ABKHAZIA versus GEORGIA: Implications for U.S. Policy toward Russia
Posted: 30 Mar 2010 05:20 PM PDT
Johnson's Russia List
By George Enteen, professor emeritus of Russian history, Penn State University
Most Americans have never heard of Abkhazia; if they have, the response
is 'O yes, that's one of the territories Russia has taken over from
Georgia.' Even some Russians will say, 'O yes, that's ours again.'
They are both wrong. Abkhazia is a small nation striving to maintain
its independence. But does it matter to us, Americans? Our policy
matters vitally to Abkhazians, because their status and destiny will be
affected by American policies. It matters indirectly to the United
States; affecting our stance toward Russia and the scope of
collaboration on a host of international issues that affect our
security.
Abkhazia is a small but ancient
nation in northwest Transcaucasia bordering on the Eastern shore of the
Black Sea. It was mostly independent in the course of its long
history, though involved in varying degrees of intimacy with peoples
who make up the Georgian nation. Beginning in 1810, it was gradually
absorbed into the Russian Empire. It was absorbed unwillingly into
Georgia during the years first of independent Georgia (1919-21) and
then of Soviet domination. High mountains, some of the snow-topped
throughout the summer, run down to the coastal beaches. Located not
far from the site of the next winter Olympics, Abkhazia was once the
playground of the Soviet Union. It is populated, like its neighbors, by
rugged mountain people adept at trading and fighting, with memorable
traditions of folk literature and art.
Georgia deems Abkhazia and another neighbor South Ossetia mere
break-aways, not entitled to the right of self-determination. The
remarks that follow challenge the justice and wisdom of Georgia's
claims and of our policies. Like most Americans, I was sympathetic to
Georgia's demands for rights and then independence from the Soviet
Union in the 1980s. I was not aware that Georgia denied the same
rights to national minorities within its proclaimed borders.
Our support of Georgia's claims clouds the future of these nations.
Last July when President Obama was in Moscow, he affirmed our
intention of inviting Georgia into NATO and our backing for the
"territorial integrity" of Georgia. A fine democratic sounding
phrase, good stand-up words. Their meaning, however, varies depending
upon time and place. I'm loath to think of our president's words
serving as a façade for the suppression or even the possible
destruction of a small nation striving to preserve its own language and
culture, its very identity. Playing such a role is no more suitable
for America than the practice of torture.
Gentle reader; forgive an historical digression at this point. Seventy
or so distinct nations or ethnic groups populate the Caucasus. Both
Georgian and Abkhazian scholars claim that their respective nations, or
at least proto-nations emerged, in antiquity and gained mention in the
chronicles of Greek travelers, and each denies such status for the
other. It is impossible for me to disentangle and draw a conclusion as
to the rival claims about priority of settlement in the region of
present day Abkhazia and the claims of predominance. The rival
contentions rest upon arcane philological arguments and slippery
archeological evidence, which are beyond my ken. I assume that they
are both correct and incorrect in approximately equal degree.
It is clear that Georgia possessed the more highly developed culture in
the early period of modern history; that is, Georgians possessed a
literary language. An alphabet for Abkhazian was devised only late in
the nineteenth century. Not that this gives Georgia primacy in any
objective sense, but it probably accounts for Georgians' sense of
superiority over other nations in the region. I do not mean
superiority in a racial sense, rather a feeling of being more advanced
with respect to European standards, which had a felt presence in the
region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Again, this feeling
is not racial but a sense of leadership on the part of Georgia.
Certain historical facts are, I believe, beyond dispute. Georgia and
Abkhazia entered the Russian Empire under similar conditions and
promptings military pressure from the north and south from the
Russian Empire and from the Ottoman Empire. They both preferred
alignment with and even subordination to their coreligionists in the
north. At that time a significant proportion of the population
followed Islam, and these would have made up the majority of those who
left or were expelled in 1864 and again after the Russo-Turkish War of
1977-78. Georgia's entry began in 1801 and required a few years for
realization as there was no unified Georgian state at the time and
different provinces came under Russian protection at different times
In 1810 Abkhazia entered. A major point here is that they entered as
separate and distinct sovereign entities. Abkhazia was a
self-administered province, a Principality in fact, until full
incorporation in 1864 when the last Abkhazian prince was expelled.
Both Abkhazia and Georgia lost their autonomy as the Russian Empire
became more centralized and its bureaucracy asserted greater authority.
