is this type of repression that makes Kabardino-Balkaria unstable today. 
Some positive steps have been in made in 2007, but they are too few and far between. For example, a local prosecutor was removed from his position on corruption charges; the level of pressure on practicing Muslims by the local police has been reduced; the court of Elbrus region rendered a verdict for two policemen, suspected in torture of teenagers – both were sentenced to 3 years in prison. Involvement of the state in the activities of the DUM (Muslim Spiritual Governance Body) became less brutal and some small compromises have been reached with the marginal elements of the society. 
On the other hand, the families of the participants of the Nalchik attacks never received the bodies of their loved ones. Many people who were not personally involved in events of October 13 have been killed or tortured simply because they had distant connections with the terrorist network – through family, friends or acquaintances.

 

Trend: Loss of Federal Control
Do you have any sense of why there is a loss of federal control in the region? Is the federal center simply busier with other things, or is this something that is planned out?

The Federal center has less control because it has no strategic approach. It is not enough to simply deploy more troops to the region. Control comes from management of social and political issues and not from containing the situation through military means. There is a competition between the local and federal law enforcement and no long term cooperation between these bodies or understanding, on the federal level, of the situation on the ground. As a result, attempting to gain greater control through troop increases in reality causes control structures to collapse because the chain of command becomes unclear. After Beslan, there was a proposal to shift the responsibility for counterterrorism oversight from the federal to the local level, which was successfully implemented during the 2005 Nalchik events. Today, however, counterterrorism has been returned to the federal level of responsibility. Still, there is no real strategic understanding on the federal level of what is going on in the region. 
For example, Chechenization was a very cruel but effective tactic to get rid of separatists. It seems that, after the experience of Dubrovka and Beslan hostage takings, Kremlin was very afraid of negotiating with terrorists, who at the time had separatist motivations. While Chechenization did eliminate the separatist threat, it is important to remember who it was that replaced the separatists of the 1990s. They have been replaced by religiously-motivated leaders with whom it is now impossible to negotiate. This makes the situation in the North Caucasus very close to a dead end, because there is no possibility for negotiation – one can only kill them. However, by killing religiously motivated young people, in the eyes of the population, you victimize them and are effectively creating heroes out of them. The end result is that the level of violence does not go down; instead, more religious fighters are joining the cause.
The same approach is used in Karachaevo-Cherkessia: young religious people, who have not participated in terrorist attacks, are labeled as Wahhabis by the government. Subsequently, they are detained and arrested. Media reported publicly about 2 dozen arrests of religious activists in July-August 2007; a couple of arrests happened earlier; 2 rebels were killed on the border of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Georgia. Relatives and friends of those who were arrested spoke up in private and in some cases even publicly, claiming that the police placed evidence such as weapons and maps, during the home searches of the suspected terrorists. 
As the presidential representative, Mr. Rapota, reported 84% of terror activities in all of Russia are organized in the South Federal District. Criminal groups are active and the response to these groups is insufficient. Mr. Sidoruk, deputy of the General Prosecutor stated, and even Putin admitted, that regional policy in the North Caucasus has not been very successful. As a whole, the situation in the North Caucasus is heading toward the direction of Central Asia: strong centralization, a radicalized religious community, vibrant protest movements against the economic gap separating the privileged government elites and the vast majority of the society. In other words, one could say that the colonial policy of Kremlin secures pseudo-loyalty of the elites and hatred from the society, which perceives itself as second class citizenry, which is probably the reason why many of them do not vote.

 

Trend: Education and the gap between government and society
The quality of education is extremely low. The literacy rate is still high and people are getting some education, but the level of professional expertise is lower than what it was several years ago. Educational degrees have taken on a symbolic rather than functional meaning. The lower quality of education makes it problematic to say that education is a way for a young person to embark on a career path in a specialized area. In general, people try to send their kids to study in other areas of South Federal District and other areas of the Russian Federation (clearly Moscow and Sankt-Petersburg are most popular destinations) because they see that the level of education in the North Caucasus is very bad. Most importantly, for most of the population of the North Caucasus, education is not considered a step towards a career. Although other regions of Russia also face unemployment problems, nowhere has this problem taken the proportions it has in the North Caucasus (more than 70-80% in some territories). When these figures are combined with the level of corruption – which is also high – education and experience alone are not enough to find a job. 
In Dagestan, for instance, you can easily buy any government position. With the previous president, positions as high up as that of a Minister were available for sale. Under the current leadership this type of corruption has been tamed a bit, but not too many things changed on the bottom. People know how much a position costs and how long payback would take – from what moment bribes would bring profits and at what level. Getting a position as a head of the department, local administration or state controlled business has nothing to do with one’s skills. In other places as well, bribery is still necessary to get a position. While the methods differ, it remains notable that in the North Caucasus education has nothing to do with getting a job. For instance, a 32 year old specialist who speaks a number of foreign languages, and has experience in humanitarian aid work would have much difficulty finding a job. Even though this person may have strong skills and connections in the region, it doesn’t mean anything. This phenomenon serves as a strong indication of the gap between the society and the government.

