From: MSN Nicknamepsychoteddybear24  (Original Message)    Sent: 7/28/2006 2:03 AM
GEORGIA: DUAL POWER OR ROUTINE CONTRADICTIONS? Some Georgian
opposition politicians, and several Russian observers interpreted the
July 21 dismissal of Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi
Khaindrava as a victory for the so-called "party of war" personalized
by Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. They expressed fears that
Okruashvili would soon launch a military offensive against either
South Ossetia or Abkhazia, fears that have been were fueled by the
deployment of Georgian forces to the Kodori Gorge in western Georgia
on July 24-25 to quash an apparent insurrection led former Kodori
Gorge Governor Emzar Kvitsiani. But both Prime Minister Zurab
Noghaideli and parliament speaker Nino Burdjanadze insist that
Georgia remains committed to resolving its conflicts with those two
breakaway regions by exclusively peaceful means.
Khaindrava's dismissal came at a point when tensions
between Russia and Georgia had reached an all-time high in the wake
of the Georgian parliament's demand for the withdrawal of the
Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
conflict zones, a demand that officials in both unrecognized
republics fear may herald a new aggression by Georgian forces. South
Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity commented on July 21 that
Khaindrava's dismissal "will have a big impact" on efforts to
resolve the conflict, while Deputy Prime Minister Boris Chochiyev
interpreted it as a clear indication that "Georgia plans a military
incursion," the independent television channel Rustavi-2 reported. By
contrast, in Sukhum, Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba and
President Sergei Bagapsh both downplayed Khaindrava's dismissal.
Moreover, Khaindrava was widely perceived as the last
remaining "dove" within the Georgian leadership following the
unexpected appointment in early June of Irakli Alasania, President
Mikheil Saakashvili's special representative for the Abkhaz
conflict, as Georgian ambassador to the UN (see "RFE/RL Caucasus
Report," June 30, 2006). Alasania's flexibility and moderate
stance resonated well with the Abkhaz side, and it was largely thanks
to the good working relations he established with leading Abkhaz
officials, Shamba in particular, that the two sides agreed earlier
this year to resume sessions, suspended in January 2002, of the
Coordinating Council established under the aegis of the UN.
Senior Georgian officials were quick to reject speculation
that Khaindrava's departure was intended to remove the last
remaining obstacle to a military solution to the conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Prime Minister Noghaideli told Rustavi-2
on July 22 that the Georgian leadership's commitment to resolving
those conflicts peacefully is unchanged, and parliament speaker
Burdjanadze conveyed the same message on July 24 to the ambassadors
in Tbilisi of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) member states.
Meanwhile, some commentators have suggested alternative, and
less alarming, explanations for Khaindrava's dismissal. One such
explanation centers on Khaindrava's recent criticisms of his two
most powerful cabinet colleagues, Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili
and Okruashvili. Khaindrava made clear his displeasure at the Tbilisi
court verdict handed down on July 6 to four Interior Ministry
staffers found guilty of the January murder of banker Sandro
Girgvliani. Several other senior ministry personnel and
Merabishvili's wife Tako Salakaya quarreled publicly in a Tbilisi
bar with Girgvliani hours before he was found on the outskirts of the
city with his throat cut. Khaindrava commented publicly on July 6
that in Merabishvili's place, he would have resigned. Two weeks
later, Khaindrava clashed publicly with Okruashvili after the latter
praised a military police official who detained a senior Russian
officer traveling through the South Ossetian conflict zone in a
vehicle with diplomatic license plates -- a clear violation of the
Vienna Convention.
Georgian political commentator Paata Zakareishvili offered a
third possible explanation, telling the Russian daily "Nezavisimaya
gazeta" of July 24 that he believes Khaindrava's dismissal was
intended as a warning to the Georgian leadership to demonstrate a
united front in the run-up to local elections scheduled for October
6. Zakareishvili further made the point that the Georgian military
cannot risk an ignominious defeat in either South Ossetia or Abkhazia
in the run-up to the NATO summit in Riga in November at which Tbilisi
hopes to be invited to proceed to an Intensified Dialogue with NATO,
even if no firm invitation to join the alliance is forthcoming at
that event.
There is, however, a fourth, more ominous explanation, namely
that Okruashvili's long-term goals are not confined to restoring
Georgian control over the two breakaway former autonomous regions.
Khaindrava's own assessment of the situation lends credence to
that hypothesis: he was quoted by the "Georgian Times" on July 22 as
saying that his dismissal was part of an attempt "by some figures
who...are undermining the president's power and his foreign
policy to usurp government." He added that that Okruashvili and his
supporters are "trying to seize power" by any means and "want to get
rid of the president in the long run." Saakashvili's failure to
intervene to prevent the operation mounted by Okruashvili and
Merabishvili against Kvitsiani raises the question whether he is
reluctant, for whatever reason, to challenge the two "power"
ministers. (Liz Fuller)