Russia fell into the channel of industrialization in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Wherever it occurs, this
ordeal proves painful. It produces new wealth and new opportunities
for work and for cultural endeavors. New ideologies emerge, such as
nationalism, liberalism and socialism. New forms of impoverishment
and oppression move into the foreground, which combine with these
ideologies and provide soil for revolutionary movements. Some of these
tendencies in Russia became well known in the West. The plight of the
Russian peasants came to the world's attention in part because of the
writings of Leo Tolstoy, especially his tracts such as The Kingdom of
God is Within You. The sufferings of Russian Jews became known thanks
to the large-scale emigration to Western Europe and to the United
States. The world at large remained ignorant of the sufferings of the
Abkhazians, who were stigmatized as a guilty nation following the 1866
Lykhny uprising against Russia's proposed land reform. The label was
not removed until 1907.
The Imperial Russian government took full control of Abkhazia in 1864.
Rebellion and then large-scale emigration and expulsion of Abkhazians
to the Ottoman Empire ensued. More followed in1877. The Abkhazian
diaspora numbered in the hundreds of thousands in the nineteenth
century. The surviving population was banned from the cities on the
Black Sea coast and banished to the mountains. Among the long-term
results of this was the enlargement of the Christian component of the
population at the expense of the Muslim minority. It should be noted
that Abkhazia, like Armenia and Georgia, were among the earliest
nations to convert to Christianity. There is evidence of a Jewish
community in Abkhazia as early as the 11th century. Jews resided
peacefully in Abkhazia until the demise of the Soviet Union provided
opportunity for emigration. Abkhazia and Georgia are perhaps unique in
for their respectful attitude toward Jews and for the absence of
anti-Semitism. It is perhaps of special interest that a thriving pagan
community is part of the Abkhazian mix. These pagans are not outcasts
in remote forests with long beards, cultivating strange herbs, but
modern folks, in modern garb and professions, who exercise the duties
of citizenship even as they practice ancient family-centered rites.
The Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in the downfall of the Imperial
Government headed by the Tsars and then in the overthrow of the
democratic Provisional Government, which replaced it. The Communist
Party headed by Lenin came to power in November of that year. The next
year Abkhazia set up a government of its own, but the Georgian
government centered in Tiblisi, its capital, quickly overthrew it. It
immediately, prorogued the Abkhazian National Assembly. The Georgian
government lasted only until 1920 when the Red Army of the Soviet
Communist Government conquered the Caucasus region. Soviet Abkhazia
and Soviet Georgia were incorporated into Soviet Union in1922 as
components of the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation. There is a
measure of ambiguity as to the status of Abkhazia. Was it
constitutionally equal to Georgia or not? Legal scholars on both
sides will dispute this matter into the foreseeable future. To me it
is a secondary matter; the aspirations of the citizens are foremost.
All traces of juridical ambiguity were removed in1931 when Stalin,
himself a Georgian, reduced the status of Abkhazia, making it a mere
region within Georgia an Autonomous Republic within the Union
Republic of Georgia, to employ the terminology of the Soviet
constitution. Needless to say, the Abkhazian people had no voice in
this matter.
There is more than a little irony in the fact that it was Stalin who
fixed the 'sacred' borders,' which presumably define the territorial
integrity of Georgia that our President pledged to uphold. They are
not based on tradition, nor are they the result of any democratic
procedures. Lavrentia Beria, an Abkhazian-born Mingrelian, and a
devoted son of the Georgian nation, served as Stalin's chief of the
secret police, which eventually came to be known as the KGB. Beria was
ruthless everywhere, but especially so in Abkhazia. Large-scale
immigration of Georgians and Beria's fellow-Mingrelians, some of it
forcible, it is claimed, and of Russians and Armenians into Abkhazia
ensued, making the Abkhazians a minority within their own territory.
After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia claimed
possession of all territories within those borders established by
Stalin. Abkhazia proposed a confederation with Georgia. I know far
less about the situation in South Ossetia, but I understand that, in
the immediate post-Soviet period, opinion there was divided as to its
future arrangements. There was (and remains) strong sentiment for
unification with their countrymen within the Russian federation, the
North Ossetians. At the same time one of the leaders proposed
confederation with Georgia. North Ossetia after all was on the other
side of the mountains, was how he put it, and, like the South
Ossetians, the Georgians were Christians.
The first president of independent Georgia, Zvid Gamsakhurdia
proclaimed that no such entity as an Abkhazian nation ever existed.
Eduard Shevardnadze followed him in the office of president. He was
popular in the West, especially in Great Britain, America and Germany,
where he was remembered as the Foreign Minister and close associate of
Gorbachev, the reformer of the Soviet Union at which time the Berlin
wall came down and Germany was reunited. He was able to win full
diplomatic recognition, which quickly entailed a Georgian seat in the
United Nations and special partnership with the European Union. Like
Gamsakhurdia, he championed the cause of Georgia against Abkhazia, and
it was shortly after his return to Georgia in March 1992 that the war
in Abkhazia began on August 14. Thanks to its own courageous struggle
for independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia enjoyed considerable
popularity in the West
.