Can you tell us more about the corruption in the region? What types of relationships exist between government officials and businesses?

The problem goes beyond simply not having a job. Small funds, which state is responsible for providing to the population, are insufficient and provided irregularly. At the same time, bureaucrats somehow manage to become very wealthy. It is not clear how they are so rich, but it is common knowledge that their salaries alone are not what make them wealthy. It is also apparent that bureaucrats have close relationships with the businesses. While the local populations tolerates this practice on some degree, rampant corruption reflected in the increasingly obvious links between government officials and businesses can incite protest, and in some cases, drive more people toward joining religiously-motivated rebel groups. So far, this trend has not spread rapidly, but the potential exists. 
In the corruption scheme of things, each region has its “boss”, or a few of them. This role is often taken by the prosecutor who “rules” over an extended period of time. He uses his administrative resources to invite businesses to the region and control them. Under this arrangement, businessmen pay the prosecutor a monthly fee or share with him their business profits. In many cases, the local prosecutor himself is a businessman. For instance, in one of the republics, the prosecutor owns gas stations all over the republic. If, for example, a new president of the republic tries to remove the corrupt prosecutor, this task can prove to be almost impossible, as business interests acquired through the above described arrangements give the prosecutor protection on both local and Federal level. If the president should to push for the removal of the prosecutor, an open clash is likely to occur. Sometimes these types of conflicts occur on a more local, for instance city mayor, level.
There are a number of levels of corruption. The most profitable one is the one dealing with the federal funds. It is easy to buy Muscovites who come to administer and supervise large funds and projects. Once they are bought, millions of dollars just disappear. This level of corruption usually involves government members and the president. 
The next most profitable corruption scheme is that linked to local businesses. There are a few branches worth mentioning. For instance, in Ossetia it is the vodka businesses, in Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria it is tourism. Construction work in the North Caucasus is profitable and there is a high demand for key products such as cement and bricks not only on the local but Russia wide level. These branches of business are controlled by the same group of people, with some variations from region to region, that have significant clout in regional politics. 
Finally, there is a grassroots level corruption that should also be mentioned. The most profitable in this category is the “business’ of traffic police; particularly those working on the busy highways. These people have monthly profit bench marks. The money made through bribes, in addition to the police working the streets, goes into the pockets of the heads of the regional and local police. Since police patrol the roads 24-7 the income is quite high. Particular times and places are more “lucrative”. For instance, more money is made at night, on the border between Dagestan and Azerbaijan, and roads used to transport products (usually there is a number of “passing fees” drivers need to pay). Even a taxi, driving across republic borders, which in some places might take no longer than 2 hours, will have to pay bribes to the traffic police.

 

Trend: Public support for the rebels
In Ingushetia, less that 100 people can be classified as active rebels. They are not connected to groups in other republics. In other republics of the North Caucasus, excluding Chechnya and Dagestan, the number of active rebels is even smaller. Latest official data indicate that there are approximately 500-700 active rebels in all of the North Caucasus. This, of course, is only one of the many estimates of the rebel movement and the exact figure is hard to establish. 
However, what we should in fact be paying attention to is not the number of active rebels, but the number of their supporters among the civilian population. These are the people who could take up arms at any moment, as they did in Kabardino-Balkaria, in 2005 during the attacks on Nalchik. In 2005, there was barely a rebel movement to speak of in Kabardino-Balkaria. Some 10-15 people made up the entire resistance. However, in spite of their seemingly small size, within two days they were able to mobilize around 200 young people for the attack. For this reason, it is the potential of mobilization that is the most important factor to consider when we discuss military threats. 
Also, the rebel movement is no longer organized as an army structure. Instead it is comprised of small groups, of about 3 to5 people, who operate on a specific territory, and do not have links to Chechnya or any larger group. Doku Umarov (leader of the self proclaimed North Caucasus Emirate) called these “tactical groups.” 
He named this new structure, in his October 2007 speech, when he announced the transformation of the Chechen independence movement into a struggle for the North Caucasus Emirate. With this move he completely diminished the political role of Ahmed Zakhaev, leader of the Chechen Parliament and that way granted Kremlin a years-long wish. 
Rebels’ techniques vary from region to region. In Ossetia, over the last few years, bombs were often used and targets included gambling clubs, 11 troop-carriers, and a helicopter. In Ingushetia on the other hand, rebels for years targeted homes of police officials and prosecutor’s office personnel. Recently however, they began targeting non-Ingush civilians, although we must note that official rebel sources never claimed responsibility for these acts. In Dagestan, rebels focused on police exclusively. In Karachaevo-Cherkessia and neighboring part of the Stavropol region, official religious leaders were attacked and killed. In addition to Wahhabists, in Kabardino-Balkaria, jihad was also officially announced by a very popular Muslim leader. In this republic, much like in the others, assassinations were conducted by small groups and not very many rebels were trained to conduct attacks. The level of organization in Chechnya was always superior to that in rest of the republics and it was aimed at military convoys and troops. The executed operations sometimes take place within the capital of Grozny. For instance, in 2007 there were signs that an attack, reminiscent of the attack organized in 2004 when rebels took control of a segment of Grozny, was being prepared. In addition, number of attacks organized in Chechnya has been increasing over the past year. All of these different tactics are not changing the fact that most rebels, and especially those behind terrorist attacks, are not hiding in the forests, but are instead living among the people. 
Also, as a result of the high levels of migration and unemployment, a lot of young people no longer live with their parents. Instead they stay in dormitories, or rent cheap apartments, while trying to earn money working, often illegally, in markets or construction sites. These young generations, in their search for job opportunities, often move around and are not registered by the authorities. As a result neither their families nor the police are informed about their whereabouts. Therefore, these groups represent an excellent pool of recruits for the rebels, as many of them are “invisible”. With rampant corruption in the country, these individuals already living on the outskirts of the society can move around unnoticed quite efficiently. This is how a few dozen of them managed to make their way into the school in Beslan. Similarly, among those who attacked Nalchik in 2005, a significant number worked away from home. The same was true for the attackers of Nazran, Ingushetia’s biggest city. From all these examples we can tell that the terrorist organizations are successfully developing their support bases outside of the North Caucasus. The overall number of active members of the rebel groups is hard to pin point. However, the exact number is not what is important now days. What is important is the emerging support of the rebel networks among the general public and youth in particular, as they increasingly perceive the rebels as fighters for the better future of the region.

