By an odd coincidence, February 17 has
linked two unrecognized (or semi-recognized) non-identical twins -
Kosovo and Abkhazia. Two years ago, on February 17 Albanians
unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the territory that Serbia
considers its own and calls "Kosovo and Metohija." On February 17,
1810, that is, 200 years ago, the Abkhazian principality joined the
Russian Empire of its own free will.
Its incorporation into Russia has
several interpretations among the highly volatile Russian scholars.
Some historians maintain that it was the ruling dynasty that joined
Russia, after which almost half of Abkhazians left the country.
However, voluntary accession is a viable version since the other half
stayed.
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In any event, Abkhazian President
Sergei Bagapsh, who is currently in Moscow on an official visit
(February 16-18) and his host President Dmitry Medvedev, have something
to celebrate. Thus, in honor of the memorable date, Abkhazia offered
Russia to run its railroad and Russia agreed.
For Kosovo the anniversary is marred by
the legal proceedings in the International Court of Justice in The
Hague regarding its declaration of independence. Since the past year
the court has been debating this issue at Serbia's request (in the UN
it was supported by 77 countries, with 74 abstaining and six voting
against it). The verdict will be passed in late spring or summer.
Importantly, the verdict will be merely
consultative but not legally binding. However, even these proceedings
are enough to keep tensions between three camps - Kosovo's supporters,
opponents, and all other non-identical twins - Abkhazian, Kosovar and
Ossetian proto-statehood.
The verdict may have the following
consequences. If the court decades that Kosovars had a legal right to
their declaration of independence (which is not likely), dozens of
movements, groups and territories will be inspired to step up their
struggle for independence and recognition. If the court rules that they
did not have that right (which is also unlikely), the Kosovo issue will
be in limbo again. But in this case dozens of movements, groups and
territories will also be inspired to intensify their struggle for
independence and recognition but for a different reason: "If the UN is
so unfair, then..."
There are also more global problems
linked with the entire system of UN functioning. Law experts fear that
if The Hague recognizes the legality of Kosovo's independence, the UN
ability to conduct peacekeeping missions will be endangered. Unstable
states with separatist attitudes may refuse to accept the UN
peacemaking mission because Kosovo created a very bad precedent: First
UN troops enter a territory and then this territory proclaims its
independence.
Judges in The Hague Court will have a
hard time. They are going into such wilds of jurisprudence from which
only very educated people can emerge unscathed. But they can make a
compromise decision, for example that the Albanians had the right to
proclaim independence but they didn't approach the issue correctly, and
the Serbians are right about some things but wrong about others, etc.
In law, conformism is more often called "broad interpretation." This is
what the court is most likely to do. It has an unlimited range of
instruments for this purpose.
International law has two main theories
on recognizing statehood - declarative and constituent. Both are
equally applicable to Kosovo, Abkhazia, Ossetia, etc. In general this
law is tailored in such a way that skillful lawyers can pull it in any
direction and make any issue almost fully transparent or totally
ambiguous. Debates in the UN bear out that this applies to resolutions
on Kosovo.
The advocates of "declarative
statehood" are convinced that for its recognition it is necessary to
have a fixed territory, a permanent population, a government and an
ability to enter relations with other states. Supporters of
"constituent statehood" believe that to achieve independence it is
enough to be recognized by other states, or even by one state.
President Medvedev quoted this theory in regard to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, although this does not at all mean that he supports it. This
is just an example.
International law is not a hadron
collider or open heart surgery. The precision of hadron particles or
sharp scalpels can only harm rather than be helpful there. As it often
happens in international law, it is possible to choose the most
befitting instrument for the specific geopolitical, historic,
diplomatic, military, economic and disputed territorial conditions.
This is what interpretation of an ambiguous decision is all about.
The trouble is that non-identical twins
like Kosovo or Abkhazia can also interpret the decisions of The Hague
Court the way they see fit, and there are many more of them than it may
seem at first sight.
Unrecognized states (or recognized by
many or several countries, or by one state) include Kosovo (recognized
by 65 out of 192 UN members), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (recognized by
Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru). There are also other states
like Taiwan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, Transdnestr, the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, Armenia (unrecognized by Pakistan), the
Palestinian Autonomy, Israel (unrecognized by 20 Muslim countries),
South Korea (unrecognized by North Korea) and North Korea (unrecognized
by South Korea), the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (West Sahara),
the Czech Republic and Slovakia (still unrecognized by Lichtenstein,
and the other way round) because of a territorial dispute.
The number of separatist or autonomy
movements in the world is countless. Most of them are based in Europe:
25 big, medium and small ones from Albania to Germany, Belgium, Spain
and Portugal. Africa is the runner-up with 24 groups, and Asia is third
with 20. There are 21 such movements in North, Central and South
America. There are separatist groups even in the U.S. Caribbean
islands, which would like to break away from the metropolis. All of
them are watching The Hague Court.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin)
Source: Ria Novosti |