As Georgia moved closer to independence from the Soviet Union in the
course of Gorbachev's perestroika in the late 1990s, Abkhazians felt
and feared further curtailment of their cultural liberties. In 1989
rioting broke out in Sukhum, capital of Abkhazia, resulting from
Georgia's policy of seeking to set up in Sukhum a branch of Tiblisi
State University, which was deemed to a fatal threat to the viability
of Abkhazia's own university. Blood was shed on both sides. As in the
Balkans, people who had lived side by side for centuries began killing
each other. Georgian emigration began at this time. In 1992, just
after it had been awarded a seat in the UN, and without warning,
Georgian troops invaded Abkhazia. Armed helicopters opened fire on
public beaches as tanks rolled into Sukhum. The war was ugly, not as
bad as in the Balkans, but cruel on both sides. No prisoners. In 1993,
the Abkhazians drove the Georgians out of their county, aided by
fighters of various ethnic groups in the North Caucasus. The war
resulted in the ethnic cleansing as a large number of Mingrelians and
Georgians, resident in Abkhazia, who felt their best interest lay in
flight into Georgia. About one hundred ninety thousand people fled the
fighting, mostly Georgians but also Russians, Jews and Greeks (the
latter two being evacuated by Israel and Greece). About sixty thousand
have returned and been resettled. These events bring o mind almost
wistfully the break-up of Czechoslovakia -- some tears but not a drop
of blood.
Especially important for the Abkhazian cause were the Russian-hating
Chechens, among the world's most ferocious and able warriors. They
warned the Abkhazians that if the Russians came to their aid, they
would go over to the Georgian side. And in fact the Russian position
during the war was ambiguous. In 1999, Abkhazia finally declared it s
independence, frustrated by failed negotiations with Georgia; it has
been recognized, however, only by Russia, Nicaragua and Venezuela.
Russia has assumed a hostile, even provocative, stance toward Georgia
since the war ended. Boris Yeltsin had taken a rather pro-Georgian
line; Vladimir Putin, his successor, reversed this. Abkhazia possesses
valuable natural resources and has vast potential as a recreation area.
Russians have returned to Sukhum for vacations, but in fewer numbers
than in the past. Unemployment is extensive, and foreign investment is
greatly needed. Its future is clouded; its dependence upon Russia is
great and growing.
A 'Rose Revolution,' evidently backed by the United States, overthrew
the Shevardnadze government in Georgia in 1993. Mikheil Saakashvili,
who had attended Columbia University law school and who had high
standing with the American government, was elected President early in
2004. Georgia, proud of its independence, was destitute after the
break up of the Soviet Union. And remained in a largely poor state,
even though there had been significant Western (especially American)
investment to bring Caspian oil westwards through the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Instead, however, of nurturing the
economy, Saakashvili set about restoring the 'territorial integrity' of
his nation. This, along with what he assumed was at least tacit
American support, plus Russian hostility, constitutes the background of
the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia in 2008 and the subsequent
Russian reaction, clearly an over-reaction (from a political if not
military perspective), which resulted in Russian occupation of portions
of Georgia. Over-reaction is normal once boots are on the ground and
tanks begin to roll, and the neutralizing of the military camps in Gori
(for South Ossetia) and Senaki (for Abkhazia) were militarily quite
logical.
Some say that Abkhazia is fated to be a province either of Russia or of
Georgia, but to my mind or to anyone with a sense of Abkhazian national
feeling, its history and its stubborn willingness to fight, this is not
an obvious conclusion. If true, however, it does make a difference
which country will possess or dominate Abkhazia. If Georgia, then
Abkhazian nationhood is very likely doomed. Georgia has shown a
persistent unwillingness to grant rights or to respect Abkhazian
national identity, having, in the dark years of Stalin and Beria,
abolished the use of its alphabet, the teaching of the language in
schools, as well as broadcasting and publications. During the war in
1992, Georgian forces destroyed the Abkhazian national library and
burned the national archives, repository of the national memory. Such
action bespeaks a policy of cultural genocide.
If incorporated into Russia, Abkhazia would have its political rights
curbed, but it would retain cultural independence. The simple fact is
that Russia is a multi-national state. National minorities have
mustered support under Putin, even as he has curbed the political
rights of citizens. More to the point, it is unlikely that Russia
would incorporate Abkhazia into its territory. It would be more useful
to retain it as a friendly but weak and dependent nation on its border.
That is the sort of neighbor all great powers fancy. That also is the
status Russia would want for Georgia.
