This article was first published on 27 August 2009 in Russian - Politcom.ru
Abkhazia
and South Ossetia celebrate the first anniversary of their independence
from Georgia on 26 August. That is how their current status is
correctly defined. It is unlikely that anyone seriously thinks that the
recognition of the independence of the two former autonomous areas of
the Georgian SSR has turned them into genuinely independent entities.
Today Abkhazian and Ossetian choices have been made in favor of Russia.
And this in turn has enabled them to achieve the aim that the elites of
these entities have had for many years - leaving Georgia. Not only de
facto, as has been the case with Abkhazia since 1993 and South Ossetia
since May 2004 (when the peace process that started in the summer of
1992 was destroyed) but also dejure. If only with the support of just
one country (however, there is a difference between countries).
No
shortcoming in the assessment of last year's events and their
consequences can be observed today. The question: "Has Russia gained or
lost from recognizing Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence?" will
be the main one for the experts and political scientists for a few
days. However, it is much more productive not to see this Russian step
as an abstract and timeless decision. Then it is possible to move from
debates in the style of the well-known poem by Vladimir Mayakovskiy
about what is good and what is evil. And acknowledge that any specific
foreign policy decision is the result not of abstract philosophizing
but of acting within a certain "corridor of possibilities".
From
the very first day after the disintegration of the USSR (this happened
on 8 December 1991 with the signing of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha
agreements), internal dissent existed within the Russian establishment
(intellectual, political and journalistic) with regard tothe 14
articles signed at Viskuli. In particular with the fifth article in the
agreements that buried the USSR. It clearly and unambiguously directed
that there should be respect for "one another's territorial integrity
and the inviolability of existing boundaries within the framework of
the commonwealth". At the same time, the text of the article stipulated
"openness of the boundaries, freedom of movement for citizens, and the
transmission of information, within the framework of the commonwealth".
That is where the phrase "near abroad" came from. According to Gasan
Guseynov, the well-known philologist and cultural historian, "the very
form of the phrase requires a dual interpretation": "countries that are
not fully or not really independent", "theoretically foreign
countries", "our own but already beyond the boundaries of our
territory". And many Russian politicians and public figures tried to
re-play scenarios for the disintegration of the USSR "strictly
according to its boundaries", considering it unjust. However, the
aspiration to restore "justice" was contained for a long time. But that
is just one aspect of the matter. The other aspect was this: inside the
"newly independent states" (a term which caught on in the West) many
"new citizens" were not delighted about such a "divorce" and for this
reason did not want to accept the new political realities. All of this
was a reason for the separatist challenges, in which post-Soviet
history is so rich, and also for the attempts to review or revise the
agreements at Viskuli.
However, Russia at the beginning of the
1990s, could not in the face of the separatist threat have even thought
about any recognition of those entities which were separating from
their named "fatherlands" and were prepared to take up the Russian flag
the next day. In 1991-1994 the separatist threat came not only from
Chechnya but also fromTatarstan. And that is not even to mention the
separatist aspirations of Yakutia, Bashkortostan and even some Oblasts,
which introduced their own customs, immigration codes and tried to
obtain republican status. At that time any recognition of the
independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia or the Dniester Region would
have been a suicidal step not for Russian foreign but for Russian
domestic policy. A certain paradox developed. During the first half of
the1990s, the West essentially had nothing to do with Georgia,
Azerbaijan or Moldova. At the time, Moscow could have recognized the
autonomy of anyone it liked much more freely. But inside the country,
the Kremlin's hands were tied by complicated circumstances (separatist
and independence threats). Today, Moscow's conduct in the "near abroad"
is watched much more closely both by the West and the East (just
remember the reaction of the PRC to the recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia last year), but inside the country the Kremlin has a much
freer hand.
However, let us return to the situation at the
beginning-middle of the 1990s. Not wishing to create precedents for
ethno-political self-determination within the country, Russia took the
path of "freezing" conflicts in the former Soviet republics. At that
moment, this was the optimal solution both for the countries suffering
from conflicts themselves and for Russia. It presented an opportunity
for domestic policies to be amended in the same Georgia and for the
extreme national policies of the beginning of the 1990s, which had led
to these conflicts, to be revised. And the Russian Federation was
prepared at that time to "contain separatism" beyond the boundaries of
its own borders. Let us recall here the blockade of Abkhazia in
1996-1999 (and de facto from December 1994), as well as the Russia
policy of forcing Sukhum(i) into "a common state". The fact that Moscow
suggested this model both to Tiraspol and to Stepanakert (with an
identical lack of success everywhere) is interesting. However, the
"frozen" time was spent not on seeking peace and compromise. The former
autonomous republics, which had de facto become states, tried to secure
success and did not think about any "re-integration". They started to
implement their own project to create separate nation states.
