Grim Expectations

By OKSANA ANTONENKO

During his visit on Wednesday to Abkhazia — Georgia’s break-away state recognized as independent by Moscow after the war ended a year ago — Vladimir Putin promised to spend around $465 million (roughly twice the size of Abkhazia’s G.D.P.) to build Russian military bases on its soil and to fortify its “border” with Georgia.

Russia’s defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, who accompanied Prime Minister Putin, said that Moscow will station 3,600 troops in Abkhazia, where 1,000 Russian border guards are already deployed.

The Abkhazians have welcomed the Russian military as insurance against future conflict, but in fact these latest measures are likely to make peace harder to achieve. Indeed, the prospects of a sustainable resolution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus remain bleaker than they have ever been since the end of the Soviet Union.

The main legacy of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 is the complete suspension of the conflict-resolution process. Discussions in Geneva mediated by the European Union, the United Nations and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe represent a useful forum for day-to-day conflict management issues, but they do not constitute a real mechanism for conflict resolution.

The problem is that there is no longer an agreement on what conflict we are talking about. The Georgians see the conflict purely as a case of Russia’s aggression and occupation of their territory. The Russians assert that the conflicts that existed between Georgia and Abkhazia, and between Georgia and South Ossetia, have been resolved with Russia’s unilateral recognition. Both of these approaches are wrong and dangerous. They ignore the simple reality that without commonly agreed terms of future co-existence between people living in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia there cannot be a lasting peace.

Russia’s recognition and the establishment of de facto protectorates in Abkhazia and South Ossetia make such an agreement difficult. But Georgia’s use of force last year, and its refusal to contemplate any reconciliation with Abkhazians and South Ossetians represent an equal obstacle to peace.

Another legacy of the war is the security vacuum that has emerged in and around the conflict zones. The catastrophic failure by the U.N. Security Council and the O.S.C.E. to agree on a status-neutral arrangement for extending their respective missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a major setback for the confidence-building process. By the end of the summer there will be no international presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia — for the first time in over 15 years — and hence no monitoring and reporting from both sides of the de facto cease-fire line.

The E.U. monitoring mission, which was deployed to implement the cease-fire agreement mediated by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, operates only on the Georgian side of the borderline, with no real prospects of being admitted to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The mission’s reporting is useful, but incomplete.

Today, there is a profound gap between policy objectives supported by the international community — Georgia’s territorial integrity with Abkhazia and South Ossetia under its sovereignty — and the reality on the ground following Russia’s unilateral recognition and deployment of its troops in both places. Most international observers privately accept that in the foreseeable future there is no chance that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would voluntarily accept Georgia’s sovereignty. Russia is unlikely to withdraw its recognition or its presence from both regions. The real question is whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia could one day accept any form of co-existence with Georgia that does not equate to their full independence.

Therefore, the task of the international community is not simply to repeat the mantra of “territorial integrity,” but to develop a realistic strategy for keeping the door open for future negotiations. This is not a trivial task; it requires honesty, flexibility and strategic vision.

It is important first of all to set the record straight on the war of 2008 — to acknowledge the suffering of all of those caught up in it as well as the unlawful use of force by both Russia and Georgia.

The second step should be to develop a strategy for engagement with communities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that does not involve the recognition of independence. It is clear that no Western state will recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because it has been imposed through Russia’s use of force and in violation of international law. However, it is important to signal that the international community will be ready to recognize a negotiated agreement between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in regard to their future political arrangements, whatever those arrangement might be. This could encourage all parties to return to the negotiating table.

At the same time, the international community should continue to support peace-building activities within Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including sending their students to be educated abroad, economic projects that promote interdependence within the South Caucasus region, and informal dialogues across the conflict divide.

If no such efforts are undertaken, it will be Russia that shapes the attitudes among the future elites in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, in the absence of engagement, there will be no option for promoting conflict transformation through Europeanization, which has been applied with varied degrees of success in the Balkans and in Cyprus.

During his recent trip to the region, the American vice president, Joe Biden, was right to assert that there is no military solution to Georgia’s conflicts. Russia should support this view by reducing its military presence in the conflict zones and by working with other members of the international community to rebuild the path toward peace that was destroyed by last year’s war.

Oksana Antonenko is a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/opinion/14iht-edantonenko.html