Perhaps I've persuaded my reader of the validity of Abkhazia's case for
self-determination. "Justice is a fine principle, and Abkhazia has as
much right to independence as does Georgia or even our own country,"
the reader may respond. "How does this affect America's global
position?" such a reader may ask. The prevailing view is that American
interest is best served by arresting Russian influence in the North
Caucasus and including the Republic of Georgia in NATO. I think this
conclusion is unwarranted for the following reasons.
For public opinion, including, it seems, all American policy makers,
Abkhazia's drive for national self-determination is a mere contrivance
of Russia, a means to establish an outpost in North West Transcaucasia
and perhaps to destabilize the entire region as a prelude to
reestablishment of the borders of the Soviet Union. So long as Russia
has a sensible government and not one composed of the extreme
nationalists ranting in the streets, such a policy is not in sight.
Russia is too dependent on the outside world. It is, of course,
asserting its presence and influence in the Caucasus, which is one of
the components in the mix in the Caucasus; it is not, however, the sole
determinant. It is difficult to see how Russian conquest of Georgia or
its incorporation of Abkhazia would advance its interests. Both or
either would stick like bones in the throat. Such actions would
thoroughly alienate Russia from the West and preclude economic
cooperation. Relations with China and India would be greatly impaired.
Russia's goal more likely, as suggested above, is the establishment of
friendly or weak neighbors on its borders. That is the traditional
concern of a great power. One might say it is the universal and normal
goal of great powers. It is a law of history, if there is any such
thing.
Historical analogies are usually misleading, but not always. Russia
and Great Britain had been the principle supporters, for better or
worse, of the status quo in Europe from 1815 to 1853. Then Russia lost
the Crimean War. In the Treaty of Paris in 1856 extremely harsh terms
were imposed upon her, most notably the Black Sea clauses. These
prohibited Russia from building fortifications on her Black-Seat coast.
It was without precedent to command a great power as to how or where
she could fortify and defend her own territory. Russia's great power
status was either done with or at risk. She then became a revisionist
power using every opportunity to overthrow the status quo. This
provided the setting for Bismarck and Cavour to re-make Central Europe.
For better or for worse the unifications of Germany and Italy occurred
in this interval, before Russia was able to disavow the Black Sea
clauses in 1871. Russia's status anxieties and its compelling drive
for recognition as a great power (its neurotic over-reaction if one can
employ such terminology in international politics) is a distinct factor
in current world politics.
What are American interests in the Caucasus? I suggest that they are
minimal, stability first of all. Decency would require opposition to a
Russian attempt to re-conquer Georgia, resistance up to the point of,
but excluding, military action. In the meantime our meddling -- the
sending of military advisors and armaments to Georgia -- is
mischievous. NATO was conceived as a defensive alliance, excluding
nations with territorial claims against another nation. Our presence
has allowed Georgia to mobilize the support that persuaded Saakashvili
to launch the invasion of South Ossetia in 2008. Even if it is not
true, as is often suggested, that Vice-President Cheney winked at
Saakashvili's plans, our mere presence emboldened him. It is difficult
to imagine the Georgian invasion without his conviction that our power
was behind him.
In the meantime it is relevant to be mindful of the limitations of
American power and of the extent of our worldwide commitments. We are
engaged in two wars, and the folly of our war in Iraq revealed that our
manpower is restricted and that many of our advanced weapons are
irrelevant. The rising economic power of China and India also prompt
caution on our part. In the meantime our internal divisions have
deepened and hardened.
What are our interests with respect to Russia? Certainly not to impede
the purposes of Russia in all cases, nor to encircle and confine it, to
cast it into a revisionist role. Russia is prickly and cantankerous,
and disappointing to us and to many of its citizens in its internal
development; it has not been aggressive, however, since the Soviet
Union ended; Georgians, Ukrainians, Poles and others would disagree in
loud voice, but it is difficult to point to actual aggression in
international relations. To dispute this point with arguments that
Ukrainians, for example, would raise would take us too far afield. We
share with Russia many objectives, securing of the safety of its
nuclear weapons to begin with and reducing their number. Between us we
possess ninety five percent of the world's nuclear weapons. Curbing
nuclear proliferation, with specific reference to Iran and North Korea,
is a shared interest. As is opposition to terrorism and concern with
global warming. That Russia possesses thirty percent of the world's
natural gas reserves and a large proportion of its petroleum reserves,
and that it sits upon a vast power grid that supplies our allies in
Europe with energy should be kept in mind. Thus our common interests
should mold our policies in the direction of reconciliation whenever
possible. Our policies under President Bush tended to encourage
strident nationalism (to the detriment of democratic development) in
Russia and to push it in the direction of China.
Clever diplomats should be able to devise some means of conflict
resolution in the area. In the long run, the most just solution would
be for the United Nations to hold referendums that would give voice to
the peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Let us push in that
direction.
http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2010/03/abkhazia.html