The
former union republics, which had been recognized by UN countries,
started to think about revanche. That is the reason for the search for
friends on their side (America, Turkey, the EU). Russia, seeing that
the status quo was to its advantage, tried with all its strength to
maintain it. As Georgia lost hope that the Russians would play
Georgia's game, relations between Moscow and Tbilisi deteriorated. "The
process started" during Shevardnadze's time and it simply took off
under Saakashvili. As a result - the "freezing" of the conflicts
(security and diplomatic) and a change in the rules of the game. In the
long term - Russia's withdrawal from the game, the internationalization
of conflict settlement, the loss of positions in the South Caucasus (as
well as in the North, where there were enough other problems as it was).
The
"five-day war" reduced Russia's choice to a black-and-white format. The
author of this article is quite happy to acknowledge that the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence was an
excessively emotional step. It was not a calculated decision (taking
into account some of the internal features of the country, relations
with CIS neighbors). But let us imagine (although this is not one of
the principles of historicism) that the Kremlin did not take this
decision on 26 August 2008. It is obvious that this would not have
meant a departure from Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Having won a victory
in a war with Georgia, Russia could not simply abandon the two former
autonomous regions of the Georgian SSR. No one in its position would
have acted like that. And that is why any other decision apart from a
hasty flight would not have rid Moscow of the headache. In reality,
taking a break for some "international discussion" would have looked
more respectable. In the final analysis, America did not recognize
Kosovo in 1999,and Turkey did not do so in relation to Northern Cyprus
in 1974. Such a "discussion" was spun out over nine years. No one would
have forced the Kremlin to leave the positions it had taken after 12
August 2008. However, there would have been criticism for "illegal
holding" of Georgian territories. There should not be any illusions
here. And there would have been criticism both with official
recognition of the two de-facto states, and without it. Moscow would
have been criticized not for its recognition of two official parts of
Georgia, but for the presence of Russian troops on the territory of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
And that is why, I repeat once
again. A less respectable decision was taken. Russian diplomacy did not
want to explain its positions over a period of many years. But
essentially, a more respectable decision would not have been that
different from the act of 26 August. By wading into a "five-day war",
Moscow severely restricted its own choice. Not wading in to it after
the attack on the Russian peacekeepers was impossible for any
self-respecting country. "The responsibility for the death of more than
one hundred civilians and Russian peacekeepers during the Georgian
attack lies entirely with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and
his generals," writes not Anatoliy Nogovitsyn but Donald Rayfield, a
professor at London University (who is also an expert in the Georgian
language, by the way), in his article "Georgia and Russia:
Consequences". Otto Luchterhandt, a German legal expert and member of
the EU commission investigating the Russo-Georgian conflict, also spoke
about this in his special work "International Legal Consequences of the
Georgian War".
Another issue is the language with which Moscow
explained its decision. Pathological anti-Western zeal, the desire to
oppose the entire world, to demonstrate proof of it "getting up from
its knees", coupled with the most odious rhetoric of the times not even
of "disengagement" but of the "father of the peoples". The impression
was createdthat the latently slumbering "revanchist" sentiments were
sublimated in the summer-autumn of last year in the Georgian direction.
Just look at the news hysteria about the "Western media war".
Meanwhile, no one other than two British military observers from the
OSCE came to the conclusion that there was no direct provocation, which
might have justified the Georgian attack on Tskhinval(i). This
confirmed items by British journalist Tim Whewell (who broadcast on the
BBC and other media). In the end, the combination of harsh
anti-Georgian action and the rhetoric of the "Cold War" era did not
work in Russia's favor. All of this alienated those who were prepared
to listen to its arguments or at least not trust Mikheil Saakashvili's
rationale. However, Moscow has not yet committed any worse mistakes.
The recognition of the two former Georgian autonomous areas has not
been the start of a total revision of the outcome of the disintegration
of the USSR.
Thus, the decision of 26 August was taken within
the framework of a quite definite historical context. It was not good
and it was not bad, it was a reaction to a certain totality of events
and circumstances. Did Moscow win or lose? Neither the one, nor the
other. Instead of one set of problems (fighting for the status quo), we
gained another (social responsibility for infrastructure development in
two republics, guarantees of their security and internal order).
Accordingly, a different context is developing and this means also a
basis for other, better quality, and respectable decisions.