When the agreement was first negotiated in 1994 it coincided with the EU’s decision on opening enlargement negotiations with former Soviet satellite states and it served two purposes. The first was to establish comprehensive contractual relations ranging from trade to political dialogue with a key European power and the second was to give Russia a deal so that it would both feel included in political developments across the continent and receive some EU support for its difficult economic and political transformation process. 

However, by deciding on this type of treaty it was also made clear that Russian membership in the EU, an idea during the visionary atmosphere of the Yelzin era and Gorbachev’s earlier “common home” rhetoric, would be impossible in the foreseeable future. 

The ratification of the agreement was delayed for some three years until the end of 1997 because of most EU member states refusing to ratify the treaty in protest against massive Russian human rights violations during the first Chechen war. Both the emphasis on common values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law and the fact that each of the now 27 EU member states will have to ratify any new comprehensive treaty points to the potential difficulties lying ahead. 

Favouring a flexible approach

Much has changed within the EU and Russia over the past ten years that would require a readjustment of bilateral relations. However, even starting talks with Russia about a new agreement seems impossible, since Poland has so far blocked the EU from entering into renegotiations because of a Russian ban on Polish meat imports (ostensibly for reasons of food safety). 

What else could happen in a long winding negotiation and drawn out ratification process is anybody’s guess. That is why diplomats involved in this process prefer a much more flexible approach. Any deal on matters of exclusive EU competencies such as trade, competition and consumer protection could be struck by the EU Commission with a qualified majority of the member states supporting it. 

This would forestall the prospect of one member state blocking the whole deal, a distinct possibility if political and security matters are included. Such considerations require unanimity of the member states. If the PCA is automatically renewed the package on political and security dialogue and cooperation on justice and home affairs will not be reopened and no new consent by all member states is needed.

Such an approach was already explored with the launching of the concept of four Common Spaces in May 2005. They foresee separate sectoral agreements on commercial, cultural, judicial and political issues. Originally conceived as an alternative to Russia’s participation in the EU’s new neighbourhood policy (ENP), it could be developed into a flexible mechanism either within a prolonged PCA or as an alternative to it. 

Despite Russia refusing to be include under an EU neighbourhood umbrella, which would have lumped it together with a multitude of much smaller states under a tight monitoring regime, including yearly progress reports and detailed Action plans, Russia will still to participate in the financial instrument designed for the ENP policy. This also offers a budget line for cross border cooperation among ENP countries and Russia that could potentially be used for low-profile trust building measures in regions where “frozen” conflicts are simmering. 

Conflicts as a sensible issue

High profile political actions such as monitoring arms shipments in South Ossetia or sending peace keeping troops to Abkhazia seem a highly unlikely prospect given the current state of EU-Russia relations. Anything relating to highly politicized issues such as questions of sovereignty of break-away territories remains highly divisive within the EU. This has as much to do with the so called “friends of Russia club” inside the EU, which includes Germany, France and Italy, as well as with smaller gas and oil pipeline partners such as Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria as it does with the virulence of old separatist movements within member states such as in Spain, the UK and Cyprus. 

For the EU the most pressing “frozen” conflict beyond its borders lies in Kosovo. Here Russia seems to have recently contemplated the possibility of not vetoing imposed (semi-) independence in the UN Security Council against express Serbian wishes. Although Russian foreign minister Lavrov denied before parliament on 21 March that such a solution would constitute a precedence for other conflicts closer to Russia, president Putin saw this differently when he said in an interview on 24 February: “If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?”

Extending this logic it could not only be applied to Transnistria, which Russian officials are keen on doing, but also to Chechnya, which would certainly be anathema to the Russian government. The EU is not and will not be able in the foreseeable future to tackle such issues against Russian interests without support from the US. 

Renewal of the PCA?

Keeping the future relationship on trade and judicial cooperation issues as strict and legally binding and as flexible on political and security matters as it is now under the PCA would seem advantageous. Such an approach could be provided by the four Common Spaces under discussion.

The list of issues on which the EU and Russia have to come to some agreement is long and warrants a broad negotiating platform on various political and bureaucratic levels as is provided by the PCA on such diverse subjects as energy, trade, Russian WTO membership, the Kyoto protocol and highly political questions such as the status of Kosovo. 

The likelihood that a new comprehensive multi-sectoral treaty will replace the current PCA on 1 December 2007 is extremely slim. Instead the PCA will most probably be automatically renewed for another year in which all parties concerned will wait and watch very closely who replaces Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, leaving serious renegotiations after the Russian presidential elections in 2008.