Can you elaborate on the mission of the armed groups and reasons civilians support them?

I’m afraid that the resistance movement is increasingly leaning towards religiously motivated separatism. This is partially due to the fact that it is impossible for one to live in a state that provides no opportunity for freedom of religion. We need to keep in mind that the lists of “Wahhabis”, which the authorities are developing, are one of the main factors behind resistance mobilization successes. Authorities in places like Dagestan and Ingushetia compile these lists in hopes of identifying religious individuals. In Kabardino-Balkaria, Wahhabi lists revealed that there are hundreds of religiously-motivated people in the republic. Those who were “written up” were automatically also suspected of being terrorists. In turn suspected terrorists are automatically assumed guilty and are tortured. Finally, if you talk to brothers or family members of these torture victims, you can be sure that they are not tolerant of the administration. And so, the circle is completed. 
In addition, mistakes are known to happen. For instance, security services arrested individuals who happen to have the same name as those who participated in the 2005 Nalchik attacks. Needless to say, this further agitates the situation among the civilians and influences their attitudes towards the authorities. We talked about public support a lot – the conclusion is – besides the underground resistance, there is no other outlet available to the wider public for resolving issues of concern. Currently, everything else – career, politics, education, businesses, religion, are areas not available for most of the population. The only thing that is left is underground resistance.

Is this the main mobilizing factor?

No, there are others also other factors to consider. It appears that the main reason is social injustice reflected in the enormous gap between the government and population. People are desperately looking for a set of principles, whether they stem from tradition, religion or ethics. This does not mean that the population demands that all politics radically change: that Khodorkovsky should be released from prison, that the prosecutor should not own a gas station, that the head of the administration should not own a BMW although his official salary is not more than $200. But people have reached their limit and so they now do have certain demands. They do want to receive the $5-7 monthly subsidy due to them by law for having a small child. It is only $5-7, but these people need it, and they often do not receive it for months. While they may tolerate corruption on higher levels, they still want their government to perform its basic functions. People are tolerant of the fact that the entire economy is based on illegal activity. However, they cannot tolerate that if they want to open a small bakery, they cannot do so because the corruption makes it impossible. They cannot tolerate that all aspects of public life are permeated and incapacitated by corruption.

What do you think about the theory that Moscow is instigating the conflict?

Ironically, it was August of 1999 when conflict started in Dagestan and it was August of 2007 when the conflict really escalated in Ingushetia. I don’t think that the current situation in Ingushetia is a result of some long term strategy, because as far as I can tell, there are no long term strategies for this area. However, there are strong ethnic conflicts developing, the likes of which we have not seen before. I attribute this to the growing government incompetence in dealing with the region, particularly in the area of economic development. 
That said, let’s compare the current situation to Dagestan in 1999. What we saw in Dagestan was clearly a set up of a counterterrorist operation. Although what is going on in Ingushetia is not that clear, one cannot exclude the possibility that it is simply a case of federal center preparing the ground for a potential war. A crisis of this sort might come in handy in case there is a need to bring Putin back on the political scene, or change Medvedev or some other bureaucrat from the “siloviki” camp. In order to be able to organize a crisis situation in a short period of time, one must do the necessary preparations. A dry peat bog easily starts a big fire in the forest. 

The interview was conducted in the period from November 2007 through February 2008. It was conducted and edited by Iva Savic, American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus program officer.