Turkey Considers the Status of Abkhazia
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 182
October 5, 2009 04:32 PM Age: 21 hrs
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Foreign Policy, Turkey, Georgia, Home Page
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
In
response to a question as to whether Ankara and Moscow have reached a
deal to recognize Abkhazia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated: “Russia will not
enter a deal implying the recognition of Northern Cyprus in exchange
for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia” (Zaman, October 4).
The
debate was originally triggered by an article written by Paul Goble in
the Moscow Times on September 16. Goble argued that: “There appears to
be a chance that Turkey, despite denials by its officials, might break
the embargo against recognition because of Ankara’s desire to play a
greater role in the South Caucasus region, its own long-standing
experience as the only country to recognize the Turkish Republic of
North Cyprus, and the influence of its own Abkhaz and Circassian
communities.” He based his argument on the intention of the Turkish
Foreign Minister Akhmet Davutoglu to visit Abkhazia in order to “get
acquainted with [that republic] and attempt to regulate its relations
with Georgia,” while he continued, “thus potentially positioning Turkey
to play a role paralleling the one it has offered to play between
Azerbaijan and Armenia.” Two days later, Unal Cevikoz, the Deputy Under
Secretary for Political Affairs in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who is
of Circassian descent, visited Sukhumi and met with the Abkhazian
Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba. While Turkish officials said that
Ankara had informed Tbilisi about the visit and had not changed its
policy of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia, Cevikoz’s
visit raised hopes in Sukhumi (The Moscow Times, September 16).
Regarding
Cevikoz’s visit to the region, Davutoglu said that the existence of the
Abkhaz community in Turkey compels Ankara to consider how to resolve
this problem. “We know very well that having peace and stability in the
South Caucasus region without achieving this in Georgia is very
difficult. With these thoughts and perspectives, Turkey will continue
making efforts toward the resolution of the Abkhazian conflict, as it
has done in previous years” Davutoglu explained (Today’s Zaman,
September 8).
Goble’s analysis also triggered a new debate
within Turkey. The Turkish media ran optimistic stories about the
possibility of such mutually beneficial recognition policies (Vatan,
September 21). However, Turkish analysts are skeptical that Turkey
would want to recognize Abkhazia or that Russia would choose to
recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (www.turksam.org,
September 27).
Recently, Lavrov joined the debate and revealed
Moscow’s position: Russia will not enter any deal implying the
recognition of Northern Cyprus in exchange for the Turkish recognition
of Abkhazia. “We are not inclined to enter any deals following ‘scratch
my back and I'll scratch yours’ logic. These are two absolutely
different stories. These are different situations from the historical,
moral and humanitarian points of view. Any bargaining is out of the
question. Each situation should be considered in its historical
context,” Lavrov added (www.russiatoday.ru, October 3).
It seems
that Lavrov’s emphasis on history may indicate that Ankara could be
interested in establishing some form of relations with Abkhazia.
Historically tens of thousands of Muslim Abkhazians moved to the
Ottoman empire, as part of a larger Muslim migration process from the
Caucasus in the nineteenth century. Approximately 500,000 Abkhazian
descendents now live in Turkey. In addition, other Caucasus communities
in Turkey have close relations with Abkhazians. The only exception is
the Georgian descended Muslim communities in Turkey. Due to their over
representation in critical government institutions, such as the
National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Turkish armed forces, and
their nationalist outlook, Abkhazians retain significant lobbying power
in Ankara.
By emphasizing the historical perspective, Moscow
might expect help from these communities in order to generate pressure
on the Turkish government to establish some form of relationship with
Abkhazia. Cevikoz’s visit to Sukhumi may indicate a policy shift in
Ankara. In 2007, when the Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh wanted to visit
Turkey to meet with the Abkhaz diaspora, the Turkish government refused
to issue a visa and President Abdullah Gul at the time stated that “I
can only reiterate in this regard that Turkey supports Georgia’s
territorial integrity” (www.civil.ge, November 21, 2007).
The
crucial question remains: since 2007, what has changed that has
required Turkish diplomats to visit the region? Hasan Kanpolat, a
Turkish analyst who has close relations with the Turkish foreign
minister, pointed out what had led the government to revise its outlook
toward Abkhazia:
“During a period in which Abkhazia’s
independence process has begun to gain momentum, Cevikoz could not have
gone to Sukhumi to engage in efforts to restart a peace process between
Abkhazia and Georgia. Therefore, we can presume that, to prevent
Abkhazia from unifying any further with the Russian Federation, Ankara
may have asked Tbilisi to allow a controlled relationship with
Abkhazia. To be more explicit, the door may be opened to preventing
Georgia from intercepting ships on humanitarian missions or those
involved in trade traveling between Turkey and Abkhazia using the Black
Sea” (Today’s Zaman, September 17).
Kanpolat further argues that
Ankara sees that a close relationship with Abkhazia would eventually
produce a similar multi-dimensional relationship with Cypriot Turks in
the eastern Mediterranean. Abkhazia in this case would become an
accessible Black Sea coastline for